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COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM
Shaanan Cohney,* David Hoffman,**
Jeremy Sklaroff *** & David Wishnick ****
This Article presents the legal literature’s ﬁrst detailed analysis of
the inner workings of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). We characterize the
ICO as an example of ﬁnancial innovation, placing it in kinship with
venture capital contracting, asset securitization, and (obviously) the
IPO. We also take the form seriously as an example of technological
innovation, in which promoters are beginning to effectuate their promises
to investors through computer code, rather than traditional contract.
To understand the dynamics of this shift, we ﬁrst collect contracts,
“whitepapers,” and other disclosures for the ﬁfty top-grossing ICOs of
2017. We then analyze how the software code controlling the projects’
ICOs reﬂected (or failed to reﬂect) their disclosures. Our inquiry reveals
that many ICOs failed even to promise that they would protect investors
against insider self-dealing. Fewer still manifested such promises in code.
Surprisingly, in a community known for espousing a technolibertarian
belief in the power of “trustless trust” built with carefully designed code, a
signiﬁcant fraction of issuers retained centralized control through
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previously undisclosed code permitting modiﬁcation of the entities’
governing structures.
These ﬁndings offer valuable lessons to legal scholars, economists,
and policymakers about the roles played by gatekeepers, the value of
regulation, and the possibilities for socially valuable private ordering in
a relatively anonymous, decentralized environment.
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INTRODUCTION
If you believe what you read on social media, the world of venture
finance is undergoing a sea change. Old institutions like banks and
venture capital ﬁrms are ﬁnding themselves supplanted by masses of
individuals coordinating through new ﬁnancial platforms.1 Excessively
compensated elites are on the outs. They are being replaced—so say the
believers—by equity crowdfunding, peer-to-peer lending, and the wisdom
of the crowd.2 The rise of the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is a chapter in
this story, and this Article’s subject.3
Obviously, the ICO was named after the IPO, or “Initial Public
Offering.” But though the IPO has been familiar for almost a century, the
ICO is exotic. Unlike its namesake, an ICO does not typically involve the
sale of equity in (or governance rights pertaining to) a corporation.4
Instead, ICO participants buy an asset—a “token”—that enables its
holder to use or govern a network that the promoters plan to develop
with the funds raised through the sale.5 It would be as if Coca-Cola had
funded its initial deployment of vending machines through the sale of
tokens its machines might one day require. The token holders’ interests
would have been imperfectly aligned with the interests of investors who
owned shares in Coca-Cola, Inc. Rather than caring about share value,
they would have cared about token value, which would relate to the
supply of the tokens and demand for vended Coke.
For this hypothetical Coca-Cola, it’s easy to imagine physical tokens
and real vending machines. But for ICOs, the tokens and the “machines”
1. See, e.g., Chance Barnett, Trends Show Crowdfunding to Surpass VC After 2016,
Medium: Startup Grind (July 22, 2016), https://medium.com/startup-grind/trends-showcrowdfunding-to-surpass-vc-in-2016-65df924d8a82 [https://perma.cc/2BUP-EDFP] (“[H]igh
growth entrepreneurs . . . have more sources and channels for ﬁnding capital than they’ve
ever had.”).
2. See, e.g., Olav Sorenson, Valentina Assenova, Guan-Cheng Li, Jason Boada & Lee
Fleming, Expanded Innovation Finance via Crowdfunding, 354 Science 1526, 1526 (2016)
(finding that crowdfunding has channeled capital to innovators outside the traditional ambit of
venture capital financing).
3. For an introduction to the law, economics, and sociology of peer-to-peer, networked
culture, see generally Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production
Transforms Markets and Freedom (2006). Finance, too, is entwined with the emerging
networked mode of information production. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology
and Securities Regulation, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 977, 997–1020 (2015); Kathryn Judge, The
Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer Lending and Kickstarter, 50
Wake Forest L. Rev. 603, 613–21 (2015); Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street
2.0, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 202–05 (2012). One goal of this Article is to place questions about
the culture and economics of networked information production on the one hand, and finance
on the other, within a common frame.
4. Here, as elsewhere, this Article makes general claims in the text but acknowledges
exceptions in the footnotes. For instance, ICOs can involve the sale of equity, but it is rare.
See infra note 209.
5. While an ICO can occur after a network has been built, the core practice is to
raise funds predevelopment. See infra sections II.A–.B.
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they operate are digital. They exist on the internet, embodied in software
code. The key forms of software are known as “smart contracts”—
automated, “if-this-then-that” rules that coders can design to govern the
functionality of the digital “crypto” assets sold in ICOs.6
Smart contracts may be digital and automated, but they help structure
real-world relationships. At present, relationships between ICO promoters
and token buyers are quite nebulous.7 Imagine that those Coca-Cola
token investors lacked established legal means to enforce any promises
made by Coca-Cola, Inc., cap the supply of tokens, require the use of
those tokens to buy Coca-Cola from vending machines, limit sales of
Coca-Cola through non-vending-machine channels, or even deploy
machines at all. That scenario roughly captures the state of ICO legal
contracting and governance today. This is a ﬁnancial form ripe for fraud,
and it has allegedly been used to that precise end.8
But fraud also went hand-in-hand with early ﬁnancial markets;9 its
presence settles little about the fate of the ICO form. According to some,
the ICO is an innovative, low-cost method to raise capital and enables a
widened range of potential investors to support the development of new,
software-based enterprises.10 In 2017—the year that ICOs entered popular
6. Smart contracts were ﬁrst introduced by Nick Szabo, who drew inspiration from
the “humble vending machine.” Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on
Public Networks, First Monday (Sept. 1, 1997), https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/
fm/article/view/548/469 [https://perma.cc/KKT6-9PHC].
7. See Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)—What to Know Now and Time-Tested Tips for
Investors, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., http://www.ﬁnra.org/investors/alerts/initial-coinofferings-what-to-know [https://perma.cc/3J2N-MLHN] (last updated Aug. 16, 2018)
(“ICO promoters and issuers may be offering the tokens or coins to investors without
typical disclosures and customer access to documents required by U.S. regulators like the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that help investors make an informed
investment decision.”).
8. Shane Shifflett & Coulter Jones, Buyer Beware: Hundreds of Bitcoin Wannabes
Show Hallmarks of Fraud, Wall St. J. (May 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/buyerbeware-hundreds-of-bitcoin-wannabes-show-hallmarks-of-fraud-1526573115 (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that approximately 20% of ICOs examined by the
authors have red ﬂags, including plagiarism in their whitepapers, false promises of returns,
and fake founder profiles); cf. John M. Griffin & Amin Shams, Is Bitcoin Really Un-tethered? 4
(June 13, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3195066 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that 50% of the rise in Bitcoin price and 64% of rise in
other top cryptocurrency prices between March 2017 and March 2018 can be explained as
the product of timed market manipulation).
9. See, e.g., Ian Klaus, Forging Capitalism: Rogues, Swindlers, Frauds, and the Rise
of Modern Finance 39–47 (2014) (recounting successful trades at the London Stock
Exchange in February 1814 based on falsiﬁed reports of Napoleon’s death).
10. See Nathaniel Popper, Easiest Path to Riches on the Web? An Initial Coin
Offering, N.Y. Times: DealBook (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/
business/dealbook/coin-digital-currency.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Popper, Easiest Path]. Nathaniel Popper, an excellent observer of this market
at its inception, wrote generally on the bitcoin phenomenon before it reached a wide
audience. See Nathaniel Popper, Digital Gold: Bitcoin and the Inside Story of the Misﬁts
and Millionaires Trying to Reinvent Money (2015) [hereinafter Popper, Digital Gold].
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consciousness11—453 ICOs raised an estimated $6.58 billion.12 By July 1,
2018, an additional 684 ICOs had raised an estimated $17.47 billion.13 Yet
only a few months later, ICO project valuations were at fractions of
previous years’ highs, causing some analysts to proclaim a “crypto
winter.”14
Twenty-four billion dollars raised over eighteen months is not chump
change, but Facebook raised sixteen billion dollars in one day with its
2012 IPO.15 Though one might not jump to read an entire law review
article about Facebook’s IPO, an article about the strange world of public
coin offerings may present a more compelling proposition. Indeed, an
inquiry into ICOs could be fascinating even if (perhaps especially if) the
entire ICO market were to dry up tomorrow.
As we aim to show, ICOs have much to teach us about the uneasy
relationships between law and technology in our present moment.16 To
students of capital markets, the interest should be obvious. One basic
question about our new ﬁnancial contracting world is simple: How are

11. See, e.g., Laura Shin, Here’s the Man Who Created ICOs and This Is the New
Token He’s Backing, Forbes (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/
2017/09/21/heres-the-man-who-created-icos-and-this-is-the-new-token-hes-backing/ [https://
perma.cc/Z8K8-462P] (identifying 2017 as the year ICOs became a “runaway trend”).
12. Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2017, CoinSchedule, https://www.coinschedule.com/
stats.html?year=2017 [https://perma.cc/HGB2-MG4P] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). This
Article will later address the difficulties of calculating accurate network values. See infra
note 293. Solely to ease exposition, this Article will generally use market values (in U.S.
dollars) reported by widely used coin-data sites.
13. See Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2018, CoinSchedule, https://www.coinschedule.com/
stats.html?year=2018 [https://perma.cc/39GY-6C23] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (summing
data for months January through June).
14. Charles Bovaird, What Will It Take to Thaw the Crypto Winter?, Forbes (Dec. 13,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cbovaird/2018/12/13/what-will-it-take-to-thaw-thecrypto-winter/ [https://perma.cc/FVY4-TRT3] (“The market for [ICO]s, in particular,
has been hard-hit . . . . Many of the companies that held these token sales in 2017, a time
when the entire market was arguably suffering from ICO mania, have been encountering
serious challenges.”); Samantha Chang, ICO Market Is Dead: Crypto Investor Barry
Silbert, CCN (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/ico-market-is-dead-crypto-investorbarry-silbert/ [https://perma.cc/VS38-5ZT4] (quoting Barry Silbert’s assertion that
“[t]he ICO market is dead—over” (internal quotation marks omitted))
15. See Evelyn M. Rusli & Peter Eavis, Facebook Raises $16 Billion in I.P.O., N.Y.
Times: DealBook (May 17, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/facebookraises-16-billion-in-i-p-o/ [https://perma.cc/V47G-6VJN].
16. We join a nascent literature on this topic. See generally Iris M. Barsan, Legal
Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings, 3 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier [RTDF] 54
(2017); Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 679 (2019) [hereinafter
Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain]; Kevin Werbach, Trust but Verify: Why the Blockchain
Needs the Law, 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 487 (2018) [hereinafter Werbach, Trust but Verify]; Dirk
A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner & Linus Föhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam,
It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators (Univ. du Lux. Law Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 2017-011, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3072298 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting severe disclosure failures in a global and rapidly growing market).
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investors protected from exploitation? 17 For regulators, scholars, and
investors this issue is an increasingly pressing one. As of early 2019,
government agencies at both the federal and state levels have launched
ICO investigations, and multiple ﬁrms have been charged as fraudulent
or criminal enterprises.18 Even blockchain technologists admit that ICOs

17. Cf. Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 Minn.
L. Rev. 561, 587–603 (2015) (describing and dismissing worries that crowdfunding markets
might be dominated by low-quality startups with few ways for investors to distinguish better
ones from the pack).
18. See In re Coinalpha Advisors LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10582, 2018 WL
6433070, at *2 (Dec. 7, 2018) (charging a digital asset investment fund with violation of
Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act); News Release, Colo. Dep’t of Regulatory
Agencies, Two Companies Promoting Cryptocurrencies Under Scrutiny by Colorado
Securities Commissioner 1 (May 3, 2018) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(announcing orders against two ICO teams for potentially violating Colorado securities
laws); Press Release, N. Am. Sec. Admin. Ass’n, NASAA Updates Coordinated Crypto
Crackdown (Aug. 28, 2018), http://www.nasaa.org/45901/nasaa-updates-coordinatedcrypto-crackdown/ [https://perma.cc/4SRN-ENC7] (noting a coordinated enforcement
effort by state regulators against ICOs and cryptoassets, resulting in 200 active
investigations and 46 enforcement actions); Press Release, N.D. Sec. Dep’t, Securities
Commissioner Issues Orders Against 3 More Companies Promoting Initial Coin Offerings
in North Dakota (Oct 11, 2018), http://www.nd.gov/securities/news/news-archive/
securities-commissioner-issues-orders-against-3-more-companies-promoting-initial [https://
perma.cc/8Y2W-PV75] (announcing charges against three ICO teams for “promoting
unregistered and potentially fraudulent securities in North Dakota”); Press Release, SEC,
SEC Charges EtherDelta Founder with Operating an Unregistered Exchange (Nov. 8,
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-258 [https://perma.cc/3ZU9-X747]
(discussing charges against the operator of a cryptoasset exchange that facilitates ICO
token sales); Press Release, SEC, SEC Halts Fraudulent Scheme Involving Unregistered
ICO (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-53 [https://perma.cc/
LZ3N-Q2BG] (announcing the charging of “two co-founders of a purported ﬁnancial
services start-up with orchestrating a fraudulent” ICO “that raised more than $32 million
from thousands of investors last year”); Press Release, SEC, Two Celebrities Charged with
Unlawfully Touting Coin Offerings (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-268 [https://perma.cc/9MFW-QK8B] (discussing charges against music
producer DJ Khaled and boxer Floyd Mayweather Jr. with unlawfully concealing payments
they received for promoting ICO tokens); Press Release, SEC, Two ICO Issuers Settle SEC
Registration Charges, Agree to Register Tokens as Securities (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-264 [https://perma.cc/7BN8-QN29] (discussing
orders entered against the Airfox and Paragon ICO teams for sales of unregistered
securities); Press Release, Tex. State Sec. Bd., $4 Billion Crypto-Promoter Ordered to Halt
Fraudulent Sales (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/4-billioncrypto-promoter-ordered-halt-fraudulent-sales [https://perma.cc/SCN5-F6FC] (noting
that the Texas Securities Commissioner entered an “Emergency Cease and Desist Order to
halt the multiple investment programs operated by BitConnect, an overseas company that
claims a market share of $4.1 billion for its cryptocurrency coins”). For a broader
discussion of legal risks accompanying ICOs, see generally Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright,
Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public
Capital Markets 97 (Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 527, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract_id=3048104 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing risk of fraud and abuse).
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as a form of fundraising suffer credibility problems, as many projects have
still not delivered functional products.19
Less obviously, an understanding of the ICO experience can also
inform debates about the digital future of capitalism.20 ICOs represent the
increasing financialization of internet-based peer production, and they
also reflect the informational ecosystem the internet has wrought. The
legal system’s interactions with these trends are on display in what follows.
This Article is built around a survey of the 50 ICOs that raised the
most capital in 2017 and the role that computer code plays in structuring
them. The presence of a cryptoasset at the heart of an offering enables
entrepreneurs to deliver investor protections through computer code,
rather than through legalistic means. This technological capacity was
central to the ideological and practical case advanced by the
entrepreneurs who engaged in ICOs. In the 2017 market, founders spoke
of automated, “[d]ynamic [c]eiling[s]” for cryptoasset supply;21 of placing
founders’ cryptoasset allocations in “time-locked smart contracts” to
align incentives for productivity;22 and of replacing trusted parties with
decentralized and veriﬁable computation.23 We take an initial look at
examples of smart contract design to establish that code does have the
potential to become either a substitute for or a complement to oldfashioned legal governance in ﬁnancial contracting.
But potential is not “reality,” and this study shows just how far code
falls short of expectations for the top 50 ICOs of 2017. We analyze the
relationship between the “paper” promises made by ICO promoters in
their offering documents and the actual functionality of the digital assets
they deliver. This Article establishes actual functionality by examining the
19. See Bovaird, supra note 14 (“Some have criticized the methods used in these
token sales, which have frequently involved nothing more than . . . [an] idea outlined in a
white paper.”); see also Rocco, Futility Tokens: A Utility-Based Post-Mortem, Token Econ. (Oct.
9, 2018), https://tokeneconomy.co/futility-tokens-a-utility-based-post-mortem-d7b1712a5a4e
[https://perma.cc/2KW2-4V7K] (dissecting ICO tokens offered by various projects and
ﬁnding that many could never have supported their touted functionality while generating
a proﬁt); Nathaniel Whittlemore, Crypto Narrative Watch: Crypto Winter Edition, Token
Econ. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://tokeneconomy.co/crypto-narrative-watch-crypto-winteredition-bf1cf584def2 [https://perma.cc/CAE2-HH38] (noting that many ICO teams
promised their tokens would eventually provide speciﬁc functions, but that such
functionality was still missing as of late 2018).
20. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17
Theoretical Inquiries L. 369, 375 (2016) (“Emerging, nontraditional regulatory models
have tended to be both opaque to external observation and highly prone to capture. New
institutional forms that might ensure their legal and political accountability have been
slow to develop.”).
21. The Status Network: A Strategy Towards Mass Adoption of Ethereum, Status
(June 15, 2017), https://status.im/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z233-EPQT].
22. Terms of Token Sale, Storj Labs (BVI) Ltd. 14, https://storj.io/sale-terms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G37K-97S4] (last updated May 18, 2017).
23. See Protocol Labs, Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network 8 (2017),
https://ﬁlecoin.io/ﬁlecoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL5G-CATU].
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smart contracts associated with each ICO, along with the broader
software environments through which those smart contracts
function.(These are known as “distributed ledgers” or “blockchains,”
which we discuss further below.) Through careful auditing of the gap
between what ICOs promise and what their code delivers, we aim to
present coin offerings at a deeper level of institutional detail than is
currently present in the literature. Indeed, though legal scholars have
begun writing about smart contracts in theory, we are the ﬁrst to take
smart contracts seriously as real-world objects of study.24
We evaluate our sample on three aspects of governance that ICO
proponents have claimed can be delivered through code and which
economic theory suggests should be salient to ICO investors. First, did
ICO promoters make any promises (and encode those assurances) to
restrict the supply of their cryptoassets? Second, did ICO promoters
pledge (and build their promises into smart contracts) to restrict the
transfer of any cryptoassets allocated to insiders according to a vesting or
lock-up plan? Third, did ICO promoters use code to retain the power to
modify the smart contracts governing the tokens they sold, and if so, did
they disclose (in natural language) that they had allocated themselves
that power? Credible commitments regarding these salient cryptoasset
qualities should matter to an investor interested in the economic
fundamentals of an ICO.
Our basic finding is that ICO code and ICO disclosures often do not
match. In a financial ecosystem built around the proposition that regulation
is unnecessary because code is the ﬁnal guarantee of performance, the
absence of coded governance protections is troubling. We also show that
at least some popular ICOs have retained the power to modify their
tokens’ rights but have failed to disclose that ability in plain English.
One takeaway is that no one reads smart contracts,25 making them a
rickety wheel on the ICO investment vehicle. Why might this be, and how
signiﬁcant is it? In evaluating our ﬁndings, we consider a few potential
explanations for the mismatches between code and disclosure that we
observe. We ultimately conclude that while the disjunct is troubling, the
normative implications of our project will turn on learning more about
who buys ICOs and why.26
24. See generally Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 91 (2003) (articulating a research agenda examining contractual artifacts as such).
For two excellent primers on smart contracts, see generally Primavera De Filippi & Aaron
Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code 72–88 (2018); Kevin Werbach &
Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 Duke L.J. 313 (2017).
25. The obvious allusion is to ordinary contractual ﬁne print. Cf. Yannis Bakos,
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?
Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2014) (ﬁnding
vanishingly low reading rates for end-user license agreements).
26. We hasten to add that the ICO is not inherently a scam: Economic theorists have
recently begun developing models that show the potential for cryptoassets to unlock
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We proceed as follows. Part I provides clear and precise deﬁnitions
of various aspects of ICO machinery. It also presents the history of
various components: cryptocurrencies, blockchain-based networks, smart
contracts, and ICO technology. Part II describes the three ways that we
evaluate the quality of an ICO’s paper–code match and offers an
introduction to the mechanisms by which tokens can vouch for quality.
Part III presents the methods of our empirical study. It describes our
sources, collections, coding, and smart contract audit procedures. Part IV
offers evidence that the ICO market does not vet smart contract code for
the qualities we have identiﬁed and offers theories as to why. It also
suggests how researchers could help regulators and lawmakers in better
understanding and overseeing this new business form.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO TOKENS
To set the stage for our analysis of ICO quality—and our premortem
on the current market’s pathologies—this Part presents an operational
account of ICO components and mechanics.
A.

From Debt and Equity to Native Coin

Consider a group of entrepreneurs who want to create a soda company.
Though they have an amazing recipe, they lack sufficient seed capital to
quit their day jobs and market their soda to the world. To access the
traditional capital markets, they might form a corporation and seek a
business loan, or perhaps a few rounds of private venture capital funding.
If successful, they might then choose to issue shares on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). In exchange for payment of a price (in dollars) set by
investment bankers through careful underwriting, the team would part
with shares of its company. The purchasers of those shares would then
possess a bundle of rights to govern the corporation, along with residual
claims on its assets in proportion to the number of shares they own. Once
built, the corporation could charge its customers in dollars, pay its
information and value for investors during the early stages of an entrepreneurial venture.
See Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Initial Coin Offerings and the Value of Crypto
Tokens 2–5 (MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5347-18, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3137213 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Sabrina Howell, Marina Niessner
& David Yermack, Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token
Sales 1 (NBER Working Paper No. 24774, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24774
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Thomas Bourveau, Emmanuel T. De George, Atif
Ellahie & Daniele Macciocchi, Initial Coin Offerings: Early Evidence on the Role of
Disclosure in the Unregulated Crypto Market 5 (July 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193392 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding a
measure of disclosure is correlated with market values). But see Eric Budish, The
Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain 5–11 (NBER Working Paper No. 24717,
2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24717 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(arguing that if bitcoin were an economically important store of value, it would be
hacked).
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employees and suppliers in the same, and then distribute the leftovers to
its shareholders.
The new world of coin-based ﬁnance looks different from this
traditional model. Instead of issuing contractual claims on the assets of a
legal entity (in the form of debt or equity), the team might now issue a
token—call it Colacoin—that it promises will be the only way to buy sodas
from its (yet to be deployed) vending machines.27 The team could also
pledge that possession of Colacoins would enable their holders to vote
on proposed alterations to the vending machine’s prices. Further, they
could even commit to paying suppliers—bottling companies, truckers,
lawyers who work for them—in Colacoin. If, and as long as, the
dehydrated people of the world want access to machine-vended cola,
then Colacoin will hold value. And if Colacoin is easily exchangeable for
dollars, then the nascent company’s truckers and lawyers will not mind
receiving their initial payments in a strange currency. Replace Coca-Cola
with a software-based venture (like a ﬁle-sharing service or a platform for
streaming video), and Colacoin with a cryptoasset, and you have an ICO.
Obviously, the scenarios differ in a few ways. First, they diverge in terms
of how they allocate claims on the entrepreneurs’ business. Traditional
capital markets require business owners to contractually divest themselves
of various rights over their corporation’s assets.28 In contrast, the ICO
method can leave economic ownership and legal control unencumbered.29
Second, they vary in their source of value. While stock prices should
reﬂect the net present value of the legal rights to the company’s expected
future cash ﬂows, 30 cryptoasset pricing should reﬂect an equilibrium
between token demand, which is driven by the present value of expected
future use and exchange options within the token’s native ecosystem, and
token supply, which is driven by the token’s monetary policy.31

27. To users, Colacoin thus resembles the coupons, scrips, airmiles, and other cash
substitutes that merchants have employed throughout the past century and a half. See
Norman I. Silber & Steven Stites, Merchant Authorized Consumer Cash Substitutes 1–2
(Hofstra Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2018-03, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3161453 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). Coca-Cola
offered a coupon redeemable for one glass of soda as early as 1887. See id. at 2.
28. See, e.g., Ivo Welch, Corporate Finance 4–5 (4th ed. 2017) (discussing tradeoffs
between various contractual methods of ﬁnancing).
29. See Balaji S. Srinivasan, Thoughts on Tokens, Earn.com (May 27, 2017),
https://news.earn.com/thoughts-on-tokens-436109aabcbe [https://perma.cc/D7RJ-8DJW].
Clearly, when a token provides rights to purchasers to use a future service, the owner is, in
a sense, encumbered. The effect is similar to an airline being encumbered by its loyal
customers’ airmiles. We mean that tokens do not typically divide the formal rights of
ownership into pieces.
30. See, e.g., Aswath Damodaran, Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for
Determining the Value of Any Asset 11–19 (3d ed. 2012).
31. Work on cryptoasset valuation is in its early stages. See, e.g., Chris Burniske & Jack
Tatar, Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor’s Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond 171–84 (2017)
(suggesting cryptoasset valuation models); Catalini & Gans, supra note 26, at 3–5; Aswath
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Third, the infrastructure of capital markets enables vetting, trading,
and liquidity in established ways. A mighty ediﬁce of regulation and
institutional capital stands behind each issuance: Investors know, or at
least have the tools to inform themselves about, what they are getting. By
contrast, cryptomarkets are new, their players mere years or months old.32
No Wall Street investment bank has backed an ICO.33 Indeed, the absence
of ICO-speciﬁc regulation and intermediaries is seen to be a feature, not
a bug, by many enthusiasts.34
Finally, and perhaps most signiﬁcantly to our lawyer-readers, ICOs
expand the role played by computer code in governing transactional
relationships. Traditional capital-market transactions are heavily mediated
Damodaran, The Bitcoin Boom: Asset, Currency, Commodity, or Collectible?, Musings on
Mkts. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2017/10/the-bitcoinboom-asset-currency.html [https://perma.cc/GXF2-ZTU3] (suggesting that cryptoassets
share characteristics with both currencies and commodities). For recent empirical work on
cryptoasset valuation, see generally Hugo Benedetti & Leonard Kostovetsky, Digital Tulips?
Returns to Investors in Initial Coin Offerings (May 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182169 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that
ICO underpricing is driving by Twitter followers and activity); Bourveau et al., supra note
26 (examining the the effects of disclosures on market quality for ICOs); Jongsub Lee, Tao
Li & Donghwa Shin, The Wisdom of Crowds and Information Cascades in FinTech:
Evidence From Initial Coin Offers (Sept. 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3195877 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that analyst
ratings are associated with increased value); Christian Masiak, Jorn H. Block, Tobias
Masiak, Matthias Neuenkirch & Katja Pielen, The Market Cycles of ICOs, Bitcoin, and
Ether (July 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198694 (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that ICO prices interact with the prices of
bitcoin and ether); Paul Momtaz, Putting Numbers on the Coins: The Pricing and
Performance of Initial Coin Offerings (May 27, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169682 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that
ICOs are systematically underpriced, but that long-term performance is mixed); Lauren
Rhue, Trust Is All You Need: An Empirical Exploration of Initial Coin Offers (ICOs) and
ICO Reputation Scores (May 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3179723 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that reputation scores
from rating sites are not very well correlated with each other or with value, but hype and
internet buzz are correlated with value).
32. See, e.g., Darryn Pollock, How Binance Conquered the Cryptocurrency World with Help
of a Utility Token, Forbes (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrynpollock/
2018/10/08/how-binance-conquered-the-cryptocurrency-world-on-the-back-of-a-utility-token/
[https://perma.cc/FH5P-N29X] (describing the rapid rise of Binance, which was
established in 2017).
33. While venture capitalists have taken cryptoassets into their portfolios, see infra
section IV.B.4, that is not the same as the underwriting function performed by investment
banks in the traditional capital markets. For a model describing when venturers will turn
to traditional capital sources instead of ICOs, see generally Jiri Chod & Evgeny Lyandres, A
Theory of ICOs: Diversiﬁcation, Agency, and Information Failure (July 18, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159528 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
34. See Jesse Powell, Kraken’s Position on Regulation, Kraken (Apr. 22, 2018),
https://blog.kraken.com/post/1561/krakens-position-on-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/X3NCG9AL] (arguing that regulatory action “doesn’t matter to most crypto traders”).
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by laws, regulations, contracts, and social norms.35 ICO transactions augment,
and perhaps replace, those mediators by embedding controls within the
smart contracts through which rules function.36 At the same time, they also
create new roles for lawyers and other legal-adjacent personnel.
The Colacoin clearly would be a far more experimental way to raise
capital for the underlying soda company than through the sale of debt or
equity.37 Yet despite their differences, the scenarios share something at a
particular level of abstraction: The value of debt, equity, and Colacoin
tokens all depend heavily on the success of the entrepreneurial team in
building and attracting customers to the product.
B.

Understanding Cryptoassets

A working conception of ICOs begins with the cryptoassets—the digital
coins and tokens—at the center of the operation. Like a physical coin, a
cryptoasset is scarce and control over it is transferable. But while physical
coins are transmitted hand-to-hand (or hand-to-machine), changes in
control of cryptoassets occur through the networks that host them (via the
transfer of a digital key).38 Indeed, a cryptoasset is nothing more than an
entry in a ledger that specifies that a particular user, identified by a certain
“private key” (essentially, a fancy password) is the sole party able to
exercise a discrete set of powers associated with the ledger entry. While
their private keys might travel hand-to-hand in the physical world, the
actual cryptoasset is destined to remain a mere ledger entry, forever
locked inside its “native” protocol.39
35. Though market fundamentalists might occasionally forget this, it is essential to
any understanding of the contemporary economy. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal, Laws of
Capitalism, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 652 (2014) (reviewing Thomas Piketty, Capital in the
Twenty-First Century (2014)) (“Capitalism is fundamentally a legal ordering: the bargains
at the heart of capitalism are products of law.”); Katherina Pistor, A Legal Theory of
Finance, 41 J. Comp. Econ. 315, 315 (2013) (“[L]aw and ﬁnance are locked into a
dynamic process in which the rules that establish the game are continuously challenged by
new contractual devices, which in turn seek legal vindication.”).
36. This places them in the tradition of code-based controls studied most closely in
the context of intellectual property. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed
Copyright Enforcement, 95 Geo. L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing this in the context of
copyright enforcement).
37. Cryptoasset sales can be viewed as a new strategy for “decoupling” economic
ownership from the control of business ventures that Henry Hu has documented. See
Henry T.C. Hu, Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of
Decoupling and Transparency, 70 Bus. Law. 347, 351, 354–63 (2015).
38. See Rainer Böhme, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman & Tyler Moore, Bitcoin:
Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29 J. Econ. Persp. 213, 213 (2015). Network
communication protocols are the linguistic conventions that enable transmissions of
intelligible information between participants in a network. See generally Andrew S.
Tannenbaum & David J. Wetherall, Computer Networks 29–40, 75–81 (5th ed. 2011).
39. By this we mean that the cryptoasset is never itself transferred. While the record
denoting its ownership may be modiﬁed, the asset is doomed to remain but an abstraction
represented within the ledger on which it originated.
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Cryptoasset history begins with Bitcoin currency and the Bitcoin
ledger (also known as a “blockchain”).40 Prior to their advent, money was
either held in physical form (for example, coins or paper notes) or on
the ledger of a centralized intermediary (for example, bank deposits or
PayPal balances).41 Bitcoin is the ﬁrst signiﬁcant digital currency system
that needs no centralized intermediary to maintain proper books.42 The
key to the ledger’s design—and that of the public blockchain-based
systems in its wake—is how it maintains a trustworthy record of
ownership rights. Rather than being centralized within a single ﬁrm, the
Bitcoin ledger is replicated and distributed across a network of computers
that communicate with each other via the internet.43 These computers
are called “nodes.”44 When a holder of bitcoins distributes a message to
the network’s nodes asking to transmit some bitcoins to another user, the
transactors need not rely on the trustworthiness of any actor in the
system to revise their copy of the ledger appropriately.45 Rather, they rely on
economic incentives and code-based controls that govern the nodes’
behavior to ensure that all copies of the ledger are updated identically.46
The shift toward a broad range of blockchain-based business plans was
realized in another network: Ethereum. The designers of Ethereum
produced a general-purpose computational system that operates through
a public blockchain.47 To perform computations on this decentralized
“world computer,” users must pay a per-function fee of “ether”—a “gas”
charge—which functions as Ethereum’s currency.48 As a result, the value
of ether depends signiﬁcantly on the supply of, and demand for,
40. On the prehistory and history of Bitcoin, see generally Arvind Narayanan & Jeremy
Clark, Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree, ACM Queue (Aug. 29, 2017), https://queue.acm.org/
detail.cfm?ref=rss&id=3136559 [https://perma.cc/ZA6A-BJL9]; Popper, Digital Gold, supra note
10.
41. See Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation 58
(2016) (distinguishing between certiﬁcated and uncertiﬁcated forms of money).
42. See generally De Filippi & Wright, supra note 24, at 61–71; Kevin Werbach,
Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust (2018).
43. See Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller & Steven
Goldfeder, Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies 27–50 (2016); Böhme et al., supra
note 38, at 216.
44. Narayanan et al., supra note 43, at 7–10.
45. See Werbach, Trust but Verify, supra note 16, at 512–13.
46. See id. This reliance on incentives and code-based controls, rather than social
control mechanisms like law and norms, was a central objective of early cryptocurrency
visionaries. See Popper, Digital Gold, supra note 10, at 119–20. But it does not mean that
Bitcoin is necessarily impossible to hack. See Ittay Eyal & Emin Gün Sirer, Majority Is Not
Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable, Comm. ACM, July 2018, at 95, 95.
47. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 24, at 333–35; Rohr & Wright, supra note 18,
at 19.
48. Ethereum Whitepaper: A Next Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized
Application Platform, Github, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper
[https://perma.cc/46KY-4V3W] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). The “gas” charged is proportional
to the complexity of the computation requested. Id.
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computational power active on the Ethereum system. One of the key
reasons for Ethereum’s popularity is its support for snippets of computer
code that interact with the ledger known as smart contracts.49 One can
think of smart contracts as a prewritten set of system-performance rules.
Just as legal contracts govern the allocation of paper money among
transactors, smart contract code governs the transmission of ether, or
other stored assets, among transactors on the Ethereum system.50
To understand how Ethereum works, imagine that you drop a quarter
into a vending machine slot and down falls a can of Coca-Cola. This
“humble” mechanism serves as the inspiration for wide-ranging creativity
on Ethereum, where smart contract engineers write scripts about how the
system will behave in response to various inputs.51 These inputs might
include basic information about where to send ether, and also more
complex information, like data from a weather vane.52 Ether plays the
role of both the vending machine’s quarters and its most important
payload—the Coca-Cola of the system. Indeed, because ether acts as a
decent (if volatile) currency, one can engage in smart contracting that
attempts to mimic paper-age agreements for insurance, 53 escrow, 54 or
even something akin to corporate formation.55
To build increasingly complex and interoperating mechanisms
within Ethereum, its community has begun developing standards—“ﬁll
49. See generally Karen E.C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based
Smart Contracts and the Social Workings of Law, 3 Engaging Sci. Tech. & Soc’y 1 (2017);
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 24; Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart Contracts and
the Cost of Inﬂexibility, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263 (2017).
50. In most ways, calling these code snippets “contracts” is quite misleading, but we
are stuck with the dominant terminology. For careful discussions, see generally J.G. Allen,
Wrapped and Stacked: ‘Smart Contracts’ and the Interaction of Natural and Formal Language,
14 Euro. Rev. Cont. L. 307 (2018); James Grimmelmann, All Smart Contracts Are Ambiguous,
J.L. & Innovation (forthcoming 2019) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
51. It also served as inspiration for Szabo’s initial coinage of the smart contract idea.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
52. That is, some device might transmit readable data to an Ethereum-based smart
contract from the outside world—for instance, a website—via an “oracle.” See Fan Zhang,
Ethan Cecchetti, Kyle Croman, Ari Juels & Elaine Shi, Town Crier: An Authenticated Data
Feed for Smart Contracts, 2016 Proc. 2016 SIGSAC Conf. on Computer & Comm. Security
270, 270; Houman Shadab, What Smart Contracts Need to Learn, Lawbitrage (Sept. 4, 2014),
http://lawbitrage.typepad.com/blog/2014/09/smartcontracts.html [https://perma.cc/H8ADQAG9].
53. See, e.g., AXA Beta, About Us, Fizzy, https://fizzy.axa/en-gb/faq [https://perma.cc/
EG6J-EHQT] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (describing an Ethereum-based flight insurance system).
54. See, e.g., LocalEthereum, How Our Escrow Smart Contract Works, LocalEthereum’s
Blog (Oct. 26, 2017), https://blog.localethereum.com/how-our-escrow-smart-contractworks/ [https://perma.cc/QSM3-Y56C].
55. Attempt is a key word here: The leading example of a quasi-corporate form on the
Ethereum blockchain was a smart contract known as “the DAO,” which failed spectacularly. See
Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, supra note 16, at 697–708 (“The 2016 DAO is a cautionary
tale about the limits of relying on a ‘code is law’ model when (as inevitably happens) gaps in the
nexus of contracts emerge without a legal intervention point on which the law can work.”).
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in the blank” templates that perform agreed-upon functions. One of
those—standard “ERC-20”56—plays a large role in our story. It establishes
a simple template to create (or “mint,” in crypto-lingo) and operate
entirely new cryptoassets within the Ethereum system. This is what the
description of the standard looks like in code:
FIGURE 1: THE ERC-20 INTERFACE57

Creating a new cryptoasset typically requires a minimum of
approximately fifty lines of code and three decision components: the asset’s
name, its ticker symbol, and the number of units—or “tokens”—to mint.

56. See Fabian Vogelsteller & Vitalik Buterin, ERC-20 Token Standard, GitHub,
https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md [https://perma.cc/4GZAEFMP] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). The acronym “ERC” means “Ethereum Request for
Comment.” Chris Dannen, Introducing Ethereum and Solidity: Foundations of Cryptocurrency
and Blockchain Programming for Beginners 106 (2017). The “Request for Comment” is a form of
memorandum used to draft networking protocols and standards, most prominently used by the
Internet Engineering Task Force in designing core internet technologies. See RFC Editor,
Informational RFC 5540: 40 Years of RFCs, Internet Eng’g Task Force (Apr. 7, 2009),
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5540 [https://perma.cc/RS4N-TU8F]. The Ethereum community
has adopted this form of consensus-based standard to develop common design patterns for smart
contracts. See Dannen, supra, at 111.
57. ERC20 Token Standard, Ethereum Wiki, https://theethereum.wiki/w/index.php/
ERC20_Token_Standard [https://perma.cc/8AXZ-LE4X] (last updated Dec. 4, 2018). A
cryptoasset that meets the ERC-20 standard contains a block of code for each of the named
functions and events above. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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ICOs Hit the Bigtime

In 2014, Ethereum raised real money by selling ether to the public.58
The next major ICO was Augur, which concluded in October 2015.59 The
market grew slowly until 2017, when it hit the gas.
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF ICOS BY MONTH60
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58. Ethereum sold tokens directly to the unaccredited public but did not initially
enable a secondary market. See Vitalik Buterin, Launching the Ether Sale, Ethereum Blog
(July 22, 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/launching-the-ether-sale/
[https://perma.cc/PK7W-XBMD] (stating, in the announcement of Ethereum’s ICO, that
ether would be purchasable directly from the Ethereum website but would not
immediately be usable or transferable). Some subsequent token sales have been private
(sometimes called “presales”), see, e.g., Chloe Cornish & Richard Waters, Silicon Valley
Investors Line Up to Back Telegram ICO, Fin. Times (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/790d9506-0175-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review),
but the archetypal version is public—democratized, in the tradition of Kickstarter and
other “peer-to-peer” ﬁnancial platforms. See supra notes 3, 17 and accompanying text.
59. See Augur: Welcome to the Future of Forecasting, ICObench, https://icobench.com/
ico/augur [https://perma.cc/43KA-CNUW] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). Between the
Ethereum ICO, which concluded in September 2014, and the Augur ICO, which
concluded in October 2015, there were several small ICOs that raised under $2 million.
See, e.g., ICOs and Crowdsales: Over $270 Million Raised and Counting, Smith & Crown (Dec. 1,
2016), https://www.smithandcrown.com/icos-crowdsale-history/ [https://perma.cc/M66D-3H2T].
60. This chart was prepared to illustrate general monthly trends in the number of
ICOs launched during the period between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2018. The
data underlying this chart—which excludes the DAO ICO in 2016—were collected from
coinschedule.com as of December 31, 2018. Since December 31, 2018, coinschedule.com
has made some minor classiﬁcation and presentation changes to this data. These
classiﬁcation and presentation changes have resulted in deviations of less than 1% (on a
total basis) from the data presented graphically herein. This holds for both the number of
ICOs in the last three years (Figure 2) and the total amounts raised by ICOs in the last
three years (Figure 3). For the most current data available from coinschedule.com, see Crypto
Token Sales Market Statistics, CoinSchedule, www.coinschedule.com/stats.html [https://
perma.cc/W9T3-AZW9] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
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FIGURE 3: TOTAL RAISED IN THE ICO MARKET BY MONTH61
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As the ICO market exploded so too did regulatory interest in its
activities.62 Such scrutiny is no surprise: ICOs, like many internet-based
phenomena before them, intentionally take place at the regulatory
perimeter.63 They exploit a basic tension between the cross-jurisdictional
and pseudonymous aspects of cryptocurrency transactions on the one
hand and the objectives of regulators on the other.64 The question of just
61. This chart was prepared to illustrate general monthly trends in the total funds
raised by ICOs launched during the period between January 1, 2016, and December 31,
2018. For further discussion of how this data set was obtained, see supra note 60. The
spike in March 2018 represents when the EOS raise was realized in the dataset, though it
occurred continuously before then.
62. See Alex Sunnarborg, The Incoming Wave of ICO Regulation (Yes, It’s Coming),
Coindesk (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/the-incoming-wave-of-ico-regulationyes-its-coming [https://perma.cc/U3GZ-DFVW].
63. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 383, 392–97 (2017) (deﬁning “regulatory entrepreneurship” as a business
activity in which legal uncertainty regarding a core aspect of the business necessitates that
the business attempt to change or shape the law, and noting that “[r]egulatory
entrepreneurship often happens when businesses are built upon new technology”); Tim
Wu, Strategic Law Avoidance Using the Internet: A Short History, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev.
Postscript 7, 7 (2017), https://southerncalifornialawreview.com/2017/03/01/strategiclaw-avoidance-using-the-internet-a-short-history-postscript-response-by-tim-wu/ [https://perma.cc/
P6JS-KTK7] (stating that tech-sector entrepreneurs, starting in the late 1990s and continuing
to the present, have recognized “that the Internet might provide proﬁtable opportunities
at the edges of the legal system”).
64. See, e.g., Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen & Tālis J. Putniņš, Sex, Drugs, and
Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, 33 Rev. Fin.
Stud. (forthcoming 2019) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that
approximately one half of bitcoin transactions are associated with illicit activity).
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how signiﬁcant the demand is for cryptoassets among money launderers
and tax evaders is not one we answer here, but it sits as a backdrop to the
inquiry that follows.
In the traditional IPO context, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and state securities regulators oversee issuer activity
from soup to nuts.65 They mandate registration of securities issuances,
require pages and pages of disclosures over the life cycle of a security,
restrict the trading activities of various parties, and possess myriad
investigation and enforcement powers to effectuate their portfolio of
laws and regulations.66 As of 2018, no similarly clear regime was in place
for ICOs.67 In lieu of the heavily lawyered products of IPO documentation,
the ICO market agreed upon a less formal document known as a
“whitepaper.”68
Like governmental and nonproﬁt whitepapers that seek to exemplify
authoritative subject mastery while gesturing toward collaborative openness,
cryptoasset whitepapers are public documents that describe promoters’
plans for development and solicit community involvement.69 Authoritative
copies are typically available in PDF form on promoters’ websites and are
provided through listing services like coinschedule.com. 70 This makes
whitepapers a transparent form of investor information but obviates the
need for outside vetting before they go live.
Unsurprisingly, the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) is using its authority to combat money laundering and criminal activity
involving cryptoassets. See Letter from Drew Maloney, Assistant Sec’y for Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to the Honorable Ron Wyden, Ranking Member, U.S.
Senate Comm. on Fin. 1 (Feb. 13, 2018), https://coincenter.org/ﬁles/2018-03/ﬁncen-icoletter-march-2018-coin-center.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P6B-K8VD] (stating that “[c]ombating
the abuse of existing and emerging payment systems by illicit financiers”—including various
cryptoasset-based systems—“is a priority issue for FinCEN”).
65. See What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://
perma.cc/75DL-EUXT] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
66. See id.
67. However, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has suggested that “tokens and offerings
that feature and market the potential for proﬁts based on the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others contain the hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.” Initial
Coin Offerings (ICOs), SEC, https://www.sec.gov/ICO [https://perma.cc/835G-LQ8K]
(last updated Feb. 22, 2019); see also Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 2017
WL 7184670, at *1 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter Report of the DAO] (“[T]he Commission
has determined that DAO Tokens are securities under the Securities Act of 1933
(‘Securities Act’) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘Exchange Act’).”).
68. See Barsan, supra note 16, at 54 (“Every ICO starts with a whitepaper, very similar
to a prospectus, that describes the project and the rights given to investors.”).
69. Appendix C contains several examples of language obtained from these whitepapers.
See Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, Coin-Operated
Capitalism—Appendix C: Individual ICO Claims (Apr. 2019), https://columbialawreview.org/
content/coin-operated-capitalism-appendix-c/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Appendix C].
70. See id.
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The legal status of whitepapers (and accompanying tweets, Medium
posts, Reddit comments, and social media buzz) is unclear at best.
Sometimes, whitepapers refer to—and embed—contractual terms and
conditions of sale. 71 In such cases, they provide information about
product attributes, which would function as contractual warranties. In
other cases, they resolutely speak in future tenses, offering difficult-toparse details about what is promised and what is merely aspirational.72
Absent clearly communicated and deﬁned offers, it is unlikely that
buying a token in reliance on such documents constitutes a traditional
contract, though other regimes of consumer protection law (state consumer
Unlawful Trade Practices statutes, false advertising, securities laws) might
ﬁll the regulatory gap.
Beyond the informational environment, ICO issuances also differ
from IPO issuances in terms of where they are traded. While public
equities trade on established secondary markets like the NYSE or NASDAQ,
cryptoassets trade on hundreds of upstart markets, sometimes under
light-to-nonexistent regulation.73 They are located in diverse jurisdictions
and have been embroiled in a range of legal controversies.74
Despite these signiﬁcant divergences between IPOs and ICOs, the
near-identical nomenclature is no mistake. Both entail the issuance of
assets whose value depends on the success of a business venture, and
both are offered to so-called “retail” investors. These essential similarities
in economic function have not been lost on federal securities regulators
in the United States, who lately have begun to apply the wonderfully
medium-agnostic securities laws to regulate ICOs.75 A number of state
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Steven Russolillo & Eun-Young Jeong, Cryptocurrency Exchanges Are Getting
Hacked Because It’s Easy, Wall St. J. (July 18, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whycryptocurrency-exchange-hacks-keep-happening-1531656000 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting that “[r]egulatory gaps” create conditions for widespread hacking);
Kai Sedgwick, The Number of Cryptocurrency Exchanges Has Exploded, Bitcoin.com
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/the-number-of-cryptocurrency-exchanges-hasexploded/ [https://perma.cc/28LB-TYM2] (documenting over 500 exchanges).
74. See, e.g., Matthew Leising, U.S. Regulators Subpoena Crypto Exchange Bitﬁnex,
Tether, Bloomberg (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0130/crypto-exchange-bitfinex-tether-said-to-get-subpoenaed-by-cftc (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); Kosaku Narioka, Court Blocks Payday for Chief of Bankrupt Mt. Gox Bitcoin
Exchange, Wall St. J. (June 25, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/court-blocks-paydayfor-chief-of-bankrupt-mt-gox-bitcoin-exchange-1529929409 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
75. At ﬁrst, the SEC moved gingerly in response to the novelty of the ICO form,
leaving open the question of whether cryptoassets fell into a bona ﬁde statutory and
regulatory gap. Cf. Eric Biber, Sarah E. Light, J.B. Ruhl & James Saltzman, Regulating
Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 Vand. L. Rev.
1561, 1583–84 (2017) (describing the business strategy of exploiting gaps in existing law as
“policy disruption”). In 2017, the SEC took a number of public actions concerning ICOs
that began answering the question. See, e.g., In re Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release
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regulators are also actively policing bad actors in the ICO market.76
Assuming the ICO market matures, these outlier-policing activities
will likely be augmented with broader regulatory schemes aimed at
standardizing disclosures for the mine run of ICOs.77 For that effort to be
successful, it is imperative for policymakers to understand the contours
of ICO transactions, and the institutional environment in which they take
place, in detail. We turn to offering such detail now.
II. SMART CONTRACTS IN THE WILD
This Part seeks to better understand some of the basic economics of
cryptoassets, and the roles that code—speciﬁcally, smart contracts—
might be playing. The central relationship we investigate is that between
“paper” and “code.”78 Ever since the cryptographer (and law graduate)
Nick Szabo ﬁrst introduced the concept of smart contracts, their artisans
have sought to use code to replace and augment traditional institutions
for ensuring performance within transactional relationships. The utopian
ideal is a “grand merger of law and computer security,”79 which might
render the protections offered by the former to be at best superﬂuous.80
That hope is emphatically present in some of the offering and
promotional materials that crypto investors receive. These materials
speak of sales where smart contracts will “stop accepting commitments at

No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf
[https://perma.cc/63QB-6CRB]; Report of the DAO, supra note 67; Complaint at 5–7,
SEC v. Plexcorps, No. 17-CV-7007 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206145.
Prominently, in early 2018, Commissioner Clayton used his bully pulpit to state that “many
promoters of ICOs and cryptocurrencies are not complying with our securities laws.” See
Jean Eaglesham & Paul Vigna, Cryptocurrency Firms Targeted in SEC Probe, Wall St. J.
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-launches-cryptocurrency-probe-1519856266
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
76. See State and Provincial Securities Regulators Conduct Coordinated International
Crypto Crackdown, N. Am. Sec. Admin. Ass’n (May 21, 2018), http://www.nasaa.org/
45121/state-and-provincial-securities-regulators-conduct-coordinated-international-cryptocrackdown-2/ [https://perma.cc/XC7D-WSPY].
77. See, e.g., Shlomit Azgar-Tromoer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks of Investments
in Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities Regulation, 68 Am. U. L. Rev.
69, 104–11 (2018) (“[I]nformational asymmetries in the blockchain territory may warrant
securities regulation.”); Rohr & Wright, supra note 18, at 97 (calling upon the SEC to
establish a regulatory framework that addresses fraud prevention, investor protection, and
capital formation).
78. For the purposes of this Article, “paper” refers to the prose-bound texts of
traditional agreements, offering materials, and promotional copy that accompany ICOs.
These documents live mainly on the internet, but resemble their physical-paper
predecessors in form. Conversely, “code” refers to the blockchains and associated smart
contracts that govern the cryptoassets sold through ICOs.
79. Szabo, supra note 6.
80. Id.
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888,888ETH hard cap,”81 of automated destruction of excess cryptoasset
supply,82 and of “Reserve Tokens . . . locked in a smart contract” according
to predetermined specifications.83 They promise with precision that “new
founders’ tokens [are] distributed pursuant to the launch of an EOSIO
Platform in a smart contract and [that the default EOSIO Software
configuration] releases 100,000,000 of such tokens . . . linearly to Block.one
every second over a period of 10 years.”84 While markets of unsophisticated
investors typically require investor protection laws and intermediaries to
protect against market manipulation,85 the “crypto industry” has “greater
transparency, fewer middle men . . . [and] programmatically enforceable
contracts.”86 That is, this community tries to make concrete the ideological
project of using code to replace the rules of entity governance that law
currently creates.
Practical realities also motivate a turn to code in this space. Even if
the paper surrounding ICOs created legally binding obligations—which
it sometimes will not87—legal rights are only as valuable as their practical
enforceability.88 Because cryptoassets can move freely and pseudonymously
through the internet, it can be difficult to pin them down to particular
jurisdictions.89 And the promoters of many ICOs have set up shop in ways
that make it challenging for U.S. courts and regulators to reach their
assets. 90 Thus, promises that are made in marketing documents and

81. Monaco, Whitepaper, Crypto Rating 8, https://cryptorating.eu/whitepapers/Monaco/
monaco-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/YSB2-GF36] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
82. Monetha, Whitepaper 35–36 (2017), https://ico.monetha.io/Monetha_WP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WE6M-859F].
83. Monaco, supra note 81, at 11.
84. Frequently Asked Questions, EOS, https://eos.io/faq (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
85. See, e.g., 1 Louis Loss, Joel Seligman & Troy Paredes, Fundamentals of Securities
Regulation 4 (7th ed. 2018).
86. Powell, supra note 34.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36, 64–77.
88. But see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2021, 2032 (1996) (discussing cases “when the relevant law announces or signals a change
in social norms unaccompanied by much in the way of enforcement activity”); Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 Stan.
L. Rev. 1269, 1300 (2015) (“In these studies, we found not only that subjects’ intuitions
about contract formation diverge from the legal rules, but that commitment to promissory
obligations is more deeply entrenched than mere legal enforceability.”).
89. See, e.g., Receiver’s Initial Status Report for Receivership Estate of Arisebank at
3–7, SEC v. Arisebank, No. 3:18-cv-0186-M (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2018), ECF No. 53 (detailing
a receiver’s difficulties in recovering cryptoassets).
90. See id.; see also SEC Office of Investor Educ. & Advocacy, SEC Pub. No. 153, Investor
Alert: Ponzi Schemes and Virtual Currency (2013), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/
ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/AKC6-R59V]; David Z. Morris, The Rise of
Cryptocurrency Ponzi Schemes, Atlantic (May 31, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2017/05/cryptocurrency-ponzi-schemes/528624/ [https://perma.cc/FJU7NSYW].
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terms and conditions of sale, even if legally binding, might lack an easy
and practical form of legal remedy.
Given this background, an ICO that promises particular, encodable
governance terms but does not encode them is not delivering on an
archetypal feature of this ﬁnancial form. According to those who argue
the form is novel—so novel as to deny the need for wise intermediaries,
venture capitalist (VC) vetters, and regulators with teeth—it is the
immutable, transparent code that enables (and creates) a trustless but
trusted market. 91 With that foundational, code-centered principle in
mind, we ask the classic question that motivates so much of the law of
ﬁnance and corporate governance: How can investors turn over
productive control of their money to entrepreneurs while also protecting
themselves against exploitation?
This is a timeworn problem. In the old-growth public markets, investors
can rely on disclosure regimes (imperfectly backed by public agency
enforcement) and ﬁduciary rules (imperfectly backed by court
enforcement) to manage risk. In private ﬁrms—ranging from familyowned businesses to VC-backed startups—contracts must generally
suffice. What is new here (if anything) is that the cryptoasset community
proposes a technological solution—the token’s coded rules—to manage
some crucial sources of agency cost.92
One type of bargained-for protection is a constraint on the supply of
the investment asset for sale. In the traditional corporate context, each
share sold to investors provides a legal right to a piece of an enterprise’s
residual assets. In an efficient market, changes to the number of
outstanding shares would affect share price but not ﬁrm value.93 Put
another way, the enterprise’s assets are like a pie, and every newly issued
share makes each slice smaller. Because they want big pieces, early
shareholders seek protection against late-breaking stock issuance. 94
Traditional corporations act through human agents; those humans are
only able to issue as many shares as the corporation’s (amendable) Articles
91. See Kemane Ba, Konduktum - SMT Proposal /Tackling Copyrights/ Voting for “Proof
of Authorship,” Steemit (Jan. 28, 2018), https://steemit.com/utopian-io/@kemane/
konduktum-smt-proposal-tackling-copyrights-voting-for-proof-of-authorship [https://perma.cc/
P7DD-H6G9]; cf. Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, Activism.net,
https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html [https://perma.cc/2WQA-LSM8]
(last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (arguing that “cryptographic protocols” will provide “nearly
perfect assurance against tampering” in the new world of crypto anarchy).
92. For an agency-costs model of the choice between VC and ICO forms, see Chod
and Lyandres, supra note 33, at 14–24.
93. See, e.g., Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution,
15 J. Fin. Econ. 61, 62 (1986) (“Thus with close substitutes, efficient capital markets and
ﬁxed investment policies, the price of any ﬁrm’s shares should be independent of the
number of shares the ﬁrm, or any shareholder, chooses to sell.”).
94. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets
the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev. Econ. Stud.
281, 291–92 (2003).
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of Incorporation allow. 95 Exploitative issuances are deterred by the
common law of ﬁduciary duty.96
Supply constraints matter to cryptoasset investors, as well. Remember,
tokens are not typically claims on the enterprise’s residual assets. 97
Rather, they normally provide investors the right to use or govern the
actual system whose hypothesized construction is funded by their
money.98 Shareholders in Coca-Cola care about the value of their residual
claims on Coca-Cola, Inc.’s assets. But the holders of Colacoin care about
the demand for, and supply of, use-rights to the future system. The
number of use-rights available—in other words, the “money supply” of
circulating tokens—is thus a central determinant of individual token
price.99 The value of a token, like the value of a stock, can be diluted
through new issuance. Just as our Colacoin owners hope that legions of
thirsty people demand vending-machine cola, they also pray that CocaCola will not engage in rampant inﬂation of the token supply. Similarly if
Coca-Cola promises to remove tokens from circulation (so-called ‘burning’),
Colacoin owners would expect the value of their investment to rise.
ICOs, unlike corporations, are not birthed through the ﬁling of
Articles of Incorporation that limit stock issuance. There is no analog to
the ﬁduciary rules, or the Delaware Chancery Court, that govern when
dilution can occur. Cryptoassets are instead created, limited, and used up
according to code controlling the contents of a blockchain.100 Thus, a
purchaser’s protection against wanton inﬂation of supply comes directly
from the cryptoasset code.101 That is not to say that ICO promoters might
not also make soft-law promises about supply—in fact, they often do, and
such promises likely bear on value.102 But when such promises are not
manifest in the code, investors’ ability to enforce constraints will be
limited to their very uncertain ability to sue and recover founders’ assets.
Because ICO project founders can do business entirely over the internet,
they may be hard to ﬁnd and sue. Further, it remains to be seen which
causes of action might be successfully pursued in the ICO context.103

95. See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 8, § 157 (2019).
96. See, e.g., In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 328 (Del. 1993).
97. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29.
99. The supply of tokens might affect a project in other ways, as well. A project with
too few circulating tokens might unnecessarily limit scalability, thereby depressing project
value. This makes the price function for tokens multimodal, a dynamic not present in
pricing shares of stock.
100. See generally De Filippi & Wright, supra note 24.
101. As one group of commentators notes, the Bitcoin blockchain “can be understood
as the ﬁrst widely adopted mechanism to provide absolute scarcity of a money supply.”
Böhme et al., supra note 38, at 215.
102. Bourveau et al., supra note 26, at 19 (using whitepaper promises of soft cap to
predict an increase in price).
103. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
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A second bargained-for protection has to do with the threat that key
members of the entrepreneurial team will walk away from the project.
Investors generally protect against desertion (and motivate exertion)
through a set of carrots and sticks offered to managers. They incentivize
them with equity options—rights that enable managers to share in the
ﬁrms’ future proﬁts—but condition those options’ exercise on
contractual conditions, in other words, vesting.104 Option, lock-up, and
vesting rules attempt to align managers’ incentives with those of the ﬁrm
and are endemic in the early-stage VC ﬁnancing world.105
In ICOs, classic options are quite rare, but token-vesting promises are
common.106 As one project (marketing its vesting promises) wrote, it “is a
governance practice designed to ensure long-term alignment of interests
and is standard for any serious project.”107 Another wrote that “[v]esting is a
must. There are no excuses not to do it. It aligns everyone’s incentives
and ensures that no founder dumps happen.”108
As with promises regarding supply, vesting promises that are coded
are enforced automatically.109 Those merely present in marketing materials
or paper contracts are less likely to be enforceable.110 Uncoded vesting
promises might (or might not) be present in governing documents of
the underlying formal organizations. They likely would be located in the
104. We appreciate that token vesting is different from the traditional equity mode
and that a more precise term might be “lock-up.” We follow the nascent industry
terminology for clarity. See, e.g., Dana Edwards, Criteria for Determining Fair Distribution
in an ICO: The Importance of Vesting to Align Incentives, Steemit (2017),
https://steemit.com/blockchain/@dana-edwards/criteria-for-determining-fair-distribution-inan-ico-the-importance-of-vesting-to-align-incentives?sort=new [https://perma.cc/3X6C-CANT].
105. See, e.g., Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 94, at 292 (“VC ﬁnancings commonly
utilize both founder vesting and non-compete clauses.”)
106. We did not observe any of the tokens in our sample using an options mechanism.
Anecdotally, we are only aware of one project that has used options to facilitate
development: Ripple. See Anna Irrera, U.S. Blockchain Startups R3 and Ripple in Legal
Battle, Reuters (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-r3-ripple-lawsuit/u-sblockchain-startups-r3-and-ripple-in-legal-battle-idUSKCN1BJ27I [https://perma.cc/W64RZ7NR]. Perhaps one reason that options mechanisms are underrepresented is that
appropriate strike prices are hard to determine for tokens. See Editorial Team,
CryptoCurrency Options—An Alternative Way to Trade Crypto, CoinBureau (Aug. 22,
2018), https://www.coinbureau.com/education/cryptocurrency-options/ [https://perma.cc/
ZF94-FBQS] (detailing the volatility of Bitcoin’s strike prices).
107. Bancor, Bancor Network Token (BNT) Contribution & Token Allocation Terms,
Medium (June 5, 2017), https://medium.com/@bancor/bancor-network-token-bnt-contributiontoken-creation-terms-48cc85a63812 [https://perma.cc/VR97-EL2Y].
108. Luis Cuende, Aragon Network Token Sale Terms: Founder Vesting, Simple
Pricing and Distribution, Aragon One Blog (Apr. 21, 2017), https://blog.aragon.one/
aragon-network-token-sale-terms-8998f63a3429 [https://perma.cc/G7X6-7WQC].
109. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
110. As an example, consider NaPoleonX, which changed its vesting mechanism from
six months to a series of four distribution periods halfway through its ICO process. See
Stéphane Ifrah, NaPoleonX Newsletter, NaPoleonX, http://notifications.napoleonx.ai/napoleonxupdate-31/01 [https://perma.cc/S4YA-M9YP] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
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employment contracts of the various managers and founders, but such
contracts probably will not be publicly veriﬁable.
Perhaps to allay this very concern, ICOs often make claims about
their smart contract vesting. For instance, one promises that:
20% of the BMCs will be allocated to the founding Blackmoon
Crypto team and advisors, locked in a smart contract with a 24month vesting period, and six-month cliff. These BMCs won’t be
immediately tradable and will secure the core team members by
ensuring their motivation after the Distribution Period.111
Because promoters focus on it so much, examining how and whether
vesting promises are coded sheds light on how strongly investors should
buy the claim that a project’s key people will not exit with their newly
raised capital.112 That is not to say that failing to code vesting means that
founders are about to abscond: Coded vesting rules are only one way to
protect against looting. However, it is a way that is technically feasible and
consonant with the industry’s ideological claim that law is a poor substitute
for code.
A third and ﬁnal protection against exploitation in ICOland is the
supposition that the initial rights investors receive are not modiﬁable.
Part of the appeal of cryptoassets and smart contracts that operate on
blockchains hinges on their “immutable” nature. Legal contracts contain
ambiguity and permit formal and informal modiﬁcations, but smart
contracts are purportedly drafted in exhaustive, precise code that seems
to set the parties’ obligations permanently.113 Because cryptoassets are
deﬁned by smart contracts, whether those smart contracts are modiﬁable
should profoundly impact price and receive intense investor scrutiny.114
A fully disclosed regime that permitted a token to be modifiable should
have uncertain effects on value. On the one hand, no social enterprise
111. Blockchain Paper, Black Moon Investment Analysis: Blackmoon Crypto, Medium
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://medium.com/@researchpaper/blackmoon-crypto-is-part-of-theblackmoon-financial-group-a-financial-technology-company-founded-56b5a64d88c3 [https://
perma.cc/M3V6-BFBC].
112. The story of a project called Matchpool demonstrates how the absence of coded
vesting rules can result in mischief. Within days of a reported $5.7 million ICO, one founder
departed from the project and wrote that his cofounder, the CEO, had withdrawn 37,500 ether
from the wallet without explanation. See Nick Tomaino (@NTmoney), Twitter (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://twitter.com/NTmoney/status/849755116156600321 [https://perma.cc/RXE2-NNUQ].
113. See Sklaroff, supra note 49, at 291.
114. In fact, to the extent that investors are told to focus on code, they are explicitly
warned that it will be immutable. See, e.g., Catalin Cimpanu, Researchers: Last Year’s ICOs Had
Five Security Vulnerabilities on Average, Bleeping Comput. (June 25, 2018), https://
www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researchers-last-year-s-icos-had-five-security-vulnerabilitieson-average/ [https://perma.cc/DRW3-99RN] (“Once an ICO starts, the contract cannot be
changed and is open to everyone, meaning anyone can view it and look for ﬂaws.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Positive ICO, ICO Projects Contain Five
Security Vulnerabilities on Average, Positive.com Blog (June 25, 2018),
https://blog.positive.com/positive-com-ico-projects-contain-five-security-vulnerabilities-onaverage-a6c6a818d89a [https://perma.cc/A3XC-N4AR])).
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existing over any medium-length time period can have functioning
governance rules immutably ﬁxed at its inception. Human relations,
including ﬁnancial ones, evolve. Imagine a constitution that could never
be amended, or a similar corporate charter.115 Thus, investors told that
every rule of a token ecosystem had been irrevocably ﬁxed at their
creation should (we think) recoil at the coders’ hubris.116 On the other
hand, when one party holds the power to modify formal relations, other
parties bear risk. To the extent that a smart contract deﬁning investors’
rights is mutable at the will of the issuer, investors ought to expect that
the limits of that process would be explained in detail. Consider a fully
modiﬁable Colacoin, for instance. One day the issuer might say that your
coin, which you thought bought you a right to delicious ﬁzzy soda, could
only be used to purchase noncarbonated beverages or could be used to
purchase cola only when you inserted additional ﬁat currency.117 The
“rights” you bought would be notional.
Surprisingly, until July 2018, the crypto industry rarely discussed
modiﬁcation.118 That month, in response to a hack of a popular token, a
handful of prominent cryptocurrency voices sounded the alarm that
several circulating tokens were modiﬁable at will. 119 They were, to
summarize a long Twitter thread, angry. This is not conclusive evidence
that modiﬁability is seen as a negative characteristic of tokens, but it does
suggest that the coded ability to modify a token is not an anodyne fact. In
short: We would expect that if token code is explicitly modiﬁable, that
fact would be disclosed. Similarly, if the token code’s governance
provisions are not modiﬁable, we would expect that the marketing

115. Cf. Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 2
(2006) (suggesting that corporations adopt state-law default terms for their charters in
order to delegate a long-term amendment power to their states of incorporation).
116. See Sklaroff, supra note 49, at 300 (providing instances of that hubris meeting its
just reward).
117. There are parallels between freely modiﬁable tokens and blank check stock,
which gave rise to signiﬁcant concerns immediately before the SEC was chartered. See
generally Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum
Corporation to the Twenty-First Century, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 1033, 1071 (2015) (discussing
Adolf A. Berle Jr. & Gardiner C. Means’ historic critique of “blank check stock” for
permitting board entrenchment).
118. Earlier discussions did exist but were limited to blog posts and commentary
outside of the mainstream. See, e.g., Alan Lu, Solidity DelegateProxy Contracts, Gnosis
(May 17, 2018), https://blog.gnosis.pm/solidity-delegateproxy-contracts-e09957d0f201
[https://perma.cc/ZVN8-6UP8] (“Proxies can enable contract logic to be updatable as
well, so additional business requirements may be implemented after the initial
deployment. Of course, this is a tradeoff: contract users would have to trust that the
contract owner updates the contract in a way that does not violate user expectations.”).
119. See Jackson Palmer (@ummjackson), Twitter (July 9, 2018), https://twitter.com/
ummjackson/status/1016455890294091776 [https://perma.cc/WKG8-WDL9] (identifying that
some tokens “include an ‘upgrade’ capability which also allows them to essentially
upgrade/replace the token contract” and others allow token creators have the “to completely and
centrally pause transfers”).
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documents would explain how, and why, the project can evolve with the
times.
With these three investor-protection ideas in hand, we now will
provide examples of how they are actually accomplished in the real world.
We focus our discussion on Ethereum code. Ethereum nodes operate a
simulated computer called the “Ethereum Virtual Machine” (EVM).120
This simulation runs by using both data and code (smart contracts)
stored on the Ethereum ledger. 121 The smart contracts exist on the
Ethereum ledger in a complex, hard-to-read machine language known as
bytecode.122 But they are most commonly written in an intuitive programming language called Solidity.123 Solidity hides the internal details of the
EVM and the complex machine language that it processes.124 Before being
uploaded to the blockchain, a program called a compiler is used to
translate the Solidity source code into Ethereum bytecode.125 This Article
presents examples in Solidity.
Solidity code contains four major types of entities: variables,
functions, events, and modiﬁers.126
• Variables are the data-storage components of any smart contract
and, in the case of a token’s smart contract, store balances for
each user-address, along with other data required for the smart
contract to operate.127
• Functions describe the rules by which the smart contract
operates, storing discrete chunks of code that perform speciﬁc
tasks.128 Functions are executed (or “called”) by sending a specially
formatted transaction to the Ethereum network.129 Functions are
identiﬁed by a name and a set of parameters (or “arguments”)
that are the inputs to the function.130

120. What Is Ethereum?, Ethereum Homestead Documentation, http://ethdocs.org/
en/latest/introduction/what-is-ethereum.html [https://perma.cc/53WA-DANP] (last visited
Jan. 26, 2019).
121. Id.
122. See Bernard Peh, Solidity Bytecode and Opcode Basics, Medium (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://medium.com/@blockchain101/solidity-bytecode-and-opcode-basics-672e9b1a88c2
[https://perma.cc/ZDB3-BH7P].
123. See id. (“Like many other popular programming languages, Solidity is a high
level programming language.”).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Structure of a Contract, Solidity, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.2/
structure-of-a-contract.html [https://perma.cc/UD2K-3WDZ] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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Events are signals that a smart contract sends to other applications
or smart contracts programmed to receive them.131 They act as a
form of logging.132
Modiﬁers allow a developer to easily restrict the execution of a
function under certain conditions.133 For example, a developer
may restrict the ability to mint new tokens to the smart contract
owner alone.134
FIGURE 4: AN EXAMPLE CODE SNIPPET135

To audit a given cryptoasset, we obtain a copy of the Solidity code
(illustrated above), either from etherscan.io, where developers commonly
upload their smart contract’s Solidity code, or from GitHub, a source
code repository often used as part of the development process.
Etherscan.io replicates the bytecode present on the blockchain but
requires developers to upload Solidity source code for display.136 The site

131. Id.
132. See Contracts, Solidity, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.2/contracts.html
[https://perma.cc/845Q-9DEG] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (“Solidity events give an
abstraction on top of the EVM’s logging functionality.”).
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. The code snippet shows a ﬁctional “addFunds” function that adds funds to the
sender’s account balance. The code can only be executed by the contract owner, as
indicated by the “function modiﬁer.” To execute the function, a user must supply two
parameters: (1) the address of the sender and (2) the amount by which to increase the
account balance—these are commonly known as “arguments.” The operator “+=” then
adds the variable “amount” to the variable “accountBalance[sender]” and then saves that
new value as the variable “accountBalance[sender].”
136. See Contract Verification - Constructor Arguments, Etherscan Support Ctr., https://
etherscancom.freshdesk.com/support/solutions/articles/35000022165-contract-verificationconstructor-arguments [https://perma.cc/2FTU-86WD] (last updated Nov. 21, 2017); What
Is Etherscan?, Etherscan Support Ctr., https://etherscancom.freshdesk.com/support/solutions/
articles/35000022140-what-is-etherscan [https://perma.cc/KD78-SSBS] (last updated Nov. 21,
2017).
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additionally provides a veriﬁcation feature, which allows users to check
that the Solidity code matches the bytecode.137
After obtaining source code, we then examine each function of a
smart contract and manually track the role each line plays. We use code
comments—explanatory lines of human-language text inserted by
developers, which have no computational function—as guides to assist in
identifying developers’ intentions. 138 A typical smart contract in our
sample contains between ﬁve hundred and one thousand lines of code.
We inspect that code, looking for the presence of our three investorprotection attributes.
A.

Supply Promises

1. Minting. — Cryptoassets issued via ICOs are created through a
process known as minting. 139 Recall that the Ethereum blockchain
provides an extremely simple way to mint new cryptoassets through the
ERC-20 standard. 140 But even if they do not conform to the ERC-20

137. See Contract Veriﬁcation - Constructor Arguments, supra note 136. In a few cases,
Etherscan did not affirmatively indicate that the uploaded display code matched the
bytecode. In those cases, we did not separately verify the match.
138. Importantly, our assessment does not constitute a security audit, nor does it
guarantee the correctness of the code. It merely seeks to ascertain the intended purpose
of the various contract components. We leave analyzing the correctness of ICO smart
contracts to others. Source code can be examined along a number of axes, among them
syntax, semantics, and correctness. Syntax refers to the symbolic representation of the
code—the particular sequence of words and numbers that comprise code. See Richard
Paige, Foundations of Tree- and Graph-Based Abstract Syntax in Software Languages:
Syntax, Semantics, and Metaprogramming 87, 87 (Ralf Lämmel ed., 2018). In our case,
this is the set of rules governing the Solidity language. At a higher level of abstraction, the
semantics of code refers to the actual meaning or functionality of a program. Isabelle
Attali, A Primer on Operational Semantics in Software Languages: Syntax, Semantics, and
Metaprogramming, supra, at 241, 241. Therefore, two pieces of code written in different
programming languages can have the same semantics, while differing in syntax. As a
result, semantics is the level at which we attempt to audit the code.
139. See David Hoffman, Penn Wharton Pub. Policy Initiative, Regulating Initial Coin
Offerings (ICOs) 2 n.2 (2018), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/ﬁles/303-a
[https://perma.cc/W5TW-K2AP]. An alternative process, known as mining, is often used
to create cryptoassets, but not for ICOs. See Böhme et al., supra note 38, at 222
(“[B]itcoins are created when a miner successfully solves a mathematical puzzle.”). In
mining, suppliers of computational power receive cryptoassets in exchange for performing
network-critical functions for the blockchains housing the cryptoassets. Id. at 218. Bitcoin
provides an archetypal example of mining. Id. Bitcoin miners devote processing power to
the blockchain, using their computers to solve complex math problems that help verify
transactions. Id. The ﬁrst miner to discover a valid solution can lay claim to the newly
mined bitcoin. Id. For further details, see id. at 215–18.
140. See Hoffman, supra note 139, at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 55–58.
Using instructions found online, we were able to mint our own cryptoasset in twenty
minutes. See maxnachamkin, How to Create Your Own Ethereum Token in an Hour (ERC20 +
Verified), Steemit (July 10, 2017), https://steemit.com/ethereum/@maxnachamkin/How-tocreate-your-own-ethereum-token-in-an-hour-erc20-verified [https://perma.cc/A5U5-RDK7].
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standard, minted assets are typically created by executing relatively simple
code on a blockchain.141
In other words, a minted cryptoasset is created through an act of
founder ﬁat. Billions or trillions of cryptoasset tokens are generated at a
nominal cost reﬂecting fees paid to interact with the respective
blockchain.142 Then the team will typically commence an ICO, transferring
the tokens to investors in private sales or to members of the general
public in mass offerings. The sales are accomplished using smart contracts,
automatically routing the project’s tokens to investors in exchange for
other cryptoassets or, more rarely, for ﬁat currency.
Minting is an essential part of the ICO story. It creates the opportunity
for early-stage blockchain projects to rapidly raise capital without the
formalities required by corporate law and regulation. But it also opens
the door to fraudsters, who can mint and sell tokens based on the
expectation of a given supply schedule, only to mint more than
expected—or to mint a special stash for themselves.
To understand minting, let’s examine an ICO for a cryptoasset called
Kin (ticker symbol: KIN), orchestrated by a company called Kik Interactive
(“Kik”). Kik runs a global messaging platform with approximately 300
million registered users.143 Like other digital communications companies,
it has sought to broaden its business model by turning to blockchain.144
Ultimately the company would like to build a “decentralized ecosystem of
digital services for daily life.”145
If all goes according to plan, Kin will be the currency enabling and
constituting this utopian ecosystem.146 Building on Kik’s previous efforts
to develop in-app loyalty points, Kin is meant to serve as a “transaction
currency” that Kik users can exchange for premium features, like

141. This is not a necessary attribute of minted assets. For a summary of the smart
contract code audited, see infra notes 594 –645.
142. In our sample, some teams minted the full supply of their cryptoasset instantaneously.
Others chose a dynamic supply model, in which supply grew proportionately to the amount of
investment received.
143. Lucas Matney, Kik Already Has Over 6,000 Bots Reaching 300 Million Registered
Users, TechCrunch (May 11, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/11/kik-already-has-over6000-bots-reaching-300-million-registered-users/ [https://perma.cc/GYN7-LAAD].
144. Kik Interactive, Inc., Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem of Digital Services for Daily
Life 3 (2017), https://kinecosystem.org/static/ﬁles/Kin_Whitepaper_V1_English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V3QE-ZHNF] [hereinafter Kik Interactive, Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem]
(advocating for the adoption of blockchain-based networks to facilitate digital ecosystems in
order “to realize Kik’s vision of a sustainable future in online communication and commerce”).
145. Id.
146. See id. at 23 (“Kin will bring to fruition a new era of decentralized community
ownership, enabling a vibrant ecosystem of digital services that power daily life.”).
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membership in “VIP” chat groups with celebrities.147 It will also incentivize
developers to work alongside the project.148
According to its whitepaper, Kik planned to mint ten trillion Kin
tokens, of which one trillion would be put up for sale.149 A blog post from
Kik’s founder and CEO states that 488 billion were sold for $50 million in
a presale arranged with speciﬁc investors and venture capital funds active
in the industry.150 The remaining 512 billion tokens were offered to the
public during the project’s ICO, which ran from September 12–26, 2017.151
Ultimately, the ICO raised $98.8 million for the project, bringing the
total amount raised to almost $150 million when including the private
presale.152
We audited the smart contract code to understand how these supply
promises were accomplished. The cap on the number of tokens available is
indeed coded in the smart contract. In addition, the smart contract
mandates two discrete sale phases, and there are coded limits on how
many tokens could be sold during each. One of these phases is the
project’s ICO, and the other is presumably the private presale.153 Figure 5
illustrates the code’s function.

147. Id. at 5, 13–15. Other proposed premium features include the ability to publish
messages with special visual features or to broadcast “shoutout” messages to large groups.
Id.
148. See id. at 5–6, 19 (describing how a “Kin Rewards Engine” will “create natural
incentives for digital service providers to adopt Kin and become partners in the
ecosystem”).
149. Id. at 21.
150. Ted Livingston, Kin TDE: If You Want to Participate, You *Must* Register by
September 9, 9:00 a.m. ET, Medium (Aug. 29, 2017), https://medium.com/kinfoundation/
kin-tde-if-you-want-to-participate-you-must-register-by-september-9-9-00-a-m-et-2f1304a4aa4b
[https://perma.cc/2RMJ-FREH]; see also Khari Johnson, Kik Raises $50 Million Ahead of
Token Sale for Its Cryptocurrency Kin, VentureBeat (Aug. 29, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/
2017/08/29/kik-raises-50-million-ahead-of-token-sale-for-its-cryptocurrency-kin/ [https://
perma.cc/3DRF-NRZL] (“Presale investors include Blockchain Capital, Pantera Capital,
and Polychain Capital, all well-known blockchain-speciﬁc investment ﬁrms.”).
151. See Khari Johnson, Kik Raises $98 Million in Kin Cryptocurrency Token Sale,
VentureBeat (Sept. 26, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/09/26/kik-raises-98-millionin-kin-cryptocurrency-token-sale/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WU-PAR2] [hereinafter Johnson,
Kik Raises $98 Million]; Kin Token Distribution Event Starts Today, Kik Blog (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.kik.com/blog/kin-token-distribution-event-starts-today/ [https://perma.cc/M7Z6GA7Q].
152. See Johnson, Kik Raises $98 Million, supra note 151. Due to concerns that there
would be insufficient demand to sell the entire ICO stake, Kik ended the sale eight hours
earlier than initially planned, and announced that it would distribute all unsold tokens to
ICO buyers on a pro-rata basis. See u/masrod, Maintaining the Kin Token Structure:
Redistributing Unsold Kin, r/KinFoundation, Reddit (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.reddit.com/
r/KinFoundation/comments/724xg9/maintaining_the_kin_token_structure/ [https://perma.cc/
YU9X-8AZE].
153. To purchase tokens, purchaser addresses must be added to a list of participants by
Kin’s development team. See Livingston, supra note 150.
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FIGURE 5: KIN PROJECT CODE154
Here, the developers hardcode a number of values
for use in later functions.
Here and elsewhere we
removed both variables
and code to better suit our
presentation format, while
retaining key features.
The “create” function is
run each time ether is
transferred to the contract
during the ICO—set at 14
days from creation.

The final function checks
that neither the individual
nor the total caps have
been reached and then
mints and issues to the
sender the appropriate
amount of Kin—stored
within the contract’s ledger.

That is minting. But there are other processes that can alter supply.
2. Increasing Supply. — The full supply of a minted cryptoasset can
be set at the outset of a project, or can ﬂuctuate depending on how
much investment the project receives.155 The circulating supply of the
asset can also ﬂuctuate. For instance, a founding team could retain some
of an initially minted asset supply and use it to inﬂate the circulating
amount in the future.156 Similarly, a team might alter rules governing the
154. Kin (KIN), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/
0x818fc6c2ec5986bc6e2cbf00939d90556ab12ce5#code [https://perma.cc/5CUF-SFC6] (last
visited Feb. 20, 2019).
155. See supra Figure 5 (setting the max tokens in the ﬁrst two lines of code).
156. See, e.g, Brad Garlinghouse, Ripple to Place 55 Billion XRP in Escrow to Ensure
Certainty of Total XRP Supply, Ripple, https://ripple.com/insights/ripple-to-place-55billion-xrp-in-escrow-to-ensure-certainty-into-total-xrp-supply/ [https://perma.cc/8FWS-FP5M]
(last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (explaining Ripple’s decision to place 55 billion XRP into a
“cryptographically-secured escrow account” to secure XRP).
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ICO process to achieve various supply effects. For example, the Kin ICO
smart contract contains code to enforce volume restrictions for individual
purchasers.157 Each address permitted to participate in the sales may only
send a limited amount of ether to the smart contract that disburses KIN
tokens.158 However, these limits could be manually modiﬁed by the smart
contract owner at any time.159
The important point here is that maximum supply of a minted
cryptoasset can be specified and enforced (or not) via the code comprising
the cryptoasset itself. Projects can also contain an absolute cap. But some
cryptoassets lack this feature. For example, there is no absolute cap on
the amount of ether that can be created.160 Indeed, there is heated
debate about whether this is a desirable feature or not.161
Supply caps are a typical part of an ICO’s marketing materials.162 As
one promoter said, “Even if on the last day of distribution Richard
Branson shows up on a resplendent white yacht packed stern to bow with
cash, we wouldn’t be able to sell him any more.”163
3. Decreasing Supply (or “Burning”). — In prototypical blockchains,
cryptoassets circulate like money. Think of Colacoin: If you drop a
Colacoin in a vending machine for a pop, the coin will get picked up by a
Coca-Cola employee, head to the corporate vault, be used in payment for
the vault guard’s salary, and then—maybe after the vault guard goes for a
jog—get dropped back into another vending machine in the system. To
take one example, circulation is the default rule for ether. 164 When

157. See supra Figure 5 (comparing weiAlreadyParticipated, the number of tokens
already purchased, with participationCap, the total amount allowed to be purchased, and
msg.value, which contains the requested purchase amount).
158. See supra Figure 5 (creating a cap on ether received).
159. This structure creates opportunities for the development team to temporarily
increase caps and quietly notify certain favored purchasers, and then reduce the cap once
the additional purchases have been made. See Kin (KIN), supra note 154 (providing
several means to place participants in different tiers with different caps).
160. See Ether, Ethereum, https://www.ethereum.org/ether [https://perma.cc/39TFTDR6] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
161. See Michael Collins, Ethereum Stakeholders Consider Capping the Amount of
Total Ether, Bitrates (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.bitrates.com/news/p/ethereumstakeholders-consider-capping-the-amount-of-total-ether [https://perma.cc/MYY6-BC26]
(discussing proposals to cap the amount of ether). Despite many attempts to impose a
hard cap, there has been no progress. See Vitalik Buterin (@VitalikButerin), Twitter (Apr.
2, 2018), https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/980744740277661696 [https://perma.cc/
Q7SX-SBZF] (describing an April Fool’s joke proposing implementing a currency cap on
ether and therefore demonstrating that there is still no cap). Note that ether supply is in
some ways determined by the economics of mining, a reference to the “ice age” difficulty
bomb. See Collins, supra.
162. See infra Part III & Appendix B.
163. See dennisk82, Polybius Bank (PLBT Tokens), Steemit (July 12, 2017), https://
steemit.com/crypto/@dennisk82/polybius-bank-plbt-tokens [https://perma.cc/TS9B-C2NY].
164. See Ethereum Whitepaper, supra note 48.
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someone pays ether to complete a transaction on the Ethereum
blockchain, its recipient can spend that ether right away.165
But perpetual circulation is not always the fate of a cryptoasset.
Cryptoassets also can be used up, or “burned”—that is, destroyed.166
Burning can play important roles depending on the business model
envisioned by project founders. Some might advertise that the token
could be exchanged for the right to access the completed project. Then,
the exchanged asset would be permanently “burned” upon use. Some
projects described plans to actively buy tokens from holders and then
burn them, creating token price appreciation similar to a stock
buyback.167 In others, only those tokens exchanged for certain features in
the product—for example, tokens paid as fees—are burned. Finally,
burning is used as a mechanism in ICOs, as a way to destroy unsold
supply.
Burning on the Ethereum blockchain takes two forms. The ﬁrst is a
simple transfer of tokens (or ether) to the address of Ethereum’s
“genesis” block,168 consisting of all zeros. As this address has no owner,
the tokens cannot be spent and as such are “burned.” The second is to
use an Ethereum smart contract’s function programmed with the logic to
either delete the ownership record and decrement the total supply
accordingly, or that which destroys the entire smart contract, rendering

165. See id.
166. See Natale M. Ferrara, ‘Token Burning’ and Other Crypto Jargon Simpliﬁed,
Forbes (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eidoo/2017/11/29/token-burningand-other-crypto-jargon-simpliﬁed/ [https://perma.cc/V323-SYF2] (“In its simplest form,
burning a token means making the token permanently unspendable.”).
167. See, e.g., FinShi Capital Crowdsale Whitepaper, FinShi Capital, http://finshi.capital/
whitepaper_ﬁnshi_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEZ9-27WX] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
FinShi’s whitepaper states:
FinShi Capital takes on the obligation of buying back the tokens
through the fund’s proﬁts, thus implementing dividend policy. Once
the fund announces an exit from a portfolio company, there will be
created a queue of investors who applied for selling their tokens back
to the fund. The amount of tokens for buy-back will be announced
together with the exit date. The fund will buy out the tokens within
one month after the exit from a startup. After that the tokens will be
destroyed.
Id. As Professor Tony Casey pointed out to us, the economics of buy-backs are interesting
in that the functional result is to distribute residual proﬁts to nonowners. Presumably, the
organizers have concluded that such commitments, whether or not credible, can result in
a more proﬁtable immediate liquidity event, suggesting that they discount the possibility of
long-term gains.
168. Every entry (“block”) on a blockchain is linked to both the entry following it and
the entry preceding it. However, this cannot apply to the ﬁrst block which has no
antecedent. This block, known as the “genesis block,” is created by computer code
explicitly laying out the contents of the ledger entry. See Genesis Block, Bitcoin Wiki,
https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Genesis_block [https://perma.cc/SDR2-UYH5] (last visited
Jan. 26, 2019).
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any tokens or ether sent to that address inaccessible. The below snippet
shows a characteristic burning function.
FIGURE 6: BURNING CODE169

A smart contract with appropriate code can keep track of burned
tokens, enabling investors to easily audit the current supply.
Not all burning promises are executed so cleanly. Consider, for
instance, Paragon, an ICO that aims to “revolutioniz[e] all things
cannabis with blockchain.”170 Lest you think it’s all a smoky haze (and we
promise that’s the ﬁrst and last joke), the project does have a dedicated
cryptoasset: an ERC-20 token called PRG. The whitepaper speciﬁes that
PRG holders will be able to interact with all of the project’s many
initiatives; holders will be able to vote on real estate investments,171 guide
project governance decisions,172 purchase access to coworking services,173
and exchange tokens for local currency in cannabis-unfriendly
jurisdictions.174
169. The burning code checks that the user has a sufficient balance of tokens, reduces
their account balance and total supply by the request amount, and notiﬁes interested
parties through the “Burn” event. See Create Your Own Crypto-Currency with Ethereum,
Ethereum, https://www.ethereum.org/token [https://perma.cc/NC6X-NED2] (last
visited Feb, 21, 2019).
170. Paragon, Whitepaper Version 1.0, at 1 (2017), https://paragoncoin.com/
whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K5W-9SWH]. “All things” is not really an exaggeration;
the whitepaper discusses plans to streamline operations for cannabis growers and
dispensaries, purchase and operate coworking spaces for cannabis startups, and engage in
widespread prolegalization advocacy. Id. The whitepaper describes a ParagonSpace, a
Paragon Accelerator, an “immutable ledger for all industry related data.” Id. at 8. Of
course, all of these efforts are powered by cryptoassets and smart contracts.
171. See id. at 21.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 17–18.
174. See id. at 12. Ultimately, the SEC focused on these promises when it brought a
cease-and-desist action against the Paragon team for selling unregistered securities. See In
re Paragon Coin, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10574, 2018 WL 6017663, at *4 (Nov. 16,
2018) (noting that “Paragon and its agents . . . emphasized that the company would build
an ‘ecosystem’ in a way that would cause PRG tokens to rise in value”). This has been one
of the highest-proﬁle enforcement actions against ICO teams; many have suggested that it
was the nail in the coffin for the 2017–2018 ICO market. See Nikhilesh De, After Friday’s
SEC Actions, Experts Say ICO Party ‘Is Truly Over,’ CoinDesk (Nov. 17, 2018),
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In addition to these promises about governance, Paragon promised
that any unsold tokens from the private or public sale would be burned.175
And it describes a transaction fee system whereby “[a]ll fees on the
Paragon ecosystem” incur a $0.000000005 charge (that’s ﬁve billionths of
a dollar), half of which is burned and half of which replenishes the
project’s PRG reserve.176
We can perceive only a small part of this complex set of rules in the
code.177 PRG’s smart contract code does limit issuance to 200 trillion
tokens. This is captured in Figure 7 below.
FIGURE 7: PARAGON SUPPLY CODE178

The code that is unique
to PRG consists mostly
of variables specifying
the name of the token
and quantity of tokens
available.

We also veriﬁed that Paragon contains code allowing users to burn a
portion of their tokens. This is captured in Figure 8 below.

https://www.coindesk.com/after-fridays-sec-actions-experts-say-ico-party-is-truly-over
[https://perma.cc/F94J-BA6K] (suggesting that due to enforcement actions against
Paragon and other ICO projects, “the party is truly over”).
175. See Paragon, supra note 170, at 14.
176. Id. at 32. Finally, the whitepaper describes a process for stabilizing the price of
PRG by selling or buying back tokens. This suggests that the team can unilaterally change
the number of tokens in circulation when it deems that that there is “severe price
volatility” or “excessive sell volume,” making it difficult for investors to value tokens ex
ante. Id. at 31. The project does claim that Reserve Funds “cannot be . . . distributed to
employees or investors,” and that insiders are restricted from trading PRG following a
purchase or sale by the Fund, though there is no enforcement mechanism speciﬁed. Id.
177. The Paragon code repository contains what appears to be a third-party audit
certiﬁcation by ABDK Consulting, a blockchain services consultancy. The certiﬁcate claims
that the auditors have inspected the code and “the code does not contain any major ﬂaws
that would prevent a secure and proper interaction with this contract.” Mikhail Vladimirov
& Dmitry Khovratovich, ABDK, ParagonCoin Token Contract: Final Report, Github (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://github.com/paragon-coin/token/blob/master/ParagonCoinTokenContractFinalReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QNC3-QBFY]. The auditors also noted that “the contract charges a fee . . .
which should be made clear.” Id.
178. Paragon (PRG), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/
0x7728dFEF5aBd468669EB7f9b48A7f70a501eD29D#code [https://perma.cc/F58F-M3G4] (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019).
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FIGURE 8: PARAGON COIN BURNING CODE179

PRG here provides a
facility for burning
tokens in a manner
that
registers
a
decrease in the token
supply.

However, we modeled the transaction fee system described in the
paper and discovered troubling implications for supply. Following the
creation of the smart contract, each transfer of a PRG token consumes
approximately one-six-billionth of the total supply in transfer fees, half of
which is paid to the owner of the PRG smart contract and half of which is
burned. After a sufficient number of transactions the fee approaches the
number of tokens remaining in the supply, causing the eventual demise
of the network. This is captured in Figure 9 below.
FIGURE 9: PARAGON FEE CODE180
Each PRG transactions is
accompanied by a token
fee of supply * 5 * 10 -33 +
2500.
Half of these tokens are
permanently removed from
the supply, and half are
distributed to the owner.
Eventually, this leads to a
complete depletion of the
token supply.

B.

Vesting Promises

If supply controls protect against the threat of dilution, vesting
mechanisms protect against the threat of desertion.181 They work either
by delaying when the founder is granted assets or deferring the moment
of their liquidity. 182 A smart contract usually provides for vesting by
allocating a portion of minted tokens to insiders but then locking them

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Kin (KIN), supra note 154 (granting assets that vest periodically over
different periods).
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up until some condition is satisﬁed.183 The code prohibits the transfer,
sale, or use of the tokens until the condition’s trip-wire is hit.184 Most
ICO-coded vesting is time-based, with few of the contractual conditions
that come with stock vesting offline.185
Let’s return to Kik and examine its vesting promises. In its marketing
documents, Kik made fairly speciﬁc, detailed promises about token
vesting. Of the ten trillion total Kin created, Kik’s whitepaper claimed that
thirty percent would be allocated to Kik in exchange for its “startup
resources, technology, and a covenant to integrate with the Kin
cryptocurrency and brand.”186 This stake would be subject to a vesting
schedule that released ten percent every quarter, for ten quarters.187
Further, sixty percent of the initial Kin was allocated to the Kin
Foundation, the entity that is meant to gradually take control of the
project.188 This stake vests according to its own schedule.189 A total of
0.061% of this stake will be released into circulation daily, or roughly
twenty percent per year. 190 Kik even released a separate whitepaper
detailing the vesting dynamics for the Foundation stake, specifying, for
example, that the unvested portion of this stake will be around 4.6
trillion Kin on March 12, 2019.191
183. See, e.g., StatusNetwork (SNT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/
address/0x744d70fdbe2ba4cf95131626614a1763df805b9e#code [https://perma.cc/FG4XDRXM] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (granting tokens to a holding wallet where they are
collectable after they vest).
184. The team could always choose to mint new tokens not subject to the vesting
condition and claim that the project will eventually accept both kinds of tokens.
185. There are, of course, outliers. Aragon, an Ethereum-based platform for building
and managing decentralized organizations, claimed that its ERC-20 tokens will provide
holders with governance rights. See Aragon Network Whitepaper, Github (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper/blob/master/README.md [https://perma.cc/J72VDY2V] (suggesting that token holders will be able to vote on issues like network upgrades,
dispute resolution, monetary policy, and ﬁscal policy). Importantly, these governance
features are only activated upon execution of a multisignature smart contract by holders
instructed not to execute until the product launches. See Luis Cuende & Aragon,
Introducing the Aragon Community Multisig, Aragon: Project Blog (May 15, 2017),
https://blog.aragon.one/introducing-the-aragon-community-multisig-348a69d16374 [https://
perma.cc/K8QM-63U2].
In our audit, we were unable to conﬁrm that ANT tokens contain these latent
governance rights. Rather, we discovered that governance features will be introduced
through a future distribution of tokens which themselves will have the promised features.
186. Kik Interactive, Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem, supra note 144, at 21.
187. Id. at 21–22.
188. Id. at 19.
189. See id. at 21. These tokens are allocated to fund the Kin Rewards Engine. See
supra note 148 and accompanying text. Since the number of tokens being placed in
circulation decreases over time, this feature also creates inﬂation for the token. Kik
Interactive, Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem, supra note 144, at 22.
190. Kik Interactive, Inc., Kin Rewards Engine 5 (2017), https://kinecosystem.org/static/
ﬁles/Kin_Rewards_Engine_RFC.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNG9-TNCF] .
191. 4,601,252,295,287 Kin to be exact. Id. This is assuming a January 1, 2018, start date. Id.
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FIGURE 10: KIN ALLOCATION CODE192

This container variable
is used to hold values
pertaining to a specific
grant.

This excerpt shows the
hard-coded allocation
of two grants—60% of
the token supply to the
Kin Foundation, and
30% to the Kik project.

The project implemented some of these promises in the code. The
Kin smart contract creates vesting by maintaining a database of grants
with a start date, end date, cliff, and installment length.193 Grants are
both creatable and revocable by the smart contract owner.194 No more
than 100 grants may ever be created and no address may receive a grant
twice.195 Every grant we have seen so far has a hardcoded cliff of one year,
with two installments, one of which must be executed by the owner of the
smart contract and on which is executed by the vesting trustee.196
When the Kin ICO commenced, the developers created two new
grants. One corresponds to Kik’s thirty percent stake and faithfully
implements the ten percent per quarter vesting schedule described in
the whitepaper.197 Interestingly, the development team manually added a
comment to the code showing that the address owning the stake belongs
to Kik.198 This suggests that Kik may have believed there would be at least
some investor scrutiny over the technical governance features of its
project.
The second grant corresponds to the sixty percent Foundation stake.
We were unable to locate code for any of the highly detailed vesting
mechanisms described in the whitepaper. We did observe that this grant
is wholly controlled by the owner of a vesting trustee smart contract. Of
course, offline ownership of that smart contract—the legal person within
the Kin or Kik organization that actually receives the unlocked tokens—is
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Kin (KIN), supra note 154.
See supra Figure 10.
See Kin (KIN), supra note 154.
See id.
See id.
See supra Figure 10.
See id.
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not hardcoded into the Kin token code itself. It’s simply bestowed on
whoever has the private keys for that smart contract. In other words,
there’s nothing about the token code that enforces separate ownership of
Kik’s stake and the Foundation’s. Instead, it depends entirely on the
offline governance features of the project, enforced using traditional
tools like corporate charters and bylaws (or not at all).
C.

Modiﬁability

Beyond the speciﬁc protections against inﬂation of supply and
desertion by key people, the promise of cryptoassets has also rested on
the idea that investors are protected by the immutability of blockchain
code. As we noted above, lawyers might well think of this as a wacky idea.
And sure enough, immutability has indeed gone by the wayside for a
number of ICO projects. Disclosure of what we refer to as “modiﬁability”
is another matter. Though some token teams do advertise that tokens
may provide new rights in the future, they do not explain that modification
is a way to change any aspect of the token, not just activate valuable new
features. And yet, as we will see, modiﬁcation is built into the design of
some ICO systems. How does this work?199
In the simplest setting, a developer can simply copy the contents of
the data stored in a smart contract, and create a new smart contract,
prepopulated with the data from the former. While those who owned
tokens in the context of the original contract also own tokens in the new
smart contract, the developer is free to create new code controlling the
behavior of the latter. More concretely, an issuer may refuse to honor the
original token when they ﬁnally complete development of the product
the ICO was designed to fund.
This can be accomplished using two sets of rules: a primary smart
contract with which users interact and a series of secondary smart contracts
whose code is incorporated by reference.200 Our lawyerly audience can
think of the typical relationship between a website’s Terms of Service and
its Privacy Policy: The former usually contains a link to the latter, and
purports to bind visitors to both.201 Or, think of a public law that points
to a private standard, like a city code that adopts LEED green-building

199. See infra notes 200, 204–215 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Blackmoon Crypto Token (BMC), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://
etherscan.io/address/0xdf6ef343350780bf8c3410bf062e0c015b1dd671#code [https://perma.cc/
8CX2-QJ64] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). A second approach to modiﬁcation ensures the
simultaneous removal of tokens from an existing contract and addition of equivalent tokens
in a new contract. Users can upgrade to the new contract by manually calling a function in
the old contract.
201. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 1635,
1636 (2011) (“The social networking site [Facebook] has a Terms of Use Agreement with
a section titled ‘privacy.’ The agreement references Facebook’s privacy policy, a separate
document.”).

2019]

COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM

631

standards.202 The standard can be updated privately, thereby modifying
the effect of public law.203
A similar “pointing” mechanism enables the modification of cryptoasset
smart contracts. All tokens using this method share identical code. The
primary smart contract stores for each user the address of a secondary
smart contract, containing the most recent set of accepted
modiﬁcations.204 The owner of the primary smart contract can modify
the code by proposing a new secondary address, deﬁning the smart
contract whose terms will be incorporated. In one example we found
(Monaco), the code gave users three days to opt in or out before the
modiﬁcation spread. When a user opts out, her current secondary smart
contract address is frozen until the next time they explicitly opt in. The
default state of all users is opt in, as illustrated below.205
FIGURE 11: MONACO MODIFICATION CODE206

202. See Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED: Municipal Adoption of
Private Green Building Standards, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 285, 289 (2010).
203. See id. at 303–07 (describing the process by which LEED certiﬁcation standards
are updated). This practice is, needless to say, controversial. See Nina Mendelson, Private
Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards,
112 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 748 (2014) (“[D]ecisions to incorporate private standards into the
law . . . represent a potentially injurious public message that is inconsistent with core
democratic values.”); Schindler, supra note 202, at 316 (describing the advantages of
standards developed in a public system, while recognizing the benefits private regulatory
standards provide).
204. When a user executes a contract function, the primary contract checks the
reference stored for the user and executes the incorporated code stored on the secondary
contract.
205. Code for some tokens with modiﬁable contracts contained copyright notiﬁcations
in the comments attributing the source to Ambisafe. See, e.g., Polybius (PLBT), Contract Code,
Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x0affa06e7fbe5bc9a764c979aa66e8256a631f02#code
[https://perma.cc/K66Y-9A26] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
206. This snippet illustrates the opt-in process in the Monaco contract. The user’s
account balance and total supply are decreased by the requested amount, the old contract
runs a function on the new contract requesting that the tokens be “transferred,” and finally,
interested parties are notified via the “Upgrade” event. See Monaco (MCO), Contract Code,
Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xb04cfa8a26d602fb50232cee0daf29060264e04b#code
[https://perma.cc/FR29-3D54] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
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The Polybius project provides another example. It is a proposed
“fully digital bank accessible everywhere at any time . . . with a very
efficient cost/revenue ratio.”207 Eventually, Polybius plans to “grow into
your daily servicer and companion ecosystem . . . enabl[ing] secure and
seamless connections between life and the things we love and use every
day.” 208 Investors contributing to the project can supposedly expect
“higher returns” than those investing in traditional banks.209
The development team did make some limited claims about smart
contract modiﬁcation. The token purchase agreement explicitly states
that “Polybius shall procure that the Smart Contract is modiﬁed and/or
amended via an additional smart contract” to activate tokenholder
voting.210 It further speciﬁes that the voting mechanism will enable the
development team to propose changes to project smart contracts and to
implement the changes if they receive two-thirds of tokenholder votes.211
There are no further details.
However, we found modiﬁability functions in the smart contract
code that extended well beyond changes to tokenholder voting rules, as
Figure 12 details.

207. Polybius, Polybius Prospectus 1 [hereinafter Polybius Prospectus] (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
208. Id. at 2.
209. Id. at 1. The ﬁrst step in this project was the sale of Polybius tokens (PLBT) to
raise money for the Polybius Foundation. Id. at 3. PLBT gives holders rights more
traditionally associated with stock or other forms of ownership. Id. It promises that holders
will have the “right to receive a part of distributable proﬁts of Polybius P.I. or Polybius
Bank. All tokens in aggregate will have the right to receive 20% of such proﬁts.” Id. at 3.
Note that this makes it highly likely that PLBT are securities. The prospectus recognizes as
much, placing the following note at the bottom of each page:
The tokens have not been and will not be registered under the United
States Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and
may not be offered or sold in the United States or to or for the beneﬁt
of US persons (as deﬁned in Regulation S under the Securities Act)
unless they are so registered, or an exemption from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act is available. One such exemption
allows the resale of tokens purchased for their own account and for
investment purposes only by investors who (i) are not otherwise
affiliated with the Polybius Foundation, (ii) have been exposed for some
time to the economic risks that ownership of tokens entails, and (iii) are
not part of the distribution of the tokens.
Id. at 1.
210. Polybius Crowdfunding Terms & Conditions, Polybius, https://polybius.io/media/
terms_and_conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7XZ-Y5HM] [hereinafter Polybius Crowdfunding
Terms & Conditions] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
211. See id.
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FIGURE 12: POLYBIUS MODIFICATION CODE212

This function allows
the contract to select
the appropriate operative code for the user.

Here, the user can
opt out of future
contract updates.

The contract owner
calls this function to
confirm an update.
This will succeed only if
three days have passed
since the modification
was proposed.

This transfer code
first obtains the code
relevant to the current
user using “getAsset.”

Through this code, Polybius can propose modiﬁcations by deploying
an entirely new secondary smart contract and linking it to the primary
smart contract via the commitUpgrade function.213 The primary smart
contract does not allow the owner to make modiﬁcations directly—the
owner must ﬁrst propose the upgrade, which only takes effect after three

212. Polybius (PLBT), supra note 205.
213. See supra Figure 12.
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days unless the user opts out. 214 In terms that legal readers will be
familiar with, it is a “sticky default.”215
Using these mechanisms, a development team can unilaterally change
the tokens purchased by investors—or sometimes, propose changes that
will be adopted if a certain percentage of users do not object.216 Unless
investors scrutinize both the potential for their tokens to be unilaterally
modiﬁed, and the substantive terms of the modiﬁcations actually
proposed, they are unlikely to discipline hasty or abusive changes. As we
describe in Part IV, investors hardly pay attention to even simple
nontechnical markers of quality. It is thus incredibly unlikely that they
have the technical skills to monitor a development team’s use of
modiﬁcation.
III. A SURVEY OF ICOS
Having identiﬁed three salient attributes of ICO governance, we now
attempt to step back to look at a larger set of issuances to see how (and
if) they dealt with governance issues. We reviewed the ﬁfty largest 2017
ICOs by amount raised in dollars. 217 For each listed promotion, we
scrutinized the whitepapers, token sale agreements, and computer code
posted by the promoters. Appendix C pulls quotes about supply, burning,
vesting, and modiﬁcation (if they are available) from the issuers’ public
statements.218 We compared those promises, read by investors, with what
we discerned from close examination of software code. Our approach is
empirical, but obviously neither comprehensive nor representative of all
2017 ICOs.

214. See supra Figure 12.
215. For the classic initial treatment, see generally Omri Ben-Shahar & John E. Pottow,
On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 651 (2006).
216. It is similar to a reverse collective action clause. See generally W. Mark C.
Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 52 Va. J. Int’l
L. 51, 52–55 (2013).
217. As discussed in section IV.B below, there are major challenges involved in
sourcing even the most basic information about this market. Finding a list of the largest
ICOs is one such example. The amount of funds raised in ICOs are self-reported and
listing sites rarely scrutinize their own ﬁgures. Further, there are omissions of important
ICOs and other discrepancies across the various listing sites. We essentially used a list of
the top ﬁfty 2017 ICOs compiled by Coinschedule, with three notable exceptions. The site
omits the Grid+ ICO, which raised about $38.5 million in its presale and ICO, as well as
Tron, a controversial project that raised $70 million in its presale and ICO. See infra
Figure 13 (summarizing ICOs and amounts raised). These projects would both be within
the top thirty of our sample, so we manually added them to our list. Additionally, we
omitted one project that was listed by Coinschedule. Sonm, which apparently raised $42
million, does not have an accessible original whitepaper. This made it impossible to
determine its claims about token functionality.
218. See generally Appendix C, supra note 69.
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The Scene from 50,000 Feet

The ﬁfty ﬁrms we studied were reported to have raised a total of
approximately $2.6 billion at their ICOs and the notional initial market
cap was $7.0 billion.219 In the sample, nineteen were headquartered in the
United States, six in Singapore, and the remaining in a variety of countries,
including Switzerland (ﬁve), England (two), China (two), Estonia (two),
and Thailand (two).220 By January 2019, eleven of the projects had not
released any kind of alpha version or demo of their project.221
Our approach to auditing is limited: We try to take the position of a
sophisticated, but time-constrained, investor. Consider, again, Polybius.
Its whitepaper makes several claims that would lead us to expect certain
features directly coded into tokens or other smart contracts. The most
striking example is the team’s promise that “according to the conditions
of the ICO, payouts to tokenholders are directly connected to the
earnings of the Polybius project.”222 The team goes on to specify a range
of offline activities that will support payment of the dividend, like
preparation of audited ﬁnancial statements, and tells readers to expect
dividend payments in Ethereum.223
Beyond ERC-20 compliance and the presence of a modification
feature, we did not verify that any of these features are present, largely
because Polybius’s coded governance exists in bytecode (which, as you
will recall, is the Ethereum machine language). Without spending a
large sum of money purchasing the time and know-how of a very
motivated and talented reverse engineer, an investor would have to rely

219. See infra Appendix A.
220. See infra Appendix A.
221. See infra Appendix A.
222. satoshi092, What Are Polybius Tokens and Why Should They Be in Every CryptoInvestor’s Portfolio?, Steemit (Aug. 9, 2017) https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@satoshi092/
what-are-polybius-tokens-and-why-should-they-be-in-every-crypto-investor-s-portfolio [https://
perma.cc/4XBK-2CPJ]; see also Polybius Prospectus, supra note 207, at 6 (noting that
moneys raised will be used “mainly, but not exclusively on acquisition of licenses, building
out the systems, hiring the team and marketing”).
223. See Polybius, Polybius Token Whitepaper 4 (2017), https://polybius.io/media/
token_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV8L-VBXE]; see also Polybius Crowdfunding Terms &
Conditions, supra note 210 (“‘Smart Contract’ means the Ethereum smart contract made for
Polybius . . . and is the mechanism of the distribution of Payouts to the Token holders as
described in the Token Whitepaper.”). There was ample mention of dividends in the terms
and conditions that governed token purchases, which calls the dividends “Payouts.”
Polybius Crowdfunding Terms & Conditions, supra note 210. That old-fashioned contract
speciﬁes that token holders are “eligible for obtaining Payouts according to their stakes”
and that the token code is “the mechanism of the distribution of Payouts.” Id. It even
provides ways to adjust the Payout calculation in the event that Polybius repurchases and
burns some circulating tokens, or to account for dilution if Polybius receives new equity
ﬁnancing. Id.
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on vernacular promises.224 Below is an excerpt of what the public-facing
code (incorporated by reference) looks like.
FIGURE 13: POLYBIUS BYTECODE 225

This shows that it is not merely the case that the investment depends
on the development team’s decision to actually build the products it
hypes in its whitepaper.226 Investors must also have faith—either that
ordinary contract law litigation will back up old-fashioned terms of use,
or that the bytecode, which essentially no one can or will parse, renders
those promises operable.
Putting unauditable smart contracts to one side, here are the results
of our analysis, which compares the software to promises made in
whitepapers, blog posts, and websites marketed to investors.
B.

Supply Promises: Scarcity and Burning

We begin with promises regarding supply. Of the ﬁfty tokens, we
audited the code of forty-five (four remain in bytecode or in proxy
contracts, and one, FileCoin, has not released any code or token). We
dropped projects without auditable code from our analysis. Figure 14
illustrates how such ﬁrms approached supply scarcity commitments.
224. Analyzing bytecode involves tracing both the low-level ﬂows of data and
arithmetic in order to reconstruct a contract’s logic. It requires meticulous attention to
each individual machine operation, and a memory to retain the state of the virtual
machine at each step. For an introduction to bytecode, see Bernard Peh, Solidity Bytecode
and Opcode Basics, Medium (Sept. 17, 2017), https://medium.com/@blockchain101/
solidity-bytecode-and-opcode-basics-672e9b1a88c2 [https://perma.cc/Q4PE-DYBM].
225. The main contract incorporates by reference code to perform most tasks. The figure
shows an excerpt of the bytecode referenced. While a skilled analyst can reconstruct the
function of the code, such analysis is beyond our scope. See Polybius (PLBT), supra note 205.
226. Note that the Polybius team actually decided to release a different project than
the one described in the whitepaper. Tzao Se, Past ICO Review: Why You Can’t Take
Polybius to the Bank, U.Today (July 23, 2018), https://cryptocomes.com/past-ico-reviewwhy-you-cant-take-polybius-to-the-bank [https://perma.cc/BWP8-L8JQ]. The team claimed
that this was due to an E.U. regulation that was released years before the ICO. Id. This
underscores the point that after an ICO, a development team is able to do whatever it
wants with the funds raised.
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FIGURE 14: SCARCITY AUDIT RESULTS 227
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Almost all issuers promise a supply restriction in their marketing
documents (40 of 45, or approximately 90%). And most of those that
promise a restriction deliver it (29 of 40, or approximately 75%). Overall,
though, only about two in three (29 of 45, or approximately 64%) ﬁrms
that we audited encoded a supply restriction. To be clear, this is not to say
that the ﬁrms that did not deliver coded scarcity limits actually promised
to do so—their marketing promises either did not mention scarcity or
may not have discussed how it was to be effected.
The second sort of supply promise—burning—displays a different
pattern. Figure 15 details our burning audit.
FIGURE 15: BURNING AUDIT RESULTS 228
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Here, fewer ﬁrms promised to burn tokens than promised to cap
supply in the initial mint (19 as compared to 40). Of those that promised
to burn supply, approximately 36% (7 of 19) did not ﬁx that claim with
code.
227. See infra Appendix B. “Scarcity Claimed” in the Figure is a designation for those
issuers that promised a supply restriction in their marketing documents.
228. See infra Appendix B.
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Of the forty-ﬁve auditable issuers, thirty-six promised vesting in their
marketing documents or whitepapers, while nine did not. Figure 16
illustrates our ﬁndings.
FIGURE 16: VESTING AUDIT RESULTS 229
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Figure 16 illustrates ﬁrst that almost 20% of the sample did not
promise to vest at all, which is a surprising result given the amounts
raised. Second, of the 80% that promised to vest, the vast majority apparently
did not use smart contracts to encode those rights.230
D.

Modiﬁcation Promises

Finally, we describe the modification rules in the sample. Modification
is rarely discussed in marketing materials: Only seven of the ﬁfty ﬁrms
discussed the token’s modiﬁability in their marketing materials or soft
contracts. But overall, twelve of the ﬁfty ﬁrms permit modiﬁcation
through their code. While most (4 of 7) of the firms that disclosed
modification had code that backed up their promises, eight ﬁrms that did
not discuss modiﬁcation permitted it.

229. See infra Appendix B.
230. Some projects use secondary smart contracts to encode vesting, such as the Basic
Attention Token. So long as the tokens transferred before the ICO, we would count that as
a coded vesting. According to Brendan Eich, BAT used this two-stage structure to have
“simple, do-as-few-things-as-possible smart contracts. We were keenly aware of all the
problems other projects to that date . . . had trying to get fancy with Solidity.” Email from
Brendan Eich to David Hoffman (July 30, 2018) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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FIGURE 17: MODIFICATION AUDIT RESULTS 231
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E.

Summary

To sum up: There are signiﬁcant differences between code and
contract in our sample.232 Projects are making governance claims that
look to be modeled off of offline VC or traditional equity-based rules
intended to reduce agency costs, but they are not encoding those promises
into the sort of trustless, decentralized systems which undergird their
networks’ purported sky-high values.
IV. COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM?
So far, our inquiry has been motivated by two goals. First, we have
tried to capture the reality of the ICO form as it existed in 2017–2018—a
snapshot of a supposedly revolutionary innovation just after its birth.
Second, we have attempted to understand smart contracts at a deep level
of contextual detail. They are at the heart of the innovation story told by
ICO proponents, some of whom claim that code will increasingly be able
to replace traditional law. 233 We have traced their early history, 234
explained how they were expected to function in the ICO market of
2017,235 and taken stock of the reality.236 In this Part, we evaluate the
distance between expectations and reality.
As we established in Part III (and in detail in Appendix B), for over
20% of ICOs in our sample where promoters promised cryptoasset supply
restrictions, and 35% of promised token burning, we could not observe
231. See infra Appendix B.
232. For the results in summary form, see generally infra Appendix B.
233. See De Filippi & Wright, supra note 24, at 102–03 (“Token sales are the Wild
West of ﬁnancing, and by using blockchain technologies and decentralized exchanges,
companies, projects, or organizations can continue to raise funds by relying on lex
cryptographica, ignoring geographic rules and regulations governing public markets and
securities trading.”).
234. See supra Part I.
235. See supra Part II.
236. See supra Part III.
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restrictions hard-coded into smart contracts. More starkly, we could not
ﬁnd hard-coded vesting restrictions in twenty-ﬁve of the thirty-six ICOs
where promoters promised to adhere to such restrictions. Finally, of
twelve ICOs for which our audit revealed that a central party could
modify the functionality of the cryptoasset’s smart contract code, only
four disclosed that ability in their promotional materials.
Our results raise serious questions about the role of code in ICOs.
Do investors punish ICOs that fail to build key protections into code or
fail to disclose the power of modiﬁcation? If not, is that because code
does not matter as much as its proponents claim it does? Or is it because
the ICO market is broken? We examine those questions in the sections
that follow.
A.

Paper, Code, and Market Response

For a minute, let’s look at our results from the perspective of an ICO
advocate who believes that code has the potential to be a cheaper and
better way of delivering investor protections than traditional venture
ﬁnancing routes. Should this person be troubled by our results? At one
level, the answer has to be yes. The fact that a majority of the leading
ICOs—each of which raised over $20 million—fail to write their own
vesting promises into code is inconsistent with a story about code
replacing law. It also raises serious questions about whether investors are
adequately protected from founder desertion.
But our ICO advocate might push back. Perhaps we are wrong about
the absence of hard-coded rules (and if we are, we hope to be corrected).
Or, maybe, investors do take the problems we observed in Part III into
account when investing. That is, maybe problems with coded investor
protection are reﬂected in market prices.
Though the ICO market is young, we are skeptical of this “investorprotection code is priced” thesis. As a ﬁrst cut, the sheer number of
problems in our sample suggests otherwise. Our results show that the
majority of the top-grossing ICOs of 2017 had major problems with how
code bore out their antiexploitation disclosures.237 To quantify the idea
of paper–code distance, we refer to any uncoded investor protection for
supply, burning, vesting, or incongruence between code and disclosures
regarding modiﬁability as “distance.” Using these data, we score each
ICO from zero to four.238 Of the fifty ICOs, we give forty-nine a score
because we can evaluate either the token or the associated smart
contracts. Fourteen have no distance, ninteen have one marker, twelve
have two, three have three, and one (Monaco) has four. If investors know

237. See infra Appendix B.
238. That is, the token gets a 1 for scarcity claims not matching code, a 1 for vesting
claims not matching code, a 1 for burning claims not matching code, and a 1 if it has
undisclosed modiﬁcation terms.
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about the problems we’ve identiﬁed, then the makeup of the top ﬁfty
suggests that they don’t much care.
Nor do the postsale market metrics we are able to observe enable us
to say a great deal about the “code is priced” thesis. We do not see
signiﬁcant changes in code congruence over time, and we lack a natural
experiment on initial code pricing. What we can observe is whether (over
time) ﬁrms that encode their disclosures have different returns and
trading volumes. An approach suggested to us by a commentator on an
earlier draft of this paper239 was to develop a rolling weighted portfolio of
the prices (and trading volume) of our ﬁfty projects, controlling for their
disclosed and coded governance rules. Using this approach, we ﬁnd
that—consistent with earlier work—disclosed governance rights do seem
to promote better returns.240
FIGURE 18: VESTING DISCLOSURES AND
ROLLING AVERAGE CUMULATIVE RETURNS241
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239. We thank Professor Robert Bartlett for his suggestion and the data that gave it life.
240. See supra note 31.
241. Data from CoinMarketCap, courtesy of Professor Bartlett. Bartlett pulled daily
volume and price data from coinmarketcap.com and created a weighted average portfolio
using our coding about project quality. We modiﬁed his work when later checking revealed
minor changes in the coding of particular projects. Both the .do and the underlying data are on
file with the authors and the Columbia Law Review.
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The next figure repeats the first, but now breaking out projects that
coded vesting and those that promised but did not code it.
FIGURE 19: VESTING (CODED VS. DISCLOSED)
AND CUMULATIVE RETURNS242
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Here, we can see that ﬁrms that coded vesting had returns that were
indistinguishable from those that did not code it. Professor Robert Bartlett
reported similar results on scarcity, as well as trading volume. In a series
of regressions, he found while disclosure of vesting and scarcity were
correlated with higher returns, coding of those attributes had no
consistent and significant effects. 243 Trading volume and price were,
however, closely tied to Bitcoin’s price and trading volume, a result that
ﬁts with other recent research.244
Finally, we are skeptical of the “investor-protection code is priced”
thesis because buy-side literature in 2016–2018 rarely treated the guts of
code as something worth considering. Like stocks, ICOs have developed
a wide range of secondary information sources, including “ratings”
websites. But most of these raters do not vet smart contract code. Of the
242. For information regarding from where this data set was obtained and the
procedures performed on it, see supra note 241.
243. The authors’ regression ﬁles are on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review.
244. See Griffin & Shams, supra note 8, at 33 (indicating that Tether, a digital
currency, inﬂuences Bitcoin pricing).
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top ﬁve English-language rating sites by Alexa ranking, which measures
how popular a website is,245 only one posts information about code quality,
though not of signiﬁcant detail.246 Similarly, code takes a backseat to
other investment drivers in the retail valuation literature.
In the period before 2017, advisory publications focused on a
project’s ability to deliver anonymity and decentralized governance, which
in turn was thought to help hedge against regulation.247 In the period
after 2017, guides focused on the potential for widespread functional use
within the startup’s system,248 the reputation and involvement of the
founders and creative team,249 and the avoidance of obvious scams.250

245. Kim Kosaka, What Is Alexa Rank?, Alexa Blog, https://blog.alexa.com/marketingresearch/alexa-rank/ [https://perma.cc/MQP5-68UV] (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
246. We use ICOnow to identify the top ﬁve ratings sites. Top ICO Listing Sites,
ICOnow, http://iconow.net/all-ico-calendarlisting-sites-with-alexa-rank-and-traffic/ [https://
perma.cc/WQ8K-8LVP] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). Four of these sites do not analyze smart
contract code: (1) icodrops.com (Alexa rank: 14,206); (2) icobench.com (Alexa rank: 15,078);
(3) coinschedule.com (Alexa rank: 18,861); and (4) cryptopotato.com (Alexa rank: 136,699).
Id. Only one of the four sites does analyze smart contract code: icorating.com (Alexa rank:
79,549). Id. However, the site’s attention to code is thin. While it mentions smart contracts
on its “methodology” page, it does not regularly (if ever) analyze any code itself. See
Project Evaluation, ICORating, https://icorating.com/methodology/ [https://perma.cc/
WXS6-UGH6] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
247. See, e.g., Roger Aitken, German Blockchain Startup BlockPay “Bootstrapped”
with Crypto ICO Investment, Forbes (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
rogeraitken/2016/08/20/german-blockchain-startup-blockpay-bootstrapped-with-cryptoico-investment/ [https://perma.cc/3A65-GE8G] (“For criminals and legitimate businesses
alike, the blockchain’s transparency could pose a real problem. . . . If you can ﬁgure out
where the money is going, you can gain a major competitive edge over a company.”);
Marco Santori, Appcoin Law: ICOs The Right Way, CoinDesk (Oct. 15, 2016), https://
www.coindesk.com/appcoin-law-part-1-icos-the-right-way/ [https://perma.cc/2BDP-FEHR]
(“Appcoin developers should consider building products . . . which run . . . in a decentralized
fashion. The more unaffiliated developers contributing to the development and operation of
the product, the less likely any profit . . . is to be considered ‘from the efforts of others’—and
the less likely vertical commonality will be present.”).
248. See, e.g., Chinedu Adeyemi, Cryptocurrency: How to Start? Guide to
Cryptocurrency Trading for Beginners, The Oofy (June 2, 2018), https://theoofy.com/
13199/cryptocurrency-how-to-start-guide-to-cryptocurrency-trading-for-beginners/ [https://
perma.cc/Y7XW-FNT9] (“Some coins seem to keep increasing in value simply due to
supply-demand factors. This trend might not be sustainable. For a coin to have [longterm] supported value, it must have a real-world use case eventually.”).
249. How to Choose an ICO to Invest In, Cointelegraph, https://cointelegraph.com/
ico-101/how-to-choose-an-ico-to-invest-in#read-the-white-paper [https://perma.cc/UPZ3Q3LK] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (advocating for potential investors to “[f]ind out
everything [they] can about the development team” and to “make sure that the developers
are not anonymous”).
250. See, e.g., John Wasik, Why Millennials Are at High Risk for Bitcoin & ICO Fraud,
Forbes (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2018/03/05/whymillennials-are-at-high-risk-for-bitcoin-ico-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/MYB2-NU5L] (“One
simple way to avoid fraud is to reject solicitations. Whenever you see a mobile ad or email
telling you about overnight riches in cryptocurrencies, avoid clicking on their links.”).
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Eventually, some investors gave up on ICOs completely.251 But there’s
never been an emphasis on checking that coded governance actually
happens.
For instance, while the bestselling Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor’s
Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond does exhort investors to scrutinize developer
activity,252 it does not view the actual product of developer activity—the
code—on the same plane. Indeed, the book does not include a project’s
codebase in the materials that it suggests a fundamental-analysis investor
would want to consider. 253 To the authors of most buy-side advice,
cryptocurrency investment is an exercise in reading whitepapers, blog
posts, and commentary—and watching the social-media trade winds—but
rarely involves inquiry into code.254 Taken together with analysis of our
sample, these impressionistic sources of evidence lead us to believe that
investor-protection code is not a signiﬁcant driver of market pricing.255
ICO advocates might reasonably respond to this absence of evidence
for the importance of code in a number of ways. First, it might be the
case that investor-protection code will manifest itself as a driver of market
returns in the future. Perhaps future researchers will develop measures
that capture price tremors in response to phenomena like the one we
identiﬁed in Part III. It is also possible that the ICO market’s “crypto
winter” was driven by investors who scrutinized the code of circulating
tokens and found it lacking.
Some commentators do advise investors to pay attention to the
underlying code of cryptocurrency projects, and their approach may be
gaining adherents. 256 Further, some ICO promoters take to Reddit
251. See supra note 19.
252. See generally Burniske & Tatar, supra note 31.
253. See id. at 172–73 (discussing the materials necessary to conduct fundamental
analysis of cryptoasset investments).
254. See, e.g., Reza Jafery, Cryptocurrency Fundamental Analysis: 4 Ways to Gauge the
Strength of a Community, Hacker Noon (Jan. 8, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/4-waysto-gauge-the-strength-of-a-cryptocurrencys-community-4b42c0e5d735 [https://perma.cc/U6QJHBQV]; Simon Kertonegoro, Fundamental Analysis: How to Judge a Cryptocurrency’s
Intrinsic Value, Medium (Mar. 12, 2017), https://medium.com/@esscay/fundamentalanalysis-how-to-judge-a-cryptocurrencys-intrinsic-value-a3d789da94e1 [https://perma.cc/
HNA3-L3LE]; Dean Patrick, On Tokenomics and ICO Valuations, Medium (Jan. 13, 2018),
https://medium.com/@deanpatrick_63570/on-tokenomics-and-ico-valuations-5312e5bdc2bd
[https://perma.cc/V8UH-DNXW].
255. Aside from Rhue, supra note 31, at 20, who ﬁnds that identiﬁcation of “bugs” on
Etherscan is associated with lower market capitalization, we are aware of no other analysis
of the relationship between code and market value.
256. See Rohr & Wright, supra note 18, at 27 n.73 (suggesting that failure to list code
in an open source site “may signal ulterior motives on the part of the party selling the
token”). Others agree. See How to Choose an ICO to Invest In, supra note 249 (“Evaluate
the quality of the code. If a project has no working code whatsoever prior to an ICO, or
even if they do, but it isn’t open source—that’s a major red ﬂag.”); Michiel Mulders, 10
Keys for Evaluating Initial Coin Offering (ICO) Investments, CryptoPotato (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://cryptopotato.com/10-keys-evaluating-initial-coin-offering-ico-investments/ [https://
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message boards to offer bounties to independent parties interested in
auditing smart contract code—an indication that attention to code (or at
least the perception of attention to code) is valuable from the promoter
perspective.257 These audits focus on the antihacking aspects of cybersecurity,
not specific instantiation of economically relevant promises.258 But perhaps
the recent “modiﬁability crisis” after the Bancor hack will bring our
investor-protection concepts to the fore. In other words, the market will
reﬂect investor protections found in code sooner or later.259
A second potential response from our ICO advocate might take a
different tack. Instead of defending the importance of code in delivering
investor protections, the advocate might retreat and take up a holistic
defense. Speciﬁcally, even if code is failing to protect investors, there still
perma.cc/9NZ3-HF55] (“The quality of a developer can be understood by analyzing some
of their code . . . . Avoid messy developers.”).
257. A search of “ICO audit” of the Etherium Community’s Developer Reddit
evidences as much. See, e.g., bfjs123, Best Way to Get My ICO Contract Audited?,
r/ethdev, Reddit (Feb. 6, 2018), https://old.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/
7vq3s0/best_way_to_get_my_ico_contract_audited/ [https://perma.cc/8DVU-AR7R];
Bspendcom, Looking for ICO Security Audit, r/ethdev, Reddit (Oct. 12, 2017), https://
old.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/75wz6m/looking_for_ico_security_audit/ [https://perma.cc/
TA54-Y9SC]; Cointed, [BUG BOUNTY][ICO] Cointed Token Audit (100k EUR Reward!),
r/ethdev, Reddit (Oct. 12, 2017), https://old.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/75x5kb/
bug_bountyico_cointed_token_audit_100k_reward/ [https://perma.cc/4AMQ-TJZP].
258. See, e.g., Cimpanu, supra note 114 (citing industry study). This auditing is quite
important, of course. See Anna Irrera, More Than 10 Percent of $3.7 Billion Raised in
ICOs Has Been Stolen: Ernst & Young, Reuters (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-ico-ernst-young/more-than-10-percent-of-3-7-billion-raised-in-icos-has-been-stolenernst-young-idUSKBN1FB1MZ [https://perma.cc/PS5P-63XZ] [hereinafter Irrera, More Than
10 Percent]. ICOcheck.io does feature crowdsourced evaluations of the presence or
absence of smart contract provisions, including hard-coded vesting constraints. See ICO
Checker, icochecker.com, [https://perma.cc/H3QX-EYJP] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). But
its Alexa rank is in the millions, in contrast with the top ﬁve sites, which range in ranking
from 136,699 to 14,206. See supra note 246.
259. Much of the excitement over ICOs has shifted to a new form of token-based
fundraising: the “security token” offering, or STO. STOs are ICOs in which issuers
embrace the security-like nature of their tokens, adhering to SEC rules governing offers
and sales, while adding features of traditional instruments like cash ﬂow or governance
rights. The imminent rise of STOs could give the SEC a greater opportunity to address
consumer protection risks posed by token sales. Or, enthusiasm for STOs could be pure
hype. See, e.g. Aashish Sharma, Will STOs (Security Token Offerings) Rule Over ICOs in
2019?, Hacker Noon (Jan. 12, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/will-stos-security-tokenofferings-rule-over-icos-in-2019-8feda7bcf562 [https://perma.cc/89EP-RBSA] (“We have it
on a good source that the estimated growth of STO is . . . $10 trillion over the next few
years.”); Syed Shoeb, Will 2019 Be the Year of the STO?, Hacker Noon (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://hackernoon.com/will-2019-be-the-year-of-the-sto-understanding-stos-security-tokensmarket-potential-over-icos-4d2502227220 [https://perma.cc/3L5E-FT38] (explaining that
STOs are ICOs with “certain regulations that hold the token issuers accountable”). For an
overview on the technical tradeoffs involved in STO issuance, see Matthew Finestone, The
2019 Truth on Security Tokens, Loopring Protocol (Dec. 21, 2018), https://medium.com/
loopring-protocol/the-2019-truth-on-security-tokens-7800c14129e4 [https://perma.cc/28WMAP5U].
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remain legal and reputational checks on exploitation and desertion by
ICO teams. That is, there will be substitutes for coded governance rules.
Instead of the law of the blockchain, the law of the Swiss stiftung, the
California Business Practices Code, and the Securities Act of 1933 will
ensure that bad actors are punished, and the market will do the rest.260
As we argued above, the legal safeguards against ICO investor
exploitation are, at present, signiﬁcantly weaker than in other investment
markets.261 It is easy for an issuer to set up shop in a low-regulation
jurisdiction,262 and the architecture of the cryptoeconomy enables far
more user and promoter anonymity than typical markets.263 And even for
transparent issuances conducted in the shadow of U.S. law, our
background legal regime presents untested forms of investor protection.
While a number of class-action suits, largely premised on state law violations,
have been ﬁled against some prominent ICO teams, the viability of any of
their claims remains unclear.264 The deterrent threat of legal ramifications
is not nearly as strong as in typical markets—and, of course, is far weaker
than the automated enforcement of code.
At a deeper level, arguments about the power of traditional legal
deterrence are dangerous for ICO advocates. They show that advocates
have already abandoned the high ground of “lex cryptographica.”265
Smart contract code was, after all, supposed to render traditional intermediaries useless, obviate the need for regulation, and reduce transaction
costs for participants.266 Without those justiﬁcations, it becomes harder to
see what beneﬁts ICOs provide, other than regulatory arbitrage.
To be explicit, if the value of blockchain-based ﬁnancial products
turns on the reputations of their creators or the vitality of legally enforceable
wrap contracts, we see no good reason why traditional regulatory tools—
260. These are some of the bodies of paper law that plaintiffs have invoked in their
lawsuits against Tezos and Paragon, for instance. See Complaint at 2, Davy v. Paragon
Coin, Inc., No. 18-cv-00671 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2018), 2018 WL 653425; Complaint at 19,
Gaviria v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 6:17-cv-01959 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2017), 2017
WL 5713392; Complaint at 5, Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. CGC-17-562144
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 5022656.
261. See supra Part II.
262. See Rohr & Wright, supra note 18, at 30–31, 96.
263. See, e.g., Shifflett & Jones, supra note 8; John O. McGinnis & Kyle Roche,
Bitcoin: Order Without Law in the Digital Age 30–33 (Nw. Pub. Law Research Paper No.
17-06, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929133 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review);
Massimo Bartoletti, Salvatore Carta, Tiziana Cimoli & Roberto Saia, Dissecting Ponzi Schemes
on Ethereum: Identification, Analysis, and Impact 1 (Mar. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
264. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
265. Cf. De Filippi & Wright, supra note 24, at 193–204 (arguing that ICOs can rely on
“lex cryptographica” to enforce investor protections).
266. See, e.g., ChainTrade, 10 Advantages of Using Smart Contracts, Medium (Dec.
26, 2017), https://medium.com/@ChainTrade/10-advantages-of-using-smart-contractsbc29c508691a [https://perma.cc/65H6-87GT] (describing in greater detail these classic
arguments raised in support of smart contracts).
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securities law, know-your-customer regulations, and ﬁduciary suits—
should not heavily police a space that currently is rife with the opportunity
to bilk investors. The analogy to the failures of the pre-1933 securities
regime would be unavoidable.267
However, we are not ready to make that sort of strong claim about
the missing role of intermediaries. Some projects encode all of their
governance protections, and others appear to fall short largely only on
vesting.268 We simply do not know enough at the moment about what
incentives encouraged particular turns to coded governance. Nor have
we investigated the more mature 2018 market. Today, several sites are
working to develop informally rich certiﬁcation systems.269 Perhaps such
systems will evolve and further depress the need for old-fashioned
intermediation in the absence of regulation.
But perhaps not. If problems with investor protection code are not
priced into the market, and traditional law presently has trouble deterring
abuses, where does that leave us?
B.

Whose Market Is This?

The absence of evidence suggesting that investors are well-protected
in the ICO market raises a natural question for legally-minded readers:
Should we regulate this thing? Some see evidence of fraud and call for
the whole market to be shut down.270 Others would like the state to keep
out.271 Each approach has costs and beneﬁts, of course—a conundrum
where good things like innovation, investor protection, and regulatory
clarity sit uneasily alongside each other.272 There are tradeoffs galore.
For the pragmatists out there, a lot depends on who is being protected,
and who beneﬁts from innovative change. Are the investors actually

267. See Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information
and the Performance of New Issues, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 295, 296–97 (1989) (describing
brieﬂy the failures in the market that led to the passage of the Securities Act of 1933).
268. See supra Part III.
269. See, e.g., Messari Disclosures Registry, Messari, http://messari.io/registry (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
270. This has been the approach taken, for example, by regulators in China and South
Korea. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 16, at 30–32.
271. See, e.g., Richard Waters, To Coin a Craze: Silicon Valley’s Cryptocurrency Boom,
Fin. Times (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2b0d8926-96d9-11e7-b83c9588e51488a0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting Tim Draper as stating that
“ICOs are ﬁlling in where governments have failed”); cf. Max Raskin, The Law and
Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 Geo. L. & Tech. Rev. 305, 333–40 (2017) (arguing for a light
hand on smart contract regulation).
272. See generally Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma,
107 Geo. L.J. 235 (2019) (describing a theoretical framework for understanding the
competing goals of clarity, innovation, and market integrity that regulators seek to balance
when confronting new financial technology).
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grandparents risking their retirement savings?273 Or are they day-traders
enjoying a virtual casino?274 We might want—really, we do want—to protect
mistaken elders more than thrill-seekers.275 We also must be aware that
regulations often will protect ﬁrst-movers against competition by setting
up new barriers to entry. And any serious regulatory strategy needs to
help combat cryptoassets’ role in supporting illicit markets.276 To inform
the best approach to regulation, we need to know a lot more about the
ICO buy side.
We see four archetypal participants on the buy side in the ICO
market. Each has different implications for how to interpret the sell-side
picture we have painted in this Article. Gaining a better read on the
precise ratios and combinations of each will be a key next step for
scholars and policymakers who deal with ICOs.
1. Irrational Exuberance. — The conventional wisdom about ICOs—
the meme that drives most headlines—is that explosive valuations were
the result of a massive ﬁnancial bubble. As one leading analyst put it in
the New York Times, “It’s not going to last forever, but it’s fun in the
interim. The space is giddy right now.”277 A massive ﬁnancial bubble
would certainly help explain why the market didn’t seem to care about
the investor protections in smart contract code.
The possibility of a bubble accords well with the existing literature
on what drives cryptoasset performance. While we are the ﬁrst to study
investor-protection measures found in code, numerous researchers have
investigated the relationship between market performance and a host of
potential predictors, including founder proﬁles, business plan characteristics, social media factors, known cybersecurity incidents, and more.278

273. See Michael Hiltzik, When Grandma and Grandpa Join the Frenzy, You Know
Bitcoin is Turning into a Bubble, L.A. Times (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-ﬁ-hiltzik-bitcoin-bubble-20171201-story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
274. See, e.g., John Omar, Making a Living Day Trading Cryptocurrency, Chain
Operator, https://chainoperator.com/making-a-living-day-trading-cryptocurrency/ [https://
perma.cc/3EB2-6YEJ] (last updated Sept. 1, 2018).
275. See, e.g., Jacob Hale Russell, Misbehavioral Law and Economics, 51 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 549, 549–54 (2018) (arguing for a normative distinction between taste-driven and
mistake-driven irrationality). Things do get complicated for our prejudiced normative
priors when it’s “grandma and grandpa” who are seeking the thrills. See Peter Rudegeair
& Akane Otani, Bitcoin Mania: Even Grandma Wants In on the Action, Wall St. J. (Nov. 29,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-mania-even-grandma-wants-in-on-the-action1511996653 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
276. See, e.g., Foley et al., supra note 64, at 1.
277. Popper, Easiest Path, supra note 10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chris
Burniske, an industry analyst). For industry postmortems on the alleged financial bubble, see
supra notes 14 and 19.
278. See supra note 31 (describing the existing literature that explores the inﬂuence
of various factors on market performance).
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A consistent theme in this emerging literature is that reputation is
the key to understanding the ICO market. Unfortunately, reputation is
hackable. For instance, one paper ﬁnds that management team quality, as
rated on a website called ICObench.com, predicts market performance.279
ICObench, however, has been accused of operating as a “pay-to-play”
operation.280 Indeed, many rating platforms at the heart of the ICO
informational ecosystem281 operate on a “pay-to-be-rated” model.282 Project
owners place a high value on their project’s rating and are willing to pay
as much as $20,000 for a rating on the most inﬂuential sites.283 Such paid
279. See Momtaz, supra note 31, at 21, 31 (deﬁning management team quality and
calling it a “ﬁrst-order predictor” for ICO success). But see Rhue, supra note 31, at 22–24
(ﬁnding no clear link between rating scores and prices).
280. See Filip Poutintsev, Beware of ICO Bench!, Cryptocurrency Hub (May 13, 2017),
https://cryptocurrencyhub.io/beware-of-ico-bench-a41e401b69ea [https://perma.cc/VR3P2KYA]. As another commentator puts it, “Most incredible of all . . . is just how blatant the
greed and corruption exhibited by sites like ICObench has become, so much so that even
the Marquis de Sade himself would blush if he were alive today.” ICObench Warmer,
Tokenicide (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.tokenicide.com/opinion/icobench-warmer/
[https://perma.cc/2KG3-68GH].
281. See Kai Sedgwick, ICO Trackers Are the New Gatekeepers of Crowdsales, Bitcoin.com
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/ico-trackers-are-the-new-gatekeepers-of-crowdsales/
[https://perma.cc/H2SP-HNFF] [hereinafter Sedgwick, ICO Trackers]; WHA Project, We Are
Rated by ICO Bench Experts Now!, Steemit (Sept. 21, 2017), https://steemit.com/
cryptocurrency/@whaproject/we-are-rated-by-ico-bench-experts-now [https://perma.cc/URD8FB95]. Like Yelp, where business owners manage their own Yelp page, the project owners
manage everything except the rating on the project’s ICO page within the rating site. Any
project can submit a request for an ICO page, but the sites reserve the right to deny
requests at their discretion. See, e.g., FAQ , ICObench, https://icobench.com/faq
[https://perma.cc/9QZZ-JJXE] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (describing ICObench’s rating
system, which combines a rating by the website with ratings by “independent experts”);
Publish Your ICO, ICObench, https://icobench.com/publish (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (requesting information from ICOs and preICOs
wishing to publish pages on ICObench and offering expedited review for a fee). Each
rating site also has a unique feature they promote to set them apart from the others. For
example, ICObench distinguishes itself with ratings crowdsourced by “independent
experts,” rather than via the paid promotion model. See Stats and Facts, ICObench,
https://icobench.com/stats [https://perma.cc/DQ5R-GB2S] (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
Cryptorated allows users to “upvote” tokens in the queue to be rated and provides both
“actual ratings” and “curved ratings” for users to see where a token stands in relation to
other ICOs. See ICO Rating System, Cryptorated, https://cryptorated.com/ico-ratingscalculator/ [https://perma.cc/LR9J-8PZG] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). Others have other
features. ICO Drops has an “interest level” weighing short-term conditions, and a “bounty
program” that allows users to get tokens by helping the ICO by, for example, promoting it
on
social
media.
About
Us,
ICO
Drops,
https://icodrops.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/69LZ-WYAD] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). ICORating organizes its IPOs by
ten investment ratings from positive to negative, based on the “independent opinion[s] of
ICORating experts.” ICORating, http://www.icorating.com [https://perma.cc/BKH2SJ4Z] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019); Project Evaluation, ICORating, https://icorating.com/
methodology/ [https://perma.cc/SF7G-3CPY] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
282. See Sedgwick, ICO Trackers, supra note 281.
283. Kirill Shilov, What Should Your ICO Marketing Plan Look Like in 2018?, Hacker
Noon (Jan. 16, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/what-should-your-ico-marketing-plan-look-
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systems have well-known pathologies, as reﬂected in the credit-ratings
experience during the ﬁnancial crisis. 284 As a result, when academic
papers find that some proxy for social “hype” or “buzz” correlate with
higher returns,285 we are not heartened. Instead, they only make us worry
about targeted ads 286 and “pump-and-dump” cartels that coordinate
massive social media pushes to temporarily inﬂate prices before selling
their tokens to their marks.287 These sources of noise and misdirection
like-in-2018-315135fe9851 [https://perma.cc/6LXP-9TTQ] (reporting that ICORating charges
$20,000 for a report). Altogether, the average cost of advertising packages from top ICO
marketing agencies starts at around $280,000. Id.
We had little success independently investigating how much a number of popular
rating sites charge. Some rating sites, such as ICO Champs, ICO Drops, and Smith +
Crown, disclaim any fee-for-rating service. See Frequently Asked Questions About ICO
Champs, ICO Champs, https://www.icochamps.com/#faq-section [https://perma.cc/
M83W-KKZ2] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019); Privacy Policy, Smith + Crown,
https://www.smithandcrown.com/faq/ [https://perma.cc/EU8F-4FQU] (last visited Jan.
27, 2019); Submit ICO, ICO Drops, https://icodrops.com/submit-ico/ [https://
perma.cc/29VF-6EGP] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). Others have premium models which
permit faster listings or access to special platforms in return for payment, such as
CoinGecko and ICObench. See How Can I Make My ICO Sponsored?, CoinGecko,
https://support.coingecko.com/knowledge_base/topics/how-can-i-make-my-ico-sponsored
[https://perma.cc/CG9S-5DLS] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019); Premium, ICObench,
https://icobench.com/premium [https://perma.cc/DPG3-R4RM] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
Finally, a few popular sites are explicit that they take payment, but sometimes will not
disclose how much. For example, ICO Holder requires $500 to be listed. See Publish ICO,
ICO Holder, https://icoholder.com/en/v2/ico/create [https://perma.cc/XSK2-AEJZ]
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019). On the other hand, CoinSchedule, ICO Alert, ICO Rating, and
ICO Watchlist will not disclose their price until after an ICO has been submitted for
listing. See Add a New ICO, ICO Watch List, https://icowatchlist.com/add-ico
[https://perma.cc/4U6G-XRYX] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019); Consulting, ICO Alert,
https://info.icoalert.com/consulting [https://perma.cc/L8FL-RWTG] (last visited Jan.
27, 2019); ICORating Terms and Conditions, ICO Rating, https://icorating.com/termsand-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/PDT9-38RM] (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); The Ultimate
ICO Guide, CoinSchedule, https://www.coinschedule.com/brochure.html (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) .
284. See Gretchen Morgenson, Ratings Agencies Still Coming Up Short, Years After
Crisis, N.Y Times (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/business/ratingsagencies-still-coming-up-short-years-after-crisis.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
285. See Bourveau et al., supra note 26, at 5; Rhue, supra note 31, at 21–23.
286. See Louise Matsakis, The Cryptocurrency Industry Might Actually Beneﬁt from
an Ad Ban, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/cryptocurrency-industrymight-beneﬁt-from-ad-ban/ [https://perma.cc/W74X-HYAD]; Kate Rooney, Twitter Bans
Cryptocurrency Advertising, Joining Other Tech Giants in Crackdown, CNBC (Mar. 26,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/26/twitter-bans-cryptocurrency-advertising-joining-othertech-giants-in-crackdown.html [https://perma.cc/39SZ-MU8T].
287. See Griffin & Shams, supra note 8; Julian Hosp Tenx, The ICO World Is Full of
Pump-and-Dump Schemes—Don’t Be a Victim, Venture Beat (Aug. 26, 2017),
https://venturebeat.com/2017/08/26/the-ico-world-is-full-of-pump-and-dump-schemesdont-be-a-victim/ [https://perma.cc/82W4-KUF7]; Oscar Williams-Grut, ‘Market
Manipulation 101’: ‘Wolf of Wall Street’-style ‘Pump and Dump’ Scams Plague Cryptocurrency
Markets, Bus. Insider (Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/ico-cryptocurrencypump-and-dump-telegram-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/CZ8Q-JCRL]; see also Erin Griffith,
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have contributed to many bubbles in the past.288
Of course, reputation-driven markets are not necessarily all bad; it is
the particular characteristics of this one that cause concern. We are not
alone in this worried hand-wringing. Even researchers who hold out
hope that “the wisdom of crowds” might one day triumph still characterize
the ICO market as a series of “information cascades” susceptible to
insanity. 289 Cooler heads suggest that taking market returns seriously
during the 2017–2018 highs would have been seriously misleading, given
the market’s immaturity and “speculative frenzy.”290 As of early 2019,
there is compelling evidence that valuation highs were more bubble than
accurate assessments of promising projects. The market capitalization of
all cryptocurrencies fell over eighty percent in 2018,291 and trading of
certain coins has essentially stopped completely.292 Research that identifies
the particular sources of air for the bubble will be valuable going forward.293
The Hustlers Fueling Cryptocurrency’s Marketing Machine, WIRED (June 12, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/the-hustlers-fueling-cryptocurrencys-marketing-machine/
[https://perma.cc/7YGD-8FKJ] (“Much of the [crypto] industry’s action happens on a
messaging app called Telegram.”); Deep Patel, 6 Red Flags of an ICO Scam, TechCrunch
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/07/6-red-flags-of-an-ico-scam/ [https://
perma.cc/8PUY-WSPB] (describing Reddit sub-threads’ discussions of speciﬁc ICOs as a
good source for technical evaluations of crypto projects).
288. See Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation 63–99 (2014).
289. Lee et al., supra note 31, at 23, 30–31 (acknowledging that the “insanity of
crowds” might be at work).
290. See Howell et al., supra note 26, at 4 n.3 (“[I]n light of the sector’s immaturity
and speculative frenzy, returns appear more divorced from the goal of serious utility token
issuers to use the ICO to (a) raise ﬁnancing; and (b) promote customer adoption of their
networks.”).
291. See Ryan Browne, Cryptocurrencies Have Shed Almost $700 Billion Since January
Peak, CNBC (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/23/cryptocurrencies-haveshed-almost-700-billion-since-january-peak.html [https://perma.cc/E29M-97AF] (tracking
a decline in total cryptocurrency market capitalization to $138.6 billion, from a peak of
over $830 billion in the beginning of 2018).
292. See Deceased Coins, Dead Coins, https://deadcoins.com/ [https://
perma.cc/Z4KF-99BE] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (listing 680 cryptocurrencies as
“deceased,” along with another 182 as “scams”); see also Jay Adkission, The
Cryptocurrency Paradox and Why Crypto Is Failing, Forbes (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/11/28/the-cryptocurrency-paradox-andwhy-crypto-is-failing/ [https://perma.cc/2SFY-AWNS] (describing the “vast majority” of
cryptocurrencies as having failed).
293. We have observed a number of instances in which reports of market capitalization
greatly exceed what we have been able to identify on blockchain explorers like
etherscan.io. Theoretically, investors could determine how many tokens were provided to
how many investors during an ICO and in exchange for what kind of consideration. The
number of transactions should correspond to the number of buyers. Verifying the size of a
team’s ICO looks like a mathematical exercise: The product of the number of tokens sold
and the price paid. In practice, however, this kind of analysis is impractical. First, teams
routinely engage in private, individualized sales of their tokens to speciﬁc investors outside
of the blockchain. See Applicature, Private Sale or Public Sale?, Medium (Nov. 8, 2018),
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In a sense, a bubble would be the least surprising and most manageable
explanation of the ICO market’s rapid price swings. Regulators would
need to focus on the time-honored, if difficult task of popping future
bubbles with better informational requirements. But the “animal spirits”
of irrational exuberance are not the only plausible drivers of ICO
demand.294
2. Illicit Demand. — As a complement to the bubble theory of
cryptoasset success, many signs suggest that a material portion of
cryptoasset demand is driven by money launderers, tax evaders, and
other holders of illicit cash.295 Some of these illicit holders might be
https://medium.com/applicature/private-sale-or-public-sale-b515476718a3 [https://perma.cc/
S7N7-KTUP] (“Presaling coins of a cryptocurrency or token of a blockchain project has
become an effective method of raising funds for the development of a new application.”).
Though it is possible to verify that a project’s tokens were transferred to certain wallets at
some point before its public sale, there is no way to know how much the owners of those
wallets actually paid for the tokens. Maybe unsurprisingly, the self-reported size of a team’s
private presale often dwarfs the amount sold in its ICO. Thus, for instance, though
Paragon announced its launch with a $50 million capital raise including presale
placements, the SEC recently entered into a consent judgment ﬁnding only around $12
million in total was raised. See supra note 174.
Second, there is generally no way to link a given Ethereum wallet address to a speciﬁc
person or institution. See Dominiek Ter Heide, A Closer Look at Ethereum Signatures,
Hacker Noon (Feb. 16, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/a-closer-look-at-ethereumsignatures-5784c14abecc [https://perma.cc/4EEB-TUAT] (“The notion of an account is a
bit of a misnomer, because in strict technical terms there are only keys and a ledger of
funds that correspond with those keys.”); cf. Sudhir Khatwani, 6 Ways to Guarantee
Anonymity When Making Bitcoin Transactions, Coin Sutra (Nov. 10, 2018),
https://coinsutra.com/anonymous-bitcoin-transactions/ [https://perma.cc/BX83-QGBH]
(“Bitcoin transactions, by design, are not linked to a person or identity . . . . A person’s
name, physical address, or email is found nowhere in the transaction.”). Ethereum
addresses can be created rapidly and for free. See, e.g., Create New Wallet, MyEtherWallet,
https://www.myetherwallet.com/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (allowing users to
instantly generate an Ethereum wallet address at no cost). As a result, though it’s possible
to verify that a certain number of Ethereum addresses received a project’s tokens, it’s
impossible to conﬁrm that a certain number of investors participated in the sale. A
development team seeking to drive up enthusiasm for its token might spawn a high
number of wallet addresses and then transfer tokens to them. These transactions would be
indistinguishable from legitimate arm’s-length purchases by actual investors. As a result,
even the portion of an ICO that takes place on a blockchain is subject to manipulation.
294. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135 (2002)
(offering a behavioral approach to irrational markets).
295. See Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 Mich. L. Rev. First
Impressions 38, 43–44 (2013), https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1001&context=mlr_fi [https://perma.cc/L3RZ-G5L2] (“Tax-evaders and money launderers
regularly use . . . tactics to attempt to hide the sources, as well as the destination, of
funds.”); Ryan Clements, Decoding the Demand for Cryptocurrency: What Is Driving the
Historic Price Surge?, FinReg Blog (Sept. 26, 2017), https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/
2017/09/26/decoding-the-demand-for-cryptocurrency-what-is-driving-the-historic-price-surge/
[https://perma.cc/7VGU-PSQN] (“Another reason for the run up in price of cryptocurrencies . . . is
its ability to facilitate criminal activity and to make transactions anonymously—away from the
informational reach of government and regulators.”).
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inspired by the original, anarcho-capitalist vision for Bitcoin: to “win a
major battle in the arms race and gain a new territory of freedom” from
centralized governments. 296 Others might not have politics on their
mind.
This second piece of “conventional wisdom” about the cryptoasset
market was initially suggested by accounts of how Bitcoin’s growth was
fueled by the drug trade.297 Recent allegations that Russian hacking of
the Democratic National Committee in 2016 was bought and paid for
using Bitcoin have made this concern more salient.298 Indeed, one recent
paper found that approximately half of all bitcoin transactions were
associated with some form of illegal activity.299 Another found that the
imposition of “Know Your Customer” policies designed to enforce tax
and anti-money laundering laws shrank ICO returns.300
This source of demand would have entirely different implications
for ICO regulation than the “bubble” story. Obviously, it would seriously
weaken the case for ensuring an “innovation-friendly” environment
through well-tailored regulation. It would also counsel in favor of greatly
increasing scrutiny on the major players in an ICO ecosystem who are
beneﬁting from their dalliance with criminal underworlds.
Along with the “bubble demand” hypothesis, the “illicit demand”
hypothesis also comports with some of our results. For instance, if
criminal payments facilitation is indeed a major driver of demand for
ICOs, then it is unsurprising that investors do not seem to care about
whether founder vesting promises are delivered via smart contract code.
Instead, they might simply be treating all ICOs like new printings of
black-market money. If this is the case, then the high-ﬂying business plans
found in ICO whitepapers are merely window dressing, or an initial spark
to help create a network effect for a new cryptocurrency. This form of
demand could dovetail with the speculators driving the bubble described
above. And it seems fair to say that gamblers, bubble speculators, and
296. Email from Satoshi Nakamoto to the Cryptography Mailing List, Re: Bitcoin P2P E-Cash
Paper (Nov. 7, 2008), https://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/
msg09971.html [https://perma.cc/R8TL-PXRU].
297. See Reza Raeesi, The Silk Road, Bitcoins and the Global Prohibition Regime on
the International Trade in Illicit Drugs: Can This Storm Be Weathered?, 8 Glendon J. Int’l
Stud., 2015, at 1, 2, 9 (noting that for a time, between 4.5% and 9% of all Bitcoin
transactions were connected to the Silk Road, an online black market associated with trade
in illegal drugs).
298. See Jordan Pearson, The Russians Who Allegedly Hacked the DNC Mined Bitcoin
to Fund Their Operation, Motherboard (July 13, 2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/
en_us/article/bjbz7v/russian-hackers-mined-bitcoin-mueller-indictment [https://perma.cc/
8JHL-8L4R].
299. See Foley et al., supra note 64, at 2 (“For example, approximately one-quarter of
all users (26%) and close to one-half of bitcoin transactions (46%) are associated with
illegal activity.”).
300. See Lee et al., supra note 31, at 3 (“[A]nti-money laundering measures, such as a
Know Your Customer policy, negatively predict fundraising success.”) .
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criminal cartels alike will not be inordinately attentive to smart contract
code.
3. Crypto Winnings. — A third possible source of ICO demand might
be coming from investors who raked in gains on investments in Bitcoin
and Ethereum. These two cryptocurrencies have appreciated enormously
since the beginning of 2015. This has led to massive wealth-creation for a
cohort of so-called “Bitcoin millionaires,”301 and their decisions about
what to do with their winnings might be driving a fair bit of ICO success.
This hypothesis might play out in two ways. First, ICOs might serve
as a decent place to park winnings that are trapped in crypto purgatory.
To the extent that the “crypto winners” have been the illicit actors
described above, they will have trouble converting their cryptocurrency
holdings to ﬁat money through traditional channels. To be explicit, even
if they could easily turn ether or Bitcoin directly into cash, they might
not want to—they might be worried that governments would investigate
the owners of ﬁat cash hoards.
Instead, they might attempt to wait until cryptocurrency affords them
more access to consumption in the real world. In doing so, ICOs would
provide a reasonably good vehicle through which to diversify their holdings
and to attempt to invest their winnings in potentially lucrative ventures.
Second, to the extent that some investors treat cryptoasset markets
like casinos, they might be simply gambling with the house’s money.302
That is, it is easier to imagine investing in speculative assets, without caring
too much about the details, when the stake one uses to invest with is itself
the product of recent, sharp, gains. This is why people sometimes
(foolishly) play the roulette wheel after winning at blackjack at the casino.
The “crypto winnings” hypothesis is the least-explored in literature
about ICO demand and market performance. Nevertheless, there is
preliminary evidence supporting it. Speciﬁcally, one time-series analysis
suggests that blockbuster ICOs have negative effects on Bitcoin and ether
prices. 303 This suggests that investors are trading between ether and
Bitcoin on the one hand, and ICOs, on the other. Other analysts observe
that ICO teams who amassed huge Ethereum war chests from the
proceeds of their token sales were eventually forced to liquidate them as
the price of ether dropped. This intensiﬁed price declines in not only
ether but tokens as well.304 If research continues to bear out this effect, it
301. See Don Reisinger, Newly-Minted Bitcoin Millionaires Are Lining Up to Buy
Lamborghinis, Fortune (Apr. 3, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/04/03/bitcoin-millionairelamborghini-when-lambo/ [https://perma.cc/7AXD-EMUL].
302. See, e.g., Derek A. Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a
Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. Ill. J.L.
Tech. & Pol’y 165, 187 (noting the extent of gambling linked to Bitcoin).
303. See Masiak et al., supra note 31.
304. See, e.g., Angel Reyes, Ethereum ICO Funds Liquidation Reaches All-Time High
as December Ends, Crypto.IQ (Dec. 31, 2018), https://cryptoiq.co/ethereum-ico-fundsliquidation-reaches-all-time-high-as-december-ends/ [https://perma.cc/GQT4-B2XV]; Joseph
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would only further support the kinds of regulatory responses that are
appropriate in light of the “bubble” and “illicit demand” scenarios
described above.
4. Smart Money. — Finally, it is possible that some ICO demand is
driven by legitimately smart money. Anecdotal reports indicate that a
wide range of old-growth VC ﬁrms, hedge funds, and family offices are,
in fact, investing in ICOs.305 Sometimes, they invest directly, as with the
participation of Sequoia Capital, Andreessen Horowitz, and Union
Square Ventures in the Filecoin ICO. 306 In other cases, they invest
through intermediaries, whether due to regulatory restrictions on their
holdings, or simply to work with other investors who are experts in the
cryptoasset class.307 In either case, these investors are the most likely to be
engaging in fundamental analysis of ICOs, and thus the most likely to be
scrutinizing smart contract code.
The presence of these investors in the market raises numerous
questions for researchers and regulators alike. First, recall the colloquy
with the ICO advocate in Part IV.A above. In a world where the code of
“lex cryptographica” is not performing crucial investor-protection roles,
we must look to traditional sources of protection. One of those is public
regulation, but another is private gatekeeping. In the IPO world, for
instance, the involvement of initial underwriters and primary marketmakers channels pricing toward a fundamental valuation.308 So, too, does
the participation of institutional investors on the long and short sides of
the market.309 These investors do the heavy analytical lifting that helps
Young, Did ICOs Cause Ethereum to Drop by 44% in 2 Weeks by Dumping on the Market?,
CCN (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/did-icos-cause-ethereum-to-drop-by-44-in-2weeks-by-dumping-on-the-market/ [https://perma.cc/D3Q7-7UVW]; c.f. Larry Cermak,
ICOs Are Not Liquidating Their ETH Treasuries, Despite Price Declines. Yet., The Block
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2018/11/20/icos-are-not-liquidatingtheir-eth-treasuries-despite-price-declines-yet/ [https://perma.cc/K9SX-HDKM].
305. See, e.g., Maiya Keidan & Jemima Kelly, Number of Crypto Hedge Funds Surges
Amid Bitcoin Volatility, Reuters (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/ukhedgefunds-bitcoin/number-of-crypto-hedge-funds-surges-amid-bitcoin-volatility-idUSKCN1FZ189
[https://perma.cc/UZN3-E729]; Olga Kharif & Camila Russo, Venture Capital Surges into
Crypto Startups, Bloomberg (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-03-26/icos-can-wait-venture-capital-surges-into-crypto-startups [https://perma.cc/3UQ566AM].
306. See Fitz Tepper, Filecoin’s ICO Opens Today for Accredited Investors After
Raising $52M from Advisers, TechCrunch (Aug. 10, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/
2017/08/10/filecoins-ico-opens-today-for-accredited-investors-after-raising-52m-from-advisers/
[https://perma.cc/YWN9-NY3H].
307. See, e.g., Michael McDonald, Cryptocurrency Hedge Fund BlockTower Raises
$140 Million, Bloomberg (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-01-04/cryptocurrency-fund-blocktower-is-said-to-raise-140-million [https://perma.cc/YP55E2Y3].
308. Steven E. Bochner, Jon C. Avina & Calise Y. Cheng, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati, Guide to the Initial Public Offering 18–20 (8th ed. 2016), https://www.wsgr.com/
publications/PDFSearch/IPOGuide2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/SFK6-8RF4].
309. See id. at 29.
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protect retail investors from succumbing to irrationality. And (most of
the time) these investors read the investment contracts.310
Are “smart money” investors playing similar channeling roles in the
ICO market? It is hard to say. Maybe investors like Sequoia Capital are
entering into side letters with ICO teams to contractually ensure that
supply and vesting promises are upheld. 311 Maybe the Andreessen
Horwitzes of the world are scrutinizing modiﬁability and holding private
corporate-governance ﬁduciary powers to rein in its use. They might also
be embedding important information into market prices—for instance,
information about ICO project activity, founding team reputation, and
the quality of an ICO’s informational disclosures.312 On the other hand,
maybe they’re not. There is nothing stopping the “smart money” from
riding cryptoasset volatility for all it’s worth. Bubbles are proﬁtable for
smart money, too, so long as they can cash out before the music stops. It
would be valuable for future research to suss out the strategies and tactics
that old-growth investors have been employing in this market.
From a regulatory perspective, the presence of smart money presents
both a reason to care about preserving ICOs as a potentially valuable
innovation and a potential lever to use. Indeed, one happy story that
might be told a decade hence is that the ICO market of 2017 merely
represented a period of growing pains, where reliable information
sources and reputable gatekeepers were taking formation.
C.

Whose Market Might It Become?

Based on the strong evidence that smart money is not leading this
market, it can be tempting to cast doubt on all aspects of ICOs, including
smart contracts. Though it will take future research to prove it, the ICO
buy side today looks to us like a mixture of a bubble and an illicit market,
with some smart money in the mix. And yet, this doesn’t mean that smart
contracts are meaningless.
As John Maynard Keynes (didn’t) say, “The market can stay irrational
longer than you can stay solvent.”313 But over a long enough time horizon,
310. Cf., e.g., Matt Levine, You Can’t Always Read the Documents, Bloomberg (June 5,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-05/you-can-t-always-readthe-documents (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining that arbitrageurs are the
people who “read[] the bond documents so that everyone else doesn’t have to. It’s just
that everyone else pays [them] to do it.”).
311. The Storj secondary vesting contract, discussed infra at note 627, would provide a
different (and more transparent) way to accomplish the same end.
312. Notably, it is possible to short cryptoassets through some exchanges. It is unclear
how broad or sophisticated the practice is. It certainly seems reasonable to suggest that
shorting crypto is not as strong a mechanism for embedding contrarian views or
information into prices as it is in securities and commodities markets.
313. See Jason Zweig, Keynes: He Didn’t Say Half of What He Said. Or Did He?, Wall
St. J.: Marketbeat (Feb. 11, 2011), https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/02/11/keyneshe-didnt-say-half-of-what-he-said-or-did-he/ [https://perma.cc/N5HY-W5JA].
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every bubble must pop. This leaves open the possibility that fundamental
aspects of smart contract quality will, eventually, sway the outcomes of the
market, with smart money at the helm.
In many ways, the ICO market of the past couple of years resembles
the dot-com boom that took place at the end of the last century. That
boom featured massive reallocations of investment capital toward nearly
any company that proposed a business strategy that incorporated what
was then called the “world wide web.”314 The same has been observed in
relation to “blockchain” and “token”-based business plans in today’s
climate.315 In the dot-com boom, investors also broke from ﬁdelity to
traditional investment metrics like price-to-earnings ratios, instead
relying on new valuation drivers like the sheer number of “eyeballs”
viewing a website or the “stickiness” of the website experience.316 Shortterm performance on these metrics turned out to have little relation to a
company’s long-term success.317
It is hard not to see the rise of crypto-investment metrics like GitHub
reputational stars, Twitter followers, and Instagram likes as representing
a similarly problematic set of proxies for the possibility of network
success. Financially, between the years of 1997 and 2000, internet stocks
zoomed up and up, suggesting a new paradigm for corporate ﬁnance.
The cryptoasset investor subcultures devoted to rejecting “fear, uncertainty,
and doubt” may be in for a similarly painful fall to earth. Almost without
question, both the dot-com market and the ICO market would have
beneﬁted from clearer and more reliable information environments to
curb their excesses.
And yet, from a distance of twenty years, the economic follies of the
late 1990s look less like utter madness, and more like a kind of overeager
prescience. The clothing retailer boo.com may have gone belly-up, but ecommerce represents 40% of sales for even classic footprint companies
like J.Crew,318 and leading apparel startups like Everlane and Rent the
Runway are decidedly “online-native.” 319 And though the grocery
deliverer Webvan.com was widely derided as one of the biggest ﬂops of

314. See Elizabeth Demers & Baruch Lev, A Rude Awakening: The Internet Shakeout
in 2000, 6 Rev. Acct. Stud. 331, 335 (2001).
315. See, e.g., Nicole Bullock & Robin Wigglesworth, Blockchain Fervour Evokes
Memories of Dotcom Bubble, Fin. Times (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/40ec964a-e429-11e7-8b99-0191e45377ec (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See J. Crew, Revenues & Sales, eMarketer Retail, https://retail-index.emarketer.com/
company/data/5374f24d4d4afd2bb444660d/5374f2814d4afd824cc159d6/lfy/false/jcrewrevenues-sales [https://perma.cc/REP5-PENE] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
319. See Everlane, https://www.everlane.com/ [https://perma.cc/6EX7-DYJ3] (last
visited Jan. 27, 2019); Rent the Runway, https://www.renttherunway.com/
[https://perma.cc/J2AV-ESGC] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
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the dot-com bust,320 Amazon is pushing in that direction.321 The rush for
eyeballs has become a rush for data, and online shopping continues its
remarkably paced growth.322
Will we look back on the cryptoasset craze initiated in 2017 with
similar curiosity twenty years from now? What will fall away as the
ephemera of the moment, and what will work itself deeply into our
economic institutions? Given the froth of the market, it can be tempting
to focus on the gut-level question of whether the ICO market is a
ﬁnancial bubble, and if so, how regulators should address it.
But our view is that legal policymakers might do well to look beyond
the bubble (and its certain fate). Bubbles misallocate capital to
unproductive uses and divert the energy of those who respond to the
capital’s call. They also harm unsavvy investors who fall prey to the
salesmen who are selling a bull market.323 These animal spirits cause
huge amounts of mischief. It ought to be—and indeed is—the province
of lawmakers and regulators to temper them. 324 And yet, we are
convinced there is something useful to be learned from this ﬁrst
experiment in blockchain governance. Some ﬁrms are encoding their
promises, though it’s not obviously rewarding to do so. Others are
working to create intermediaries and certiﬁcation regimes despite the
contrary incentives present in a sharply rising market. Rewarding such
good actors should be as important to regulators as punishing fraudsters.

320. See 10 Big Dot.com Flops: Webvan.com, CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/
galleries/2010/technology/1003/gallery.dot_com_busts/2.html [https://perma.cc/8BPWB8A2] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (describing Webvan as the biggest ﬂop of the dotcom
bubble).
321. See Nick Turner, Selina Wang & Spencer Soper, Amazon to Acquire Whole Foods
for $13.7 Billion, Bloomberg (June 16, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-06-16/amazon-to-acquire-whole-foods-in-13-7-billion-bet-on-groceries
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
322. See Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, The Ongoing Evolution of US Retail: A
Format Tug-of-War, 29 J. Econ. Persp. 89, 96 (2015) (putting e-commerce in context and
documenting its nominal eleven-fold increase between 2000 and 2014).
323. See Sean Silverthorne, Inexperienced Investors and Market Bubbles, Harvard
Bus. Sch.: Working Knowledge (Feb. 19, 2007), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/
inexperienced-investors-and-market-bubbles [https://perma.cc/TT8D-XUM6].
324. One implication of our Article is that regulatory agencies might investigate the
costs and beneﬁts of requiring that cryptocurrencies match their marketing materials to
their smart contracts. For further recommendations on potential disclosure requirements,
see generally Chris Brummer, Trevor Kiviat & Jai R. Massari, What Should Be Disclosed in
an Initial Coin Offering?, in Cryptoassets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives (forthcoming
2019) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Usha Rodrigues, Semi-Public Offerings?
Pushing the Boundaries of Securities Law (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 2018-30, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3242205 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
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CONCLUSION
The computer code at the heart of ICOs enables a new way of
founding and governing enterprises. It allows entrepreneurs to adopt the
ICO method, whether for good or ill. But while smart contract
technology may be a driver—indeed, a deﬁnitional component—of the
ICO phenomenon, we believe our study demonstrates in detail that
smart contracts are also embedded in the social world. Just like CocaCola’s vending machines, ICOs are products of their time and place.
They are built atop innovative “technical systems” that only recently
came into being, and they are conducted within particular “communities
of discourse” that happen to exist here and now.325 To make sense of the
technology’s role, scholars and regulators alike should study the unique
forms that this embeddedness takes.
Our study demonstrates that the current structures—markets, formal
organizations, and professional communities—where ICOs take place are
producing a disconnect. Far from replacing (or seamlessly extending)
law and norms, code is often falling short of expectations. It sometimes
fails to deliver key investor protections, and can provide founders with
signiﬁcant, undisclosed authority to alter the terms of investor
engagement. While ICOs are promoted by an industrial community that
espouses technolibertarian beliefs in the power of “trustless trust” and
carefully designed code, actual ICO practices do not uphold that ideology.
The disconnect we observe reﬂects the informality of the ICO world.
Paper contracts and IPOs are joint products of law ﬁrms, investment
banks, regulators, and a panoply of buy-side institutional intermediaries.
Smart contracts and ICOs, at least at the moment, largely result from
coders and entrepreneurs working at greater distance from risk-averse
gatekeepers. Beﬁtting their relatively informal production setting, smart
contracts have been plagued with quality control problems. They suffer
vast amounts of hacking,326 and, as we show, standards as to how code is
produced and made legible are wanting.327 Unlike the traditional legal
world, there are currently no guilds or expert institutions governing
smart contract coders’ practices to encourage quality. To withstand
market ups and downs, the ICO community should invest in developing
reliable institutions and promulgating best practices for the long term.
The informality of smart contract production leads to risks, to be
sure, but it also breeds creativity. Lawyers tend to recycle language from
agreement to agreement without much thought, but the smart contract
community is full of “makers,” excitement, and avocational energy. This
distinction suggests that the rate of innovation within smart contracting
325. See Suchman, supra note 24, at 92.
326. See Irrera, More Than 10 Percent, supra note 258 (“More than 10 percent of
funds raised through ‘initial coin offerings’ are lost or stolen in hacker attacks.”).
327. See supra Part III.

660

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:591

is driven by social factors, as well as technological ones.328 It also suggests
that whether or not the ICO market is a bubble, professionals and
hobbyists working on ICOs will be able to port smart contract governance
into new settings over the years to come. As their ranks increase, the “noreading” problem for smart contracts might also be tempered. Right
now, one aspect of the disconnect we’ve identiﬁed is that so few people
can read smart contracts. The community of people who are able to vet
and audit smart contracts has much room to grow. As it does grow, and as
existing institutions develop vetting capacity, we would expect to see
quality improve.
We think that optimal regulation depends heavily on a better
understanding of the buy side of the market. But whatever the fraction of
investors who deserve protecting, our results show that computer code is
not presently a reliable part of the ICO form. Our results strongly suggest
that an increased presence of gatekeepers and regulators might help that
process along. The SEC, with its newly developed “Cyber Unit,”329 is
increasingly active in patrolling the scene. Other regulators, along with
courts, will also contribute to increasing formalization of ICO code
standards. So, too, will private standard-setting organizations within the
industry itself. The rise of trusted intermediaries will be the next
necessary step in any maturation of this novel ﬁnancial form.

328. Cf. Kevin Davis, Contract as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 86–88 (2013)
(encouraging scholars to study innovation in contracting outside traditional domains).
329. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Combat
Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2017-176 [https://perma.cc/PVR2-3S3N].

2019]

COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM

661

APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF TOP 50 2017 ICOS 330
ICO Name

Country331

Filecoin
Tezos
EOS Stage

USA336
USA341
USA346

Announced
Raise ($M)332

ICO Date333

Initial Market
Value ($M)334

$257.0337
$232.0342
$185.0347

9/10/17338
7/13/17343
6/11/17348

N/A339
$1,138.6344
$654.9349

Market Value
12/31/18
($M)335
N/A340
$281.0345
$2,326.3350

330. We ﬁrst developed the list of projects from www.coinschedule.com. By early 2019,
that site no longer provided the relevant data. This chart thus uses a combination of other
sources, primarily www.icomarks.com and www.coinmarketcap.com.
331. This column represents the country with which each ICO is associated. Countries
are abbreviated using their International Organization for Standardization Alpha-3 code
abbreviations.
332. This column represents the total amount of capital raised through each ICO, as
reported by publicly available sources.
333. This column represents the last day of the ICO period for each ICO.
334. This column represents the ﬁrst reported market capitalization for each ICO.
The date is different for each ICO and is indicated parenthetically.
335. This column represents the reported market capitalization for each ICO as of
December 31, 2018.
336. Filecoin, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/ﬁlecoin [http://perma.cc/4QH28U6M] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Filecoin, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/filecoin/historicaldata/ [http://perma.cc/39NT-7VYN] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (showing that no market
capitalization has yet been announced).
340. Id.
341. Tezos, ICOmarks, http://www.icomarks.com/ico/tezos [http://perma.cc/5SF22PTG] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Tezos, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tezos/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/8MLC-GLCE] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of July 4, 2018).
345. Id.
346. EOS, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/eos [http://perma.cc/VW96-QA8H]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. EOS, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/eos/historical-data/
?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/T476-LAY2] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019)
(reported as of July 3, 2017).
350. Id.
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RUS351
ISR356
CAN361
CHE366
CHN371

$50.0352
$153.0357
$98.0362
$100.0367
$70.0372

10/15/17353
6/12/17358
9/26/17363
6/20/17368
9/2/17373

$18.7354
$98.8359
$88.0364
$194.9369
$29.3374

$10.9355
$38.6360
$28.7365
$59.8370
$1,254.5375

351. Paragon Coin, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/paragon-coin [http://perma.cc/
Z3N6-XMUX] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Paragon, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/paragon/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/4GJL-GA8T] (last visited Jan. 24,
2019) (reported as of Nov. 5, 2017).
355. Id.
356. Bancor, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/bancor [http://perma.cc/V3WGH2PG] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Bancor, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bancor/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/MG9S-9DN5] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of June 26, 2017).
360. Id.
361. Kin, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/kin [http://perma.cc/EWX2-XU5G]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Kin, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/kin/historical-data/
?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/J7HA-3LR7] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019)
(reported as of Sept. 27, 2017).
365. Id.
366. Status, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/status [http://perma.cc/Y4HV-3PU7]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Status, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/status/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/W4PJ-PT2D] (last visited Jan. 24,
2019) (reported as of June 28, 2017).
370. Id.
371. Tron, CoinGecko, http://www.coingecko.com/en/ico/tron [http://perma.cc/
R5RQ-HSNF] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Tron, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tron/historical-data/
?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/ZK8P-KVGX] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019)
(reported as of Sept. 28, 2017).
375. Id.
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KyberNetwork
MCAP
Loopring
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SGP376
USA381
SGP386
USA391
CHN396

$80.0377
$53.0382
$49.0387
$44.3392
$45.0397

6/24/17378
5/25/17383
9/15/17388
5/7/17393
8/16/17398

$115.4379
$139.2384
$254.8389
$29.9394
$42.4399
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$28.3380
$51.3385
$20.6390
$0.1395
$31.5400

376. TenX, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/tenx [http://perma.cc/U8ZQ-CD8B]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. TenX, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tenx/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/7MY3-YVDB] (last visited Jan. 24,
2019) (reported as of July 8, 2017).
380. Id.
381. MobileGo, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/mobilego [http://perma.cc/
DH2Z-L58N] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. MobileGo, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/mobilego/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/W5B2-6EBZ] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019)
(reported as of June 13, 2017).
385. Id.
386. KyberNetwork, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/kybernetwork [http://perma.cc/
AKN3-CJQA] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Kyber Network, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/kybernetwork/historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/XAS8-NCZS]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 24, 2017).
390. Id.
391. MCAP, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/mcap [http://perma.cc/693A-REQS]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. MCAP, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/mcap/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/T94G-5BF5] (last visited Jan. 24,
2019) (reported as of June 3, 2017).
395. Id.
396. Loopring, ICOmarks, http://icomarks.com/ico/loopring [http://perma.cc/H9CMFJMU] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Loopring, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/loopring/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/UM7V-4KJY] (last visited Jan. 24,
2019) (reported as of Sept. 2, 2017).
400. Id.
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USA401
JPN406
USA411
GBR416
BGR421

$45.0402
$45.0407
$42.6412
$40.0417
$24.4422

9/11/17403
9/22/17408
9/22/17413
10/20/17418
6/19/17423

$51.9404
$1,976.4409
N/A414
$349.8419
$100.6424

$21.6405
$112.0410
N/A415
$64.0420
$90.6425

401. Enigma, ICOmarks, https://www.icomarks.com/ico/enigma-catalyst [https://perma.cc/
R2TX-CGSR] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Enigma, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/enigma/historical-data/
?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/UEH8-2TXE] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019)
(reported as of Oct. 14, 2017).
405. Id.
406. ICON, ICOmarks, https://www.icomarks.com/ico/icon [https://perma.cc/3CM9-7T7X]
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. ICON, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/icon/historical-data/
?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/XAG7-SKYF] (last visited Jan. 24,
2019) (reported as of Dec. 25, 2017).
410. Id.
411. PeerBanks, ICOmarks, https://www.icomarks.com/ico/peerbanks [https://perma.cc/
GJ5N-GLVX] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. No market capitalization data for PeerBanks were available from publicly
available coin-focused websites because PeerBanks has not yet been listed on an exchange.
See PeerBanks IRA (@PeerBanks), Twitter (Feb. 8, 2018), https://twitter.com/PeerBanks/
status/961816827281080321 [https://perma.cc/4TW3-ZJSQ] (“We continue waiting for
the transfers of your peerbanks to our waves wallet, please, until this does not end, we will
not be able to advance to the next step, which is to place Peerbanks IRA in an exchange.”).
415. See supra note 414.
416. Electroneum, ICOmarks, https://www.icomarks.com/ico/electroneum [https://
perma.cc/G472-FXK5] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Electroneum, CoinMarketCap, http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/electroneum/
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [http://perma.cc/3HUS-4G52] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of Dec. 14, 2017).
420. Id.
421. Aeternity, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/aeternity [https://perma.cc/SXQ6CJAE] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Aeternity, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/aeternity/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/K5AD-ZDLJ] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 8, 2017).
425. Id.
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LTU426
USA431

$37.0427
$15.0432

8/31/17428
5/31/17433

$61.1429
$171.0434

$4.2430
$156.9435

GIB436
USA441
DEU446

$33.0437
$33.0442
$32.9447

8/4/17438
6/22/17443
10/17/17448

$36.0439
$60.0444
$38.7449

$0.6440
$17.5445
$15.4450

426. Monetha, ICOmarks, https://www.icomarks.com/ico/monetha [https://perma.cc/
GG2J-G67Y] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Monetha, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/monetha/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/PQ8E-QS9V] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 6, 2017).
430. Id.
431. Basic Attention Token, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/basic-attention
[https://perma.cc/982X-8JZG] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Basic Attention Token, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/
basic-attention-token/historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/
P3JK-3W92] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of June 1, 2017).
435. Id.
436. Stox, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/stox [https://perma.cc/2Q42-GJN3]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Stox, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/stox/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/L3BU-AC8T] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of Aug. 5, 2017).
440. Id.
441. Civic, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/civic [https://perma.cc/57KQ-HRFY]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Civic, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/civic/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/K2GC-34W8] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of July 17, 2017).
445. Id.
446. Request Network, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/request-network [https://
perma.cc/CH84-KXJ5] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Request Network, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/requestnetwork/historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/Z3KU-M55T] (last
visited Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Oct. 20, 2017).
450. Id.
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USA451
USA456
EST461
USA466
FRA471

$32.2452
$32.0457
$31.0462
$28.6467
$45.0472

11/12/17453
9/19/17458
6/30/17463
10/23/17468
10/9/17473

$35.8454
$66.2459
$12.8464
$15.8469
$16.8474

$1.8455
$101.3460
$3.9465
$3.0470
$1.2475

451. Grid+, ICODrops, https://icodrops.com/grid/ [https://perma.cc/M6GT-LB2U]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Grid+, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/grid/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/6UBQ-XUSG] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of Nov. 13, 2017).
455. Id.
456. ChainLink, ICODrops, https://icodrops.com/chainlink/ [https://perma.cc/CWZ2EJZS] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Chainlink, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/chainlink/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/97VG-FDA6] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 20, 2017).
460. Id.
461. Polybius, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/polybius [https://perma.cc/5NV3U8LQ] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Polybius, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/polybius/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/VA5C-XVV6] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of July 15, 2017).
465. Id.
466. Unikoin Gold, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/unikrn [https://perma.cc/
869H-YA4Z] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Unikoin Gold, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/unikoingold/historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/J8M7-4NJX] (last
visited Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Nov. 21, 2017).
470. Id.
471. DomRaider, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/domraider [https://perma.cc/
5MH8-QHZK] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. DomRaider, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/domraider/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/R2LV-CACL] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of Nov. 6, 2017).
475. Id.
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Storj
Eidoo
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CYP476
LTU481
EST486
USA491
CHE496

$30.0477
$150.9482
$35.0487
$30.0492
$28.0497

10/12/17478
2/27/18483
8/17/17488
5/25/17493
10/16/17498

$25.3479
N/A484
$34.5489
$23.5494
$25.5499
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$3.8480
N/A485
$3.3490
$19.3495
$22.3500

476. Blackmoon, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/blackmoon [https://perma.cc/Y6EXL7DM] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Blackmoon, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/blackmoon/
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/5L3R-QQPN] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 20, 2017).
480. Id.
481. Bankera, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/bankera [https://perma.cc/4CQUL6VF] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. No market capitalization data for Bankera were available from publicly available
coin-focused websites.
485. See supra note 484.
486. Agrello, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/agrello [https://perma.cc/M8QMFEPB] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Agrello, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/agrello-delta/
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/DA72-2RW9] (last visited
Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 9, 2017).
490. Id.
491. Storj, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/storj [https://perma.cc/WK6J-W4ZR] (last
visited Jan. 24, 2019).
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Storj, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/storj/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/UX89-8YXN] (last visited Jan.
24, 2019) (reported as of July 2, 2017).
495. Id.
496. Eidoo, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/eidoo [https://perma.cc/5JMZ-JBCQ]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Eidoo, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/eidoo/historical-data/
?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/D68K-KBQU] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019)
(reported as of Oct. 17, 2017).
500. Id.
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CHE501
AUS506
SGP511
ARG516
GBR521

$26.7502
$13.2507
$26.7512
$24.0517
$20.0522

6/18/17503
10/6/17508
8/31/17513
8/8/17518
6/23/17523

$23.9504
$76.6509
$31.5514
$18.7519
$348.3524

$35.3505
$32.0510
$4.4515
$47.7520
$22.9525

501. Monaco, ICODrops, https://icodrops.com/monaco/ [https://perma.cc/JGG8-PRE9]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Crypto.com, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/crypto-com/
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/R2UG-JSG8] (last visited
Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of July 3, 2017).
505. Id.
506. Power Ledger, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/power-ledger [https://perma.cc/
F4E6-7TA5] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Power Ledger, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/powerledger/historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190124 [https://perma.cc/AXD8-UTEA]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Nov. 6, 2017).
510. Id.
511. Everex, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/everex [https://perma.cc/3BVJFW6P] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Everex, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/everex/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/8GXU-H92P] (last visited Feb.
2, 2019) (reported as of Oct. 10, 2017).
515. Id.
516. Decentraland, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/decentraland [https://perma.cc/
8QLC-AVFC] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Decentraland, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/decentraland/
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/G6VA-S7DG] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 28, 2017).
520. Id.
521. FunFair, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/funfair [https://perma.cc/9NQ9C6QL] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. FunFair, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/funfair/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/5CMJ-6FZA] (last visited Feb. 2,
2019) (reported as of July 2, 2017).
525. Id.

2019]

COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM

669

BitClave
Tierion
OmiseGo
Aragon

USA526
USA531
SGP536
ESP541

$25.5527
$25.0532
$25.0537
$25.0542

11/29/17528
7/28/17533
7/23/17538
5/17/17543

$81.7529
$81.6534
$42.6539
$36.9544

$0.3530
$5.0535
$189.5540
$11.2545

0x

USA546

$24.0547

9/15/17548

$134.6549

$163.9550

526. BitClave, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/bitclave [https://perma.cc/7JVUDC8N] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. BitClave, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitclave/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/KR7E-WABF] (last visited Feb.
2, 2019) (reported as of Jan. 16, 2018).
530. Id.
531. Tierion, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/tierion [https://perma.cc/S44LP449] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Tierion, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tierion/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/S34T-QHJZ] (last visited Feb. 2,
2019) (reported as of Aug. 27, 2017).
535. Id.
536. OmiseGo, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/omisego [https://perma.cc/N7G3YV8M] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. OmiseGo, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/omisego/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/QCU9-EH6B] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019)
(reported as of July 15, 2017).
540. Id.
541. Aragon, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/aragon [https://perma.cc/DB26QH48] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Aragon, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/aragon/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/4LRD-3NSK] (last visited Feb. 2,
2019) (reported as of May 19, 2017).
545. Id.
546. 0x, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/0x [https://perma.cc/K6MJ-ZDCN]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. 0x, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/0x/historical-data/
?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/9CZ8-KVJD] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019)
(reported as of Aug. 16, 2017).
550. Id.
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SGP551
USA556
SGP561
CHE566
IND571

$23.0552
$21.5557
$21.4562
$20.0567
$20.7572

10/31/17553
10/25/17558
10/6/17563
11/20/17568
8/31/17573

$18.7554
$31.6559
N/A564
$68.1569
$28.8574

$28.6555
$7.2560
N/A565
$10.0570
$0.8575

551. Enjin Coin, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/enjin-coin [https://perma.cc/
UY3T-GJB4] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Enjin Coin, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/enjin-coin/
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/7DY8-XLH9] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2019) (reported as of Nov. 15, 2017).
555. Id.
556. BLOCKv, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/blockv [https://perma.cc/68GUVQM4] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. BLOCKv, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/blockv/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/BCB8-XVY3] (last visited Feb. 2,
2019) (reported as of Dec. 7, 2017).
560. Id.
561. FinShi Capital, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/finshi-capital [https://perma.cc/
FT72-X3FL] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. No market capitalization data for FinShi Capital was available from publicly
available coin-focused websites.
565. See supra note 564.
566. UTRUST, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/utrust [https://perma.cc/5KVGYVUT] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. UTRUST, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/utrust/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/SWZ8-Y629] (last visited Feb. 2,
2019) (reported as of Dec. 29, 2017).
570. Id.
571. Target Coin, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/target-coin [https://perma.cc/
QGL2-C2R2] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Target Coin, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/target-coin/
historical-data/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/UZ72-G6DZ] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2019) (reported as of Oct. 7, 2017).
575. Id.
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ATB Coin
Giga Watt

USA576
USA581

$20.4577
$15.0582

9/1/17578
7/31/17583

$35.2579
$4.3584

$0.4580
$1.6585

Total

N/A

$2,584.0

N/A

$6,969.7

$5,335.1

576. ATB Coin, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/atb-coin [https://perma.cc/
L7DV-MNDS] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. ATBCoin, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/atbcoin/historicaldata/?start=20130428&end=20190203 [https://perma.cc/GV7E-D6MB] (last visited Feb.
18, 2019) (reported as of Oct. 7, 2017).
580. Id.
581. Giga Watt, ICOmarks, https://icomarks.com/ico/giga-watt [https://perma.cc/
H4CW-CWNF] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Giga Watt Token, CoinMarketCap, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/gigawatt-token/historical-data/?start=20130801&end=20190125 [https://perma.cc/AXD8-UTEA]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (reported as of Sept. 2, 2017).
585. Id.
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF CODE/CONTRACT AUDIT
ICOName

Filecoin594
Tezos595
EOS Stage 1596
Paragon597
Bancor598

Scarcity
Claimed
(Y/N)586
Scarcity Coded
(Y/N)587
N/A
ScarcityNN
ScarcityNN
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYN

Burning
Claimed
(Y/N)588
Burning
Coded
(Y/N)589
N/A
BurningYN
BurningNN
BurningYY
BurningYY

Vesting
Claimed
(Y/N)590
Vesting Coded
(Y/N)591

Modiﬁcation
Disclosed (Y/N)592
Modiﬁcation
Coded (Y/N)593

N/A
VestingYN
VestingYN
VestingNN
VestingYN

N/A
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN

586. For individualized details related to claims of token scarcity for each ICO, see
generally Appendix C, supra note 69.
587. All claims are evaluated individually based on each ICO’s smart contract.
Individual contracts for each ICO are cited at infra notes 594–645.
588. For individualized details related to claims of token burning for each ICO, see
generally Appendix C, supra note 69.
589. All claims are evaluated individually based on each ICO’s smart contract.
Individual contracts for each ICO are cited at infra notes 594–645.
590. For individualized details related to claims of token vesting for each ICO, see
generally Appendix C, supra note 69.
591. All claims are evaluated individually based on each ICO’s smart contract.
Individual contracts for each ICO are cited at infra notes 594–645.
592. For individualized details related to claims of token modiﬁcations for each ICO,
see generally Appendix C, supra note 69.
593. All claims are evaluated individually based on each ICO’s smart contract.
Individual contracts for each ICO are cited at infra notes 594–645.
594. Filecoin’s ICO buyers received traditional investment agreements that promise
delivery of cryptoassets in the future. See Bennett Garner, What Is Filecoin? Beginner’s
Guide to the Largest-Ever ICO, CoinCentral (Feb. 20, 2018), https://coincentral.com/
filecoin-beginners-guide-largest-ever-ico/ [https://perma.cc/PJ52-J335]; see also Appendix
C, supra note 69. To date, Filecoin has not made any smart contract code publicly available
for audit on Etherscan. See Email from Marvin Ammori, Gen. Counsel of Protocol Labs,
to David Hoffman, Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. (Aug. 2, 2018) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (conﬁrming that the organization was not affiliated with any tokens
labeled “Filecoin” available on Etherscan).
595. Tezos ran simultaneous capital raising efforts on both the Bitcoin and Ethereum
networks. Following the development of the independent Tezos blockchain, contributors
were to be manually allocated “Tezzies” (the associated coin) on the new chain, in
proportion to their contributions. The “ICO” contract on the Ethereum blockchain
provided no such guarantee. See Steven O’Neal, The History of Tezos: The Infamous ICO
Trying to Rebound Amidst Lawsuits and Disputes, CoinTelegraph (July 5, 2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/the-history-of-tezos-the-infamous-ico-trying-to-reboundamidst-lawsuits-and-disputes [https://perma.cc/F88J-5BDW].
596. EOSIO, Eos-Token-distribution, Github (July 5, 2017), https://github.com/
EOSIO/eos-token-distribution/blob/master/src/eos_sale.sol [https://perma.cc/8TXF-XTEH].
597. Paragon (PRG), supra note 178.
598. Bancor (BNT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x1f573d6f
b3f13d689ff844b4ce37794d79a7ff1c#code [https://perma.cc/JD5L-U6CL] (last visited Feb. 16,
2019).
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Kin599
Status600
Tron601
TenX602
MobileGo603
KyberNetwork604
MCAP605
Loopring606
Enigma Catalyst607
ICON608
PeerBanks609
Electroneum610
Aeternity611

ScarcityYY
ScarcityYN
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYN
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityNY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYN
ScarcityYY

BurningNN
BurningYY
BurningNN
BurningNN
BurningYY
BurningYY
BurningNN
BurningNN
BurningYN
BurningNY
BurningNN
BurningNN
BurningYN

VestingYY
VestingYY
VestingYN
VestingYN
VestingNN
VestingYN
VestingNN
VestingNN
VestingYN
VestingYN
VestingNN
VestingYN
VestingYN

673
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationYY
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN

599. Kin (KIN), supra note 154.
600. StatusNetwork (SNT), supra note 183.
601. Tronix (TRX), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xf230b
790e05390fc8295f4d3f60332c93bed42e2#code [https://perma.cc/ZF45-QSTX] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
602. TenXPay (PAY), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xB97048
628DB6B661D4C2aA833e95Dbe1A905B280#code [https://perma.cc/87RH-XDAX] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
603. MobileGo (MGO), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x40395
044Ac3c0C57051906dA938B54BD6557F212#code [https://perma.cc/2WFL-QZ9W] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
604. KyberNetwork (KNC), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xdd974
d5c2e2928dea5f71b9825b8b646686bd200#code [https://perma.cc/J5T9-83T7] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
605. MCAP (MCAP), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x93
e682107d1e9defb0b5ee701c71707a4b2e46bc#code [https://perma.cc/7MJN-GAJR] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
606. Loopring (LRC), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xef68
e7c694f40c8202821edf525de3782458639f#code [https://perma.cc/L8K8-3Z9Z] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
607. Enigma (ENG), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xf0ee
6b27b759c9893ce4f094b49ad28fd15a23e4#code [https://perma.cc/P622-PA3Q] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
608. ICON (ICX), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xb5
a5f22694352c15b00323844ad545abb2b11028#code [https://perma.cc/6Z4P-PLEU] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
609. PEERBANKS (IRA), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xcb73
cef85b5d50a23a580919e72818fd2264c0f5#code [https://perma.cc/RXU7-37BD] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
610. This ICO was performed entirely off chain, prior to the launch of the Electroneum
network. As a result, automated enforcement of the promises made in the whitepaper was
not available.
611. Aeternity (AE), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x5ca
9a71b1d01849c0a95490cc00559717fcf0d1d#code [https://perma.cc/K46G-E6H5] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
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Monetha612
Basic Attention
Token613
Stox615
Civic616
Request Network617
Grid+ 618
ChainLink619
Polybius620
Unikoin Gold621
DomRaider622
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ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY

BurningYY
BurningNN

VestingYY
VestingYY614

ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN

ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
Unauditable
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY

BurningNY
BurningNN
BurningYY
BurningYN
BurningNN
Unauditable
BurningNN
BurningNN

VestingYY
VestingYN
VestingNY
VestingYY
VestingNN
Unauditable
VestingNN
VestingYY

ModiﬁcationNY
ModiﬁcationNY
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationYY
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN

612. Monetha (MTH), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xaf4
dce16da2877f8c9e00544c93b62ac40631f16#code [https://perma.cc/35DX-3GUY] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
613. Basic Attention Token (BAT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/
0x0d8775f648430679a709e98d2b0cb6250d2887ef#code [https://perma.cc/26YV-YR3F] (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019).
614. BAT implements vesting via a secondary smart contract, to which tokens were
transferred before the ICO. See BATSafe, Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/
address/0x67fa2c06c9c6d4332f330e14a66bdf1873ef3d2b#code [https://perma.cc/A2GELWWN] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
615. Stox (STX), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x006
bea43baa3f7a6f765f14f10a1a1b08334ef45#code [https://perma.cc/6Z6V-U94T] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
616. Civic (CVC), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x41e
5560054824ea6b0732e656e3ad64e20e94e45#code [https://perma.cc/G6PU-2TFA] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
617. Request (REQ), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x8f8221
afbb33998d8584a2b05749ba73c37a938a#code [https://perma.cc/G22E-FJ9N] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
618. Sale, Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x94dc1cf66c8fd62
ef3bd7da53f47423862839823#code [https://perma.cc/8BJT-93F8] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
619. ChainLink Token (LINK), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/
0x514910771af9ca656af840dff83e8264ecf986ca#code [https://perma.cc/J367-VV4R] (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019).
620. This ICO constitutes a “proxy contract”: a primary smart contract with which
users interact and a secondary smart contract whose code is incorporated by reference.
The primary contract for this ICO is written in Solidity and stores the modiﬁable reference
along with code controlling how the reference may be changed, thus modifying the
overall functionality. The secondary smart contract is available on Etherscan but only in
bytecode format. As all functionality other than modiﬁcation is delegated to the secondary
bytecode contract, we were unable to audit the scarcity, burning, and vesting whitepaper
claims. See Polybius (PLBT), supra note 205.
621. Unikoin Gold (UKG), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/
0x24692791bc444c5cd0b81e3cbcaba4b04acd1f3b#code [https://perma.cc/KWA3-4DT7] (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019).
622. DomRaiderToken (DRT), Contract, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x9af4f
26941677c706cfecf6d3379ff01bb85d5ab#code [https://perma.cc/B9DL-897Y] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
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Crypto623
Bankera624
Agrello625
Storj626
Eidoo628
Monaco629
Power Ledger630
Everex631
Decentraland632
FunFair633
Bitclave634
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Unauditable

Unauditable

Unauditable

ModiﬁcationNY

ScarcityYN
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYN
ScarcityYN
ScarcityYY
ScarcityYY
ScarcityNN
ScarcityYN
ScarcityYY

BurningNN
BurningNN
BurningYY
BurningYY
BurningYN
BurningNN
BurningNN
BurningYY
BurningYY
BurningYN

VestingYN
VestingYN
VestingYN627
VestingYY
VestingYN
VestingYN
VestingYN
VestingYN
VestingYN
VestingYN

ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNY
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNY
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationNN
ModiﬁcationYY
ModiﬁcationNY

623. This ICO constitutes a “proxy contract.” For a detailed description of what
constitutes a proxy contract, see supra note 620. As a result, for this ICO our audit was
limited solely to claims related to Modiﬁcation. See Blackmoon Crypto Token (BMC),
supra note 200.
624. Banker Token (BNK), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/
0xc80c5e40220172b36adee2c951f26f2a577810c5#code [https://perma.cc/3YCM-JMXE] (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019).
625. Delta (DLT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x07e3c70653548
b04f0a75970c1f81b4cbbfb606f#code [https://perma.cc/S5DZ-J2XR] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
626. Storj (STORJ), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/
0xb64ef51c888972c908cfacf59b47c1afbc0ab8ac#code [https://perma.cc/ZF7X-Y69P] (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019).
627. Storj is a hard case. It built a token-based vesting regime outside of its ICO smart
contract. For the vesting contract and associated transaction log, see TokenVault, Contract Overview,
Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x34f34f58c50ef059b766065dbb24f7cf885e6463
[https://perma.cc/FE7X-DH8P] (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). While we believe that the
project team manually transferred tokens for lockup into that second contract, this was
not an automatic process. Nor (as with BAT, supra note 614) was it completed manually in
advance of the ICO.
628. Eidoo (EDO), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xced4e
93198734ddaff8492d525bd258d49eb388e#code [https://perma.cc/6MFT-LRZC] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
629. Monaco (MCO), supra note 206.
630. Power Ledger (POWR), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x59583
2f8fc6bf59c85c527fec3740a1b7a361269#code [https://perma.cc/32AB-WBVN] (last visited Feb.
22, 2019).
631. Everex (EVX), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xf3db5
fa2c66b7af3eb0c0b782510816cbe4813b8#code [https://perma.cc/ZP4X-EL5G] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
632. Decentraland (MANA), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x0f
5d2fb29fb7d3cfee444a200298f468908cc942#code [https://perma.cc/XK5P-PMNL] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
633. FunFair (FUN), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x419d
0d8bdd9af5e606ae2232ed285aff190e711b#code [https://perma.cc/KYH7-NFS8] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
634. BitClave (CAT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x12345
67461d3f8db7496581774bd869c83d51c93#code [https://perma.cc/D6BP-3Q6H] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
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635. Tierion Network Token (TNT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/
address/0x08f5a9235b08173b7569f83645d2c7fb55e8ccd8#code [https://perma.cc/U2VN-EX32]
(last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
636. OmiseGO (OMG), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xd26114
cd6EE289AccF82350c8d8487fedB8A0C07#code [https://perma.cc/36TP-ERFH] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
637. Aragon (ANT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x960b
236A07cf122663c4303350609A66A7B288C0#code [https://perma.cc/J37D-DBVQ] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
638. ZRX (ZRX), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xe41d
2489571d322189246dafa5ebde1f4699f498#code [https://perma.cc/42Z2-R23M] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
639. EnjinCoin (ENJ), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xf629
cbd94d3791c9250152bd8dfbdf380e2a3b9c#code [https://perma.cc/ZCF7-UKVK] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
640. BLOCKv (VEE), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/|
0x340d2bde5eb28c1eed91b2f790723e3b160613b7#code [https://perma.cc/KB8N-X33B]
(last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
641. This ICO constitutes a “proxy contract.” For a detailed description of what constitutes
a proxy contract, see supra note 620. As a result, for this ICO our audit was limited solely to
claims related to Modification. See FinShi Capital Tokens (FINS) Contract Code, Etherscan,
https://etherscan.io/address/0x4805e471dd86dc0e3cbe44305391e37e491b579e#code [https://
perma.cc/HN3V-6R79] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
642. UTRUST (UTK), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x70a72833
d6bf7f508c8224ce59ea1ef3d0ea3a38#code [https://perma.cc/NHL2-H3F5] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).
643. Target Coin (TGT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0xac3
da587eac229c9896d919abc235ca4fd7f72c1#code [https://perma.cc/QD9D-T8SC] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
644. ATB Coin received ICO contributions through a wallet address rather than a
smart contract address. The Ethereum network therefore provides no restrictions on the use of
the funds by the owners of the address. Contributors were to later receive tokens through
a manual process following the development of the ATB network. 0x13CA7Bb198
aA6f8dbEe853742501B691497DE333, Overview, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x13ca7bb1
98aa6f8dbee853742501b691497de333 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited
Mar. 23, 2019).
645. WTT (WTT), Contract Code, Etherscan, https://etherscan.io/address/0x84119
cb33e8f590d75c2d6ea4e6b0741a7494eda#code [https://perma.cc/FQE8-ZU5N] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019).

COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM
APPENDIX C
ICO Name
Filecoin

Supply Claims
Sale Cap: 200,000,0001

Tezos

“Following the example set by the Ethereum
Foundation, there is no cap on the amount of
contributions that will be accepted by the
Foundation. This is done in order to ensure that
participation is not limited only to insiders or the
‘fast-fingered.’ The Tezos development team believes
that an uncapped fundraiser will promote a
widespread distribution of the tokens, a necessary
prerequisite to launching a robust network.”4

Burning Claims
“Q: What happens if less than 200mm
tokens are sold? Do they get burnt? If not,
who owns them?
A: . . . We will split all remaining tokens as
follows:
•
We will first apply the remainder to
pay for the costs of the token sale itself
(many token sales usually pre-allocate
this cost)
•
We will sell half of the remainder to
the public on network launch.
•
We will keep the other half for market
stability (buying and selling filecoin
on exchanges to provide market
liquidity, price stabilization, correcting
unbalanced incentives for storage and
retrieval miners, etc.).”2
“If two endorsements are made for the
same slot or two blocks at the same height
by a delegate, the evidence can be
collected by an accuser [sic] and included
in a block . . . . This accusation forfeits the
entirety of the safety deposit and future
reward up to that point in the cycle. Half is
burned, half goes to the accuser in the
form
of a block reward.
In the current protocol, accusations for the
same incident can be made several times
after the fact. This means that the deposits
and rewards for the entire
cycle are forfeited, including any deposit
made, or reward earned, after the
incident.”5

1

Vesting Claims
“The vesting schedule for each participating group is as follows:
•
Investors: 1 year minimum (advisor pre-sale), 6 month minimum
(public sale)
•
Protocol Labs: 6 years, linear vesting
•
Foundation: 6 years, linear vesting.
•
Miners: Release half-life of 6 years
For investors, the following vesting periods and discounts are
available:
•
6 month vesting, 0% discount
•
1 year vesting, 7.5% discount
•
2 year vesting, 15% discount
•
3 year vesting, 20% discount”3

Modification Claims
N/A

“10% to the Foundation, vesting over four years.
An amount equivalent to one eighth of the tokens allocated in pools
A, B, and C will be allocated to the Foundation. This pool will
represent 10% of the total number of tokens issued during the
fundraiser. . . . These tokens will vest over a period of 4 years.”6

N/A

Filecoin, Filecoin Token Sale Economics, CoinList, coinlist/assets/index/filecoin_index/Filecoin-Sale-Economics-e3f703f8cd5f644aecd7ae3860ce932064ce014dd60de115d67ff1e9047ffa8e.pdf [https://perma.cc/U75F-XNUS] [hereinafter Filecoin Token Sale] (last
visited Feb. 15, 2019).
2
Filecoin, Filecoin Investor FAQ, IPFS (Aug. 9, 2017), https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmWdXyhqHJWJut5wt4gSCueTjSnFyDHBy3SRfmcqArtz1a/2017-08-08-Filecoin-Investor-FAQ.html [http://perma.cc/M5FD-Q8Q6].
3
Filecoin Token Sale, supra note 1.
4
Tezos, Tezos Overview 11 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
5
Arthur Breitman, Proof of Stake in Tezos, Gitlab (Nov. 23, 2018), https://gitlab.com/tezos/tezos/blob/master/docs/whitedoc/proof_of_stake.rst (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
6
Tezos, supra note 4, at 12.
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
ICO Name
EOS Stage 1

Paragon

Bancor

Supply Claims
“The EOS.IO software may be configured to enforce
a cap on producer awards such that the total annual
increase in token supply does not exceed 5%.”7
“These founders' tokens (‘Founders' Tokens’)
represent 10% of the aggregate EOS Token
Distribution (or 100,000,000 EOS Tokens).”8
“Paragon will issue a total of 200,000,000 tokens. No
additional tokens will ever be generated. Distribution
of the initial 100 million tokens will be through a
series of token offerings.”10

•
•

Kin

“Fixed Price: 0.01 ETH per 1 BNT (i.e. 100 BNT
per 1 ETH)
Hidden ETH Cap: revealed if 80% of the cap is
reached.”13

“In order to finance the Kin roadmap, Kik will
conduct a token distribution event that will offer for
sale one trillion units out of a 10 trillion unit total
supply of kin.”16

Burning Claims
N/A

Vesting Claims
“The default EOSIO Software configuration developed by Block.one
locks new founders’ tokens distributed pursuant to the launch of an
EOSIO Platform in a smart contract and releases 100,000,000 of such
tokens (10% of the aggregate EOS Token Distribution) linearly to
Block.one every second over a period of 10 years.”9

Modification Claims
N/A

“All fees on the Paragon ecosystem will be
paid in PRG. The fee structure will keep
the price of each transaction low. Each
transaction will cost $.000000005 or
5/1000000000 of a cent (5E-10%). Onehalf of the fee will be burned each time a
transaction occurs, and the other one-half
will be deposited to the Paragon Reserve
Fund. With the cannabis market surpassing
$100B market size in the US alone and
current banking issues, we’re hoping to
bring a big share of it onto our platform.”11
“4.3.1 Implicit burn by transferring tokens
to the SmartToken address
•
Likelihood: low
•
Impact: high
SmartToken implements functionality that
burns tokens if transferred to the address
of the token itself. While this seems a
sensible default, absent a compelling need
for users to be able to burn tokens, we
recommend that this functionality be
removed, and the token instead throw an
exception in this case. User error, and
mistakenly entering the token address in
the to [sic] field, could otherwise easily
lead to them inadvertently destroying
tokens.”14
N/A

•

“50,000,000 tokens for sale at stage 2—no sooner than 2021, at
market price (not the initial $1 of the first crowdsale)
40,000,000 tokens allotted for Paragon controlled reserve to
maintain price support of the PRG tokens. Tokens can be
bought or sold to keep the tokens circulation stable
10,000,000 tokens community-controlled reserve to be used for
the best startup ideas as voted on by the community”12

N/A

“Vesting is a governance practice designed to ensure long-term
alignment of interests and is standard for any serious project. All
founders and team members will have a 3 year vesting schedule with
a 6 month cliff. This means we will mature one-sixth of our tokens
every 6 months.”15

N/A

“Each day, once the Rewards Engine is up and running, d=0.061% of
the remaining reserves will be put into circulation (for a total of 20
percent of remaining reserves every year).”17

N/A

7

•
•

EOS, EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2, GitHub (Apr. 28, 2018), https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/blob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper.md [https://perma.cc/7D6W-AQ73].
Frequently Asked Questions, EOS, https://eos.io/faq (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
9
Id.
10
Paragon, Whitepaper Version 1.0, at 29 (2017), https://paragoncoin.com/whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/K4YZ-LTYD].
11
Id. at 32.
12
Id. at 13.
13
Bancor, Bancor Network Token (BNT) Contribution & Token Allocation Terms, Medium (June 5, 2017), https://medium.com/@bancor/bancor-network-token-bnt-contribution-token-creation-terms-48cc85a63812 [http://perma.cc/H7DV-NZPN].
14
Nick Johnson, Bancor Audit, GitHubGist (May 31, 2017), https://gist.github.com/Arachnid/c65fd1bd61a8e0294aef95a4808edc78#file-bancor-audit-md [http://perma.cc/3DSR-KCU5].
15
Bancor, supra note 13.
16
Kik Interactive, Inc., Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem of Digital Services for Daily Life 21 (2017), https://kinecosystem.org/static/files/Kin_Whitepaper_V1_English.pdf [http://perma.cc/7XH2-H4LL].
17
Kik Interactive, Inc., Kin Rewards Engine 5 (2017), https://kinecosystem.org/static/files/Kin_Rewards_Engine_RFC.pdf [http://perma.cc/9VRJ-Y2BZ].
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COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM
ICO Name
Status

Supply Claims
“The easiest way to understand the Dynamic Ceiling
is as a series of ‘hidden hard caps’. A fixed upper
limit that restricts further contributions until the next
upper limit is revealed.
The first ceiling is public and begins the moment
12M CHF (Swiss Francs) equivalent has been
reached. It signifies that the Contribution Period will
end within 24 hours, or sooner if the hidden hard
ceiling has been met.
The moment the first ceiling has been triggered
there will be a series of additional hidden ceilings
that begin after a given number of blocks has been
reached. Each hidden ceiling decreases in size and
has to be revealed publicly before accepting further
contributions.
This allows contributors to continue to participate
after the first ceiling has been reached, but reduces
the maximum contribution size per ceiling, and
solves the problem of run-away ‘soft caps’.”18

Burning Claims
“The distribution of SNT created during
the contribution period has been outlined
by Status’ team in the following way: . . .
- 29% SNT Reserve for future stakeholders,
locked for a minimum of a year, to be
burned if not deemed necessary for the
growth of the network.”19

Vesting Claims
“20% of SNT created during the Contribution Period will be
allocated to Status Core Dev; the founders and team, over a 24
month vesting period, with a 6 month cliff. This means Founder
tokens will not be immediately tradable . . . .”20

Tron

“A total of 100 billion.”22

N/A

“The 34.2518% TRX held by Tron Foundation, namely the
34251807523.9 TRX had already being locked up until January 1st,
2020. Tron Foundation TRX will not be withdrawn or traded.”23

18

Modification Claims
“Based on the work of smart contract
developer Jordi Baylina, the Status
Network token possesses an interesting
attribute—the ability to easily spawn new
tokens that have the same balance
distribution as the parent token at any
given block number. We're strong
believers in a culture of
experimentation, and this model
preserves fair contribution for early
backers, without imposing rigid
restrictions on the ability to test new
SNT utility as the project evolves over
time.
The core team and the Status
community are committed to ensuring
that the SNT token adds value to the
platform and drives network effects.
Given the Ethereum ecosystem is still in
its infancy and token models are still
being researched and developed, we
also plan to introduce the ability to
propose new functionality to the Status
community. Thus, SNT may be assigned
a number of additional functions in the
network beyond those defined in the
scope above. Due to its complexity,
future rights of the SNT are not
guaranteed and remain a research
topic.”21
N/A

The Status Network, Status (June 15, 2017), https://status.im/whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/HD28-8RE8].
Blockchain Paper, Status ICO Analysis, Medium (June 15, 2017), https://medium.com/@researchpaper/status-ico-analysis-7ca4c491295e [http://perma.cc/A98X-E5XP].
20
Status, supra note 18.
21
Id.
22
Tron, Tron Whitepaper 30 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
23
Tron Found., Announcement to Our Investors, Medium (Dec. 19, 2017), https://medium.com/@Tronfoundation/announcement-on-the-lock-of-trx-held-by-tron-foundation-e64bf861c7e0 [http://perma.cc/GX8Q-WCM8].
19
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TenX

MobileGo

PAY token price24

1 PAY token equals 1/350
ETH (1 ETH will buy 350
PAY tokens)
80%

Total Percentage of all
PAY tokens for public,
comprising (a) and (b)
below
(a) Percentage of all
51%
PAY tokens for TenX
Initial Token Sale
29%
(b) Percentage of all
PAY tokens for
community initiatives
etc.
Percentage of all PAY
20%
tokens for long-term
alignment of interests
Target Amount Sold
200,000 ETH worth of PAY
(Fixed limit)
Tokens
“The token has a fixed supply of 100 million tokens,
with the full supply created on both blockchains.”26

N/A

“10% will be used by TenX to incentivise founders, employees and
the development team. Each TenX founder and employee will
receive part of their compensation package in PAY tokens, which will
vest over 4 years.”25

N/A

“We will use a percentage of the profits
from the Gamecredits mobile store to buy
back and burn MobileGo tokens. Once the
crowdsale is completed, a marketing fund
will be created with a minimum of 50% of
funds raised. The allocation of these
resources and the profits that these
resources generate will be audited and
made available to MobileGo Token
holders.”27

N/A

N/A

24

TenX, Payment Platform Whitepaper 34 (2017), https://downloads.ctfassets.net/xecblntwky6m/5sWzq3FOoMiWuiQ0i8gKCG/84d359acabe7bb1ef3d1c1252c82828a/tenx_whitepaper_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ZYL-TT5F].
Id. at 37.
26
MobileGo, Whitepaper MobileGo Token, BRAVENEWCOIN, https://orig.bravenewcoin.com/assets/Whitepapers/MobileGo-Whitepaper.pdf?_ga=2.246319106.704478340.1548440339-1315354191.1548440339 [http://perma.cc/M6RB-CVXF] (last visited Jan. 25,
2019).
27
Id.
25
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KyberNetwork

“A maximum amount of 226,000,000 KyberNetwork
Crystal tokens (KNC) will be minted.”28

MCAP
Loopring

“There are a total of 100 million MCAP tokens.”31
“Part of providing an open protocol is remaining
blockchain agnostic. Hence, Loopring has launched
an initial currency on Ethereum (LRC), but it also
plans to launch Loopring NEO (LRN) and Loopring
QTUM (LRQ). . . . The total supply of LRN will be
139,507,605.45. This is exactly 1/10 of the total
supply of LRC.”32
“There will now be 150M total tokens in the
supply.”33

Enigma Catalyst

“Before operating, KyberNetwork reserves
need to pre-purchase and store KNC
tokens. In every trade, a small fraction
(exact numbers are TBD) of the trade
volume will be paid by the reserve to
KyberNetwork platform in KNC. This small
fee represents the reserve's payment in
return for the right to be able to operate
and earn profits from trading activities in
KyberNetwork. The collected KNC tokens
from the fees, after paying for the
operation expenses and to the supporting
partners, will be burned, i.e. taken out of
circulation. The burning of tokens could
potentially increase the appreciation of the
remaining KNC tokens as the total supply
in circulation reduces.”29
N/A
N/A

“The tokens for founders and advisors (around 15% of the total
tokens) will be fully vested in 2 years, with a one year lock-up
period.”30

N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

“The crowdsale will continue for 5 days. If
we do not sell all 75M tokens in our
crowdsale, the unsold tokens will be
burned. We will also burn proportional
tokens from the remaining supply. This
ensures the crowd owns 50% of all created
tokens.”34

“The team’s ENG tokens vest over multiple years, with all of the team
committed to holding their tokens through the first year.”35

N/A

28

Loi Luu, KyberNetwork’s Token Sale Terms Overview, KyberNetwork (Aug. 24, 2017), https://blog.kyber.network/kybernetworks-token-sale-terms-overview-de031ce9738e [http://perma.cc/R4CT-WFFK].
Loi Luu & Yaron Velner, KyberNetwork Whitepaper, CryptoGround 16, https://www.cryptoground.com/storage/files/1527489066_KyberNetworkWhitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/MQM6-UZEF] (last updated Aug. 27, 2017).
30
Luu, supra note 28.
31
MCAP, MCAP Whitepaper, Crypto Rating, http://cryptorating.eu/whitepapers/MCAP/mcap-whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3HM-9P7F] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
32
Bennett Garner, Loopring NEO: All About the LRN Token & Airdrop, CoinCentral (May 2, 2018), https://coincentral.com/loopring-neo-lrn-airdrop/ [http://perma.cc/5NEC-HM89].
33
Enigma Project, Enigma’s Token Sale — Full Details, Enigma Blog (Sept. 5, 2017), https://blog.enigma.co/enigmas-token-sale-full-details-4d70c56510ba [http://perma.cc/GX6S-AYR4].
34
Id.
35
Token Data, The MITation Game — Q&A with Enigma, Medium (Aug. 29, 2017), https://medium.com/blockchannel/the-mitation-game-q-a-with-enigma-bf2c0c85adc [http://perma.cc/TN76-3F77].
29
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ICON

PeerBanks
Electroneum

“ICX can be issued up to 20% of total volume
annually with the consensus of ICON Republic,
taking into consideration the ICX trading volume,
DEX trading volume, freezing volume, and
transaction fee. However, ICX is not directly issued
but by providing nodes with the right to issuance.
These rights are granted to the nodes on ICON
Republic, and each node is entitled to receive ICX
from the ICON Foundation by exercising its rights.
Each Node may exercise its rights at any time and
does not have to exercise immediately.”36
“Currently, the total number of IRA tokens are fixed
to 1,000,000.”38
“With Electroneum’s supply of 21 billion coins we’ve
made it easier to mine whole coins and pay with
whole coins.”39

Aeternity

“Aeternity conducted 2 rounds of public token sale.
The Aeternity token is named AE. . . . The Aeternity
team kept 17% of total supply (46,526,591 AE). This
resulted in a total supply of 273,685,830.”41

Monetha

“The creation will be capped (‘Soft Cap’) upon
receipt of ETH equivalent to EUR 7m (fixed on
28000 ETH). This amount is subject to change before
the Token Creation event. The Token Creation
period will last 31 (thirty one) days, if Soft Cap is not
reached sooner. If the Soft Cap is reached before the
end of 31 (thirty one) days, additional contributions
will be accepted for 120 hours in case some
contributors missed the very short window for MTH
creation.”44
“Token Distribution

Basic Attention

N/A

“Lock up period for team will be 2 years, with vesting 6 months for 4
times. For advisors it varies, but mostly ¼ every six months as well.”37

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

“How many coins is allocated for the devs?
- $2000 dollars worth of Electroneum, which is around 20 million
coins.
Can the devs dump them when the coin gets listed?
- No. They cannot sell them within the first 12 months of the launch
of the coin.”40
“Two years, but certain amount of the sums will become spendable in
periods.”43

N/A

% of tokens generated to
Monetha team

15%. Automatically locked for 12
months by smart contract.

N/A

% of tokens generated for
loyalty program
% of tokens generated to
bounty campaign, advisors,
partners, ICO campaign costs
% of tokens generated for
future company financing
BAT Contract
BAT Total

13%. Automatically locked for 12
months by smart contract.
12%

Aeternity has discussed “burning” its
tokens on the Ethereum blockchain in the
process of converting the tokens to
currency on the Aeternity blockchain,
which does not yet exist.42
“Tokens that are not sold during the
Crowdsale will be burned automatically by
the smart contract.”45

N/A

36

10%. Automatically locked for 12
months by smart contract.46
Distribution

N/A

N/A

ICON Found., ICON Whitepaper 30 (2017), https://docs.icon.foundation/ICON-Whitepaper-EN-Draft.pdf [http://perma.cc/334K-FM98].
helloicon, ICON Technical Q&A Summary, r/hellocin, Reddit (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.reddit.com/r/helloicon/comments/70t56h/icon_technical_qa_summary/ [http://perma.cc/GXW4-F2K4].
38
Peerbanks, Peerbanks Whitepaper 7 (2017), https://peerbanks.org/doc/whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/YA5B-9L6N].
39
Electroneum, Electroneum Overview & Whitepaper 9 (2017), https://electroneum.com/overview-white-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/9YFG-TJVJ].
40
Imikocha, Electroneum FAQ, Electroneum Talk (Sept. 16, 2017), http://electroneumtalk.proboards.com/thread/8/electroneum-faq [http://perma.cc/A7MX-MSVW].
41
Edward Ward, Token Analysis: Aeternity (AE), Medium (May 28, 2018), https://medium.com/@Edward.Ward_53210/token-analysis-aeternity-ae-782a87a5aabe [http://perma.cc/DB4U-8Z7Q].
42
See Aetrnty, Comment in Burning Token, r/Aeternity, Reddit (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.reddit.com/r/Aeternity/comments/6za07b/burning_token/ [https://perma.cc/483H-EQV3].
43
vdramaliev, Comment in How Long Is the Founders/Team Coins Locked? 12 Months?, r/Aeternity, Reddit (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.reddit.com/r/Aeternity/comments/632f8l/how_long_is_the_foundersteam_coins_locked_12/ [http://perma.cc/Y45K-H5CC].
44
Monetha, White Paper 35–36 (2017), https://ico.monetha.io/Monetha_WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HUA-ZYHY].
45
Id. at 35.
46
Id. at 36.
37
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Token

Stox

Civic

•
•
•

Brave: 13.3% of max; 200 million BAT.
User growth pool: 300 million BAT.
Token available to public at launch: 1 billion
(corresponding to the ETH raised at token
launch).”47
“In order to finance Stox’s road map, Stox will
conduct a token sale of an initial supply of STX
tokens.
STX will be sold at a constant price (in ETH) and the
initial supply will depend on amount of STX sold. As
of the conclusion of the sale, the distributed STX will
constitute the entirety of the available liquid supply.
A portion of the supply would be preallocated to
invest.com as the founding member of the ecosystem,
in a long term vesting schedule. Major portion of the
allocation to Stox Ltd. will be used for bringing
further strategic partners to the Stox platform.”49

“[The] Company will create 1 billion Tokens . . . .”51

N/A

0x67fa2

133,650,000
(180-Day Lockup)

Development Pool48

% of Total
Supply
50%

Beneficiary

Special terms

Coins cannot be
transferred until end
of token sale period
12.5%
invest.com Ltd.
Uniform 12-month
vesting schedule
10%
Stox team
Uniform 24-month
vesting schedule
27.5%
Stox Ltd.
Will be used to bring
strategic partners to
the Stox ecosystem,
and as operational
reserve50
“33% (or 330 million) [of the created Tokens] will be allocated to
the Company (the “Company Inventory”), for its use as follows:
(i) One third of the Company Inventory will remain in a locked state
for 1 year from the Crowdsale End Date; another third of the
Company Inventory will remain in a locked state for 2 years from the
Crowdsale End Date; and the remaining third of the Company
Inventory will remain in a locked state for 3 years from the Crowdsale
End Date.
(ii) Once unlocked, Company reserves the right to use the Company
Inventory for any purposes at its sole discretion.
(iii) In no event will the Company sell any Tokens from the
Company Inventory before the date that is one year after the
Crowdsale End Date.
(iv) In no event will any Tokens from the Company Inventory be sold
by the Company at any point for a Price Per Token of less than USD
$0.10.”52

N/A

47

Token sale participants

Stox Platform for Prediction Markets, Stox 43, https://resources.stox.com/stox-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2Q3-RKGY] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
FAQ, Basic Attention Token, https://basicattentiontoken.org/faq/ [https://perma.cc/6RJE-PAQE ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
49
Stox, Stox Platform for Prediction Markets 43, https://resources.stox.com/stox-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2Q3-RKGY] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
50
Id.
51
Civic Techs., Inc., Crowdsale Terms 12 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
52
Id.
48
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Request Network

“The Request Network token launch ended
successfully with 100% of the tokens distributed. We
are glad to have received positive feedbacks [sic]
from the community and that the event happened in
a smooth way.
The fundraising was capped at 100,000 ETH for
500,000,000 REQ and we limited the number of
approved registrants at 14,895.”53

Grid+

“A fixed number of GRID tokens (300,000,000) will
be minted before the upcoming token sale—this will
be the only time GRID are created.”55

ChainLink

“The total supply of the token is 1,000,000,000, and
each token is divisible up to 18 decimal places.”58

Polybius

“The total supply is not locked, as we will need to be
able to add tokens before the end of sale and revoke
the unsold amount. . . . At the end of the crowdsale all
sold tokens are considered to be 93% of the total
supply. The remaining 7% are then distributed
among founders and bounties receivers according to
the information above.”60

“This layer is chargeable, in that each
extension will take a fee that will be
partially burned and partially transferred
to the extension developers, with the
extensions accrued on the same invoice.
Costs decrease over time to remain
competitive and discourage alternative
systems. The costs of these extensions [are]
estimated to be between 0.1% and 0.5%
initially, though as the system grows, the
costs will be reduced. More than 5,000
billion dollars in payments are made each
day, and in the end it will be enough to
finance the network by less than 0.1%.”54
“Each GRID token will be a credit on the
Grid+ platform, redeemable by customers
of the Grid+ platform for the right to
purchase 500 kWh of electricity at the
wholesale price available to Grid+ in the
relevant jurisdiction at the time such
electricity is received by the redeeming
customer. At the time of redemption,
GRID tokens will be assigned a timestamp
by the redemption contract and taken out
of supply forever via a mechanism modeled
after EIP 661.”56
“To prevent accidental burns, the token
does not allow transfers to the contract
itself and to 0x0.”59
“There will be 20, 000, 000 Tokens
generated for the purpose of the
Crowdfunding. Unreleased Tokens will be
destroyed after the Crowdfunding.”61

53

N/A

N/A

“20% (60,000,000) will be held by the founders of Grid+; of these,
25% will remain time-locked for each of 6, 12, and 18 months, with
the final 25% also being unlocked after 18 months. Another 20%
(60,000,000) will be held by external owners of Grid+; these will be
time-locked on the same schedule and in the same percentages as
the founders’ tokens.”57

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

“Polybius can propose modifications by
deploying an entirely new secondary
smart contract and linking it to the
primary smart contract via the
commitUpgrade function. The primary
smart contract does not allow the owner
to make modifications directly—the
owner must first propose the upgrade,
which only takes effect after three days
unless the user opts out.”62

Laura Girod, Request Network Token Launch — Statistics, Request Network (Oct. 17, 2017), https://blog.request.network/request-network-token-sale-statistics-db65476ae8ca [https://perma.cc/Q7HQ-9AHP].
Request Network, The Future of Commerce: A Decentralized Network for Payment Requests 8 (2018), https://request.network/assets/pdf/request_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JN6-FRK5].
55
Welcome to the Future of Energy, Grid+ at 40, https://gridplus.io/assets/Gridwhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL23-D6SX] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
LINK Token Contracts, GitHub, https://github.com/SmartContractKit/LinkToken [https://perma.cc/TF2N-DQDK] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
59
Id.
60
Polybius Prospectus, Polybius 3, 5, https://polybius.io/media/prospectus.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGH9-XREW] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
61
Polybius Crowdfunding Terms & Conditions, Polybius, https://polybius.io/media/terms_and_conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7XZ-Y5HM] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
62
See Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 591, 633–34 (2019) (footnote omitted).
54
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COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM
Unikoin Gold

“Company will create a total of 1,000,000,000
UnikoinGold by the time of the Delivery Date . . . .
No additional UnikoinGold will be created.”63
“The Trading Operation foresees the creation and
distribution of 1 billion DomRaider Tokens (DRT) . .
. .”64

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Blackmoon
Crypto

“All available BMC will be issued during the
Distribution period. This will be a one-time operation
and no additional issuance is available for BMC
tokens. The total number of BMC to be issued will be
calculated at the end of the Distribution Period
according to the formula: amount of BMC sold
during the Distribution multiplied by 2.”66

“50% of the proceeds are distributed
among the fund’s token holders via a buyback process. In this way, distribution of
income provides liquidity of the fund’s
tokens. Bought-out tokens are burned so
that income will continue to increase for
the remaining fund tokens.”67

Bankera

“[T]he total HARDCAP for pre-ICO and ICO is
10,000,000,000 BNK (2,500,000,000 + 7,500,000,000)
worth 177M EUR (25M EUR + 152M EUR) and at
least 750M EUR for the SCO.”69

N/A

“Sold tokens may be used and transferred from the time they are
assigned. 20% of tokens distributed free of charge to stakeholders
that have contributed to the operation’s success will be immediately
useable and transferable. The remaining 80% will be released
gradually at 10% of the total each month from the date the first
tokens are issued. In this way, every holder of tokens obtained
through this category will have received full free usage and
transferability of these tokens 8 months following their issue. The
tokens held in reserve by DomRaider will be locked at a level of 90%
of the reserve and released gradually at 5% of the total reserve per
month.”65
“30% of the BMCs will be allocated to the Company reserve and
locked for a minimum of 36 months. This reserve is a source of the
Company’s income after the Distribution Period and can be
allocated only partially and only among direct contributors and the
core team if necessary, and not earlier than 36 months. This reserve
is a necessary foundation for sustainable future development of the
Blackmoon Crypto Platform.
20% of the BMCs will be allocated to the founding Blackmoon
Crypto team and advisors, locked in a smart contract with a 24-month
vesting period, and six-month cliff. These BMCs won’t be
immediately tradable and will secure the core team members by
ensuring their motivation after the Distribution Period. Some BMCs
from this pool (but not more than 5% of all BMCs) will be allocated
to non-operational advisors and will be locked with a six-month cliff
without vesting.
Up to 3% will go to subcontractors and bounty campaign members
without vesting.”68
“The 25% of tokens will be attributed to the team as a motivation as
well as for bounty program for outsiders. The team part of tokens will
be allocated over time.”70

DomRaider

63

N/A

N/A

Terms of Token Sale, Unikrn 13, https://static.unikrn.com/42/unikrn_bm/doc/terms_of-token_sale.pdf [https://perma.cc/G75U-SDH4] (last updated Sept. 22, 2017).
Domraider, ICO: Whitepaper 47 (2017), https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/domraider/domraider/DomRaider+ICO+Whitepaper+EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSA6-EZMK].
65
Id.
66
Blockchain Paper, Black Moon Investment Analysis, Medium (Sept. 7, 2017), https://medium.com/@researchpaper/blackmoon-crypto-is-part-of-the-blackmoon-financial-group-a-financial-technology-company-founded-56b5a64d88c3
[https://perma.cc/C3KH-BAS8].
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Bankera, Bankera Whitepaper, Icorating 19, https://icorating.com/upload/whitepaper/YLuetfjRzqDjwWwCnfi8BN3IcZ3l2ytV6AtTBz1M.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6AK-H8JS] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
70
Id.
64
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Agrello

“With a total of 150 million DLT token (and no plan
to create new), Agrello’s team has decided to
distribute 90 million DLT via its ICO which will take
place on July 10th, 2017 till August 9th, 2017 (token
distribution date as well), with a minimum
investment goal of 4,000 BTC.”71

N/A

Storj

“At present, the total supply of Pre-existing Tokens is
500 million, 51,173,144 of which are [sic] Pre-existing
Tokens in circulation (‘Circulating Pre-existing
Tokens’). As of April 1, 2017, Storj U.S. held
448,967,875 Pre-existing Tokens (‘Storj U.S. Preexisting Tokens’).”73

“4. Tokens to Be Sold
The Company anticipates selling
approximately 75 million Tokens during
the Sale Period. The Tokens to be sold
during the Sale Period will be from a pool
of Company-owned Tokens transferred
from the Company Custodial Wallet to the
Smart Contract System. All Tokens will be
of equal value and functionality. During
the Sale Period, Company will burn at least
one Token in the Company Custodial
Wallet for each Token it sells.
5. Tokens Retained by Company
. . . Although it has no plans to do so at this
time, the Company reserves the right to
burn Retained Tokens at any point during
or after the Sale Period.”74

71

“The token sale funds are held in thousands of cold stored addresses.
This is a way that the sale was conducted and anyone associated with
the sale would know this. Agrello is a private company and we plan
on having open dialogue with our supporters and we have been very
appropriately been using funds. There are not 1 or a few addresses
that show the funds collected. No one on the team, any contractors,
advisors, or partners have received DLT. All parties have vesting
periods for their tokens.”72
“Tokens not sold or burned during the Sale Period will be retained
by the Company (the “Retained Tokens”). At least 80% of Retained
Tokens retained will be placed into time-locked smart contracts and
remain in a locked state for at least six (6) months. Although it has
no plans to do so at this time, the Company reserves the right to
burn Retained Tokens at any point during or after the Sale Period.
Over time, the Company currently anticipates using the Retained
Tokens to compensate employees (including salaries and non-salary
compensation), to fund future development of Storj and the
Network, provide grants to (or purchase equity stakes in) thirdparties working on projects in the Storj ecosystem, donate Tokens to
non-profit entities, and support general development of the Storj
ecosystem. These anticipated purposes are listed for illustration only,
and Company reserves the right to use Reserved Tokens for these
purposes (or others) at its sole discretion.”75

MCAP Labs, Agrello ICO Evaluation, Medium (Aug. 2, 2017), https://medium.com/mcap-labs/agrello-ico-evaluation-ccae2f4b1281 [https://perma.cc/5CRU-GT6B].
Agrello, Alex Left Agrello Team, r/Agrello, Reddit (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.reddit.com/r/Agrello/comments/72qv3o/alex_left_agrello_team/dnl6se7/ [https://perma.cc/GYG3-F6Y6].
73
Storj Labs (BVI) Ltd., Terms of Token Sale 11 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
74
Id. at 14.
75
Id.
72

10
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COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM
Eidoo

Monaco

“Total number of token: 100 million.”76

“Monaco Card aims to accept up to 150,000ETH
from our initial token partners and create
approximately 17.6m MCO for sale in exchange for
the ETH committed.
The MCO smart contract will stop accepting
commitments at 888,888ETH hard cap. The Token
Sale will last for 30 days. If soft-cap is reached, the
event will be extended for 7 days and then closed. If
hard-cap is reached, the event will close
automatically.” 79
“We are setting aside 30% of all MCO created as
Reserve Tokens.
These MCO will not be issued or sold during the
initial sale and are locked in a smart contract.”80

Eidoo
Tokens

“Unsold tokens during the sale will be
burned.”77

“At any time, a holder of MCO can
‘Redeem and Burn’ the MCO for their prorata share of each token held by the MCO
Asset Contract. The holder will irrevocably
destroy the MCO, and in exchange, the
MCO Asset Contract will transfer the
underlying tokens to the holder.
MCO token will have a market value at or
above the assets contained in the MCO
Asset Contract. If the value goes below,
market participants will be incentivized to
purchase MCO and burn it; this will then
push the value of MCO back up.”81

76

Eidoo

Total
(millions
of tokens)
47

Unlocked
(millions
of tokens)
0

Locked
(millions
of tokens)
47

Founders

13

3

10

Advisors
Early
Investors

3
12

3
3,6

0
8,4

Pre-sale

5

1

4

Lock Time

N/A

20M EDO
2 years
15M EDO for 1
year
6M EDO
6 month*
6M EDO
3 month*
10M EDO for 2
years**
8.4M EDO
unlocked
progressively in
9 months
4m EDO for 2
years**

Token
20
20
078
Sale
•
“25% of MCO created during the creation event will be
allocated to Monaco Card founders, locked in a smart contract
for 3 months
•
10% of MCO created during the creation event will be allocated
to the Company and utilized as a future employee token pool, to
strengthen our ability to attract & retail top talent; these tokens
will be locked in a smart contract for 12 months
•
5% of MCO created during the creation event will be created for
and granted to advisors; these tokens will be locked in a smart
contract for 3 months.”82

N/A

Eidoo, Ethereum Funding Informative Prospect 13 (2017), https://eidoo.io/docs/EIDOO_Ethereum_Funding_Informative_Prospect_v_1_0_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/MPP7-EXXA].
Id.
78
Id. One asterisk indicates that “[t]hese tokens will be subjected to Airdrop.” Id. Two asterisks indicates that “[t]hese tokens will be locked after the token sale.” Id.
79
Monaco, Monaco Whitepaper, White Paper Database 8, https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Monaco-MCO-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXS9-5GQY] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
80
Id. at 11.
81
Id. at 6.
82
Id. at 29.
77
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Power Ledger

“1,000,000,000 POWR tokens have been created and
the total amount of tokens will be allocated as follows:
•
600,000,000 tokens distributed to rapidly develop
the Ecosystem (i.e Distribution Pool’s allocation
of 350,000,000 to the Token Sale, 248,500,000
used by the Power Ledger Growth Pool, and
1,500,000 towards the Bounty Campaign);
•
250,000,000 tokens will be reserved for future
use if needed (Power Ledger Escrow); and
•
150,000,000 tokens allocated under escrow to
Developers and Founders.”83

“Q: Are there any plans to burn the
remaining tokens held by PL if they are not
needed for future funding?
A: We will need them if we grow to the size
aimed for that was the logic in 1 b
selection. But like the thinking[!]”84

Everex

“Total EVX Tokens supply: approx. 25,000,000*
Tokens offered for a public sale: 17,500,000
*final number of tokens is defined after the end of
the token sale based on amounts contributed.
No tokens are pre-issued before the crowdsale
event.”86

“If less than 70,000 ETH in proceeds has
been received by the termination of the
Sale Period (the ‘Minimum Threshold’),
the unsold balance of Tokens that is
authorized but unissued to purchasers will
be retained in Company inventory to be
utilized by Company as part of its incentive
Development Fund to be distributed in
accordance with the decision of the board
on a quarterly basis as elsewhere set forth
herein.”87

“The POWR tokens which are gifted to or discounted to Application
Hosts, from the Growth Pool, will be held in escrow for a minimum
period of 1–3 years after they are distributed to ensure that they are
used on the Platform . . . .
A further 250,000,000 tokens will be retained for any future funding
needs of Power Ledger and the Platform, including development or
on-boarding future Participants if required. Due to the dependency
on the outcome of the Token Sale, this allocation will be held in the
Power Ledger Escrow. The escrow period will be 2 years. The escrow
period in respect of these tokens will commence at the date of
distribution . . . .
The Developer's and Founder's tokens will be distributed to Power
Ledger’s directors, employees and contractors engaged in the
building of the Platform. All of the Developer's and Founder’s tokens
will be subject to escrow for a period of between six and 18 months,
with their release linked to performance variables. The escrow period
in respect of these tokens will commence at the completion of the
Token Sale.”85
EVX Vesting Schedule88
Team holdings:
15%
-not vested
5%
-vested in 6 month
5%
-vested in 12 month
5%
Advisors and partners:
4% not vested
EVX Development fund
4% vested in 12 month

N/A

N/A

83
Power Ledger, Token Generation Paper, Hubspot 2, https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4519667/Documents%20/Power%20Ledger%20Token%20Paper%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW32-LPW4] [hereinafter Power Ledger Token Generation] (last
visited Jan. 26, 2019).
84
Power Ledger, Power Ledger Founders AMA Transcript, Medium (Nov. 14, 2017), https://medium.com/power-ledger/power-ledger-founders-ama-transcript-9b147521de4d [https://perma.cc/F8N7-THFZ].
85
Power Ledger Token Generation, supra note 83, at 3–4.
86
Everex One, Pte, Ltd., Token Sale Event: Terms and Conditions 2 (2017), https://azdoc.pl/evx-token-sale-event-terms-and-conditions.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
87
Everex, Everex Terms and Policies 27 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
88
Everex One, supra note 86, at 5.
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Decentraland

“Increasing Sale: MANA tokens will sell at a price that
goes from $24 USD per LAND equivalent to $40
USD. A hard cap is set at $25 million USD. The
distribution of additional tokens is fixed. . . .
Inflation rate: Included is an 8 percent increase of
the token supply for the first year, and a lower rate in
subsequent years. This is implemented through a
Continuous Token Model. This structure will allow
Decentraland to regularly expand while
accommodating new users.”89

FunFair

“The Phase 1 creation crediting period will end no
later than July 7, 2017 at 14:00 UTC. If 500 million
(500,000,000) FUN have been created at any time
before Jul[y] 7, 2017 14:00 UTC, token creation will
continue for 4 additional hours at that time. After 4
hours or 1 billion FUN are issued, the crediting
period will cease, the receiving contract will be
marked “finished” and it will reject ether from that
time on by calling throw.
As soon as Phase 1 closes, additional tokens will be
created in an amount equal to three times the
amount sold during the Phase 1 creation crediting
period and held in trust until the Phase 2 token
issuance event.
At some point following the Phase 1 close, the Phase
2 token issuance event will begin. In Phase 2, all
tokens held in trust will be offered in a Dutch
auction. Whatever tokens remain unsold in this event
will be distributed pro rata to holders of tokens sold
in Phase 1 issuance.”92
“General Terms
•
Consumer Activity Token (CAT)
•
2 billion total token supply
550,842,000 tokens distributed in token sale or
25,547,000 USD hard cap.”96

Bitclave

“Decentraland will use an Ethereum smart
contract to maintain a ledger of ownership
for land parcels in the virtual world. We
call these non-fungible digital assets LAND
....
LAND is bought by burning MANA, a
fungible ERC20 token of fixed supply. This
token serves as a proxy for the cost of
claiming a new parcel. The LAND contract
uses a burn function to destroy MANA and
create a new entry in the LAND registry.
New parcels need to be adjacent to a nonempty parcel.”90
“The Token Contract implements the
ERC20 standard with a few additional
features. The contract is split into three
separate parts: . . .
•
A ‘Ledger’ contract referred to by the
‘Controller’—this contract holds all
balances and manages all minting and
burning and will not change except in
extreme circumstances.”93

“20 percent will go to the development team, early contributors and
advisors, and the remaining 20 percent will be held by Decentraland.
Project Leads will have three-year vesting.”91

N/A

“Founder Stake: FunFair developers, founders and angel investors
will receive 37.5% of total tokens, released slowly over an 18-month
period.
Advisor Stake: FunFair advisors will receive 2.5% of total tokens,
released immediately.”94

“The Token Contract implements the
ERC20 standard with a few additional
features.
The contract is split into three separate
parts:
•
A ‘Front End’ contract—this is the
permanent address of the token.
•
A ‘Controller’ contract referred to
by the Front End—this encapsulates
the logic used to implement FUN
token mechanics and may be
upgraded in the future.” 95

“Due to the recent increase in crypto to
USD rate, we might reach our USD cap
before reaching the tokens cap. In this
case, the unsold tokens will be burned.”97

“Team has vesting for 2 years. They cannot sell the tokens.”98

N/A

89

Ari Meilich, The Decentraland Token Sale Terms, Decentraland (July 3, 2017), https://blog.decentraland.org/the-decentraland-token-sale-terms-81861704c086 [https://perma.cc/9JLH-EWG6].
Decentraland White Paper, Decentraland 9, https://decentraland.org/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CGJ-CQJZ] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
91
Meilich, supra note 89.
92
FunFair Technologies Token Creation Event Terms & Conditions, Funfair Techs. 2 (June 22, 2017), https://funfair.io/wp-content/uploads/FUN-Token-Creation-Event-Terms-V0.2.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM8J-FGDQ].
93
Funfair, Disruptive Online Gaming on the Blockchain That’s Fun, Fast and Fair 18 (2017), https://funfair.io/wp-content/uploads/FunFair-Commercial-White-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/C2J6-9LY3].
94
Id. at 13.
95
Id. at 18.
96
BitClave, [Draft] BitClave Token Sale Terms, Medium (Nov. 6, 2017), https://medium.com/bitclave/draft-bitclave-token-sale-terms-27cd2f9a6be2 [http://perma.cc/2AE3-RLP5].
97
BitClave, BitClave Token Sale Terms, Medium (Nov. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/bitclave/bitclave-token-sale-terms-f8413bf59d67 [http://perma.cc/3MDB-QDAM].
98
Tyska, Re: [ANN] [ICO] Bitclave - Decentralized Search ★ September, 15 ICO ★, Bitcoin Forum (Sept. 1, 2017), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2005370.msg21405447#msg21405447 [https://perma.cc/G9WV-2KHK].
90
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Tierion

OmiseGo

“Tierion is creating a total supply of 1 billion
(1,000,000,000) TNT tokens, of which: 35% will be
available for purchase as described above, 29% will
remain in the Company’s inventory under a lock up,
35% will be allocated to incentivize the Tierion
ecosystem, and 1% will be used to cover token sale
costs.”99
“During the crowdsale period (‘OMG token creation
period’), up to a total of USD $25 million (Maximal
Launch Quantity) equivalent of OMG are to be
created by the smart contract, all equal value and
functionality, but divided by the smart contract into
different pools, for both public and private
distribution:
Public
(i) Sale [65.1% of OMG issued]
The bulk of the OMG will be released in a sale, where
they will be sold in exchange for up to a maximum of
USD $25 million equivalent.”101

N/A

“Will there be a lock-up on tokens retained by Tierion?
Yes, these tokens will be locked up for six months. After the initial
lockup, they will be distributed 10% per quarter for ten consecutive
quarters.”100

N/A

“The token itself acts as a bond for its
activity on this blockchain, improper
activity results in the token/bond being
burned on the OMG chain. By creating a
custom chain with deep enforcement, we
are able to construct a system where
consensus rules optimize for highperformant activity.”102

“(iii) OmiseGO reserve [20% of OMG issued]
Directly released by the smart contract to OmiseGO for future costs
and uses including use for network validation as part of the
development and execution of the project. These OMG are locked
through a smart contract function and may not be transacted by
OmiseGO for a period of 1 year, starting at the end of the creation
period.
(iv) Team [9.9% of OMG issued]
Reserved for team members and key contributors who worked to
develop the ideas, supporting structures, and actual implementations
of the OmiseGO Project. These OMG are locked for 1 year.”103

“OMG will be a standard Ethereum
ERC20 token, until the OmiseGO chain
(‘OMGchain’) is launche[d]. When
OMGchain is launched, ERC20-OMG is
used as a Proof-of-Stake token on this
network. This is achieved by allocating
control of one’s the ERC20 to an ETH
contract reflecting the OMG chain.
Further improvements are possible from
reallocation of ERC20 tokens and may
be taken if it proves to be a better
design, but the current approach is to
have the ERC20 token locked into
activity on a contract on the ETH chain.
It is the responsibility of the community
to elect to allocate the ERC20 token
towards the OMG chain, as the
community has control over the
network.”104

99

Tierion Token Sale - Frequently Asked Questions, Tierion, https://tokensale.tierion.com/faq.html [http://perma.cc/AJ85-VDZR] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
Id.
101
OmiseGo, OmiseGo Crowdfunding Whitepaper 21 (2017), https://cdn.omise.co/omg/crowdsaledoc.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QJB-2NAL].
102
Joseph Poon & OmiseGo Team, Decentralized Exchange and Payments Platform 5 (2017), https://cdn.omise.co/omg/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T4P-EGN8].
103
OmiseGo, supra note 101, at 21–22.
104
Id. at 20.
100
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Aragon

0x

“70/15/15 distribution: 70% will go to purchasers,
15% to the Foundation, and 15% to the founders and
early contributors who have worked on the
project. . . .
We want our token sale to last so we can onboard to
our community as much people as we can. So
uncapped was the obvious choice.
But since we don’t want another The DAO scenario
to happen, a security cap is a must.
So we will place a hidden cap. The cap will be
cryptographically sealed, and revealed after the sale.
If it’s reached, we will issue an emergency stop that
will stop the acceptance of new purchases.
Since we take security seriously, we will also set a
hardcoded cap into the sale contract, just in case.”105
“ANT will continue to be minted by the network
following the initial sale and network deployment.
Minting new tokens will have a cost, and a percentage
of the fees (decided by governance) paid by
organizations to join the network will fund the
minting of new tokens. This creates an incentive for
Aragon organizations to pay fees, as organizations
that contribute more will receive more ANT. . . .
The cost to mint new tokens will be determined by
ANT token holders. This will likely be a contentious
decision, and one where the basic economic
principles of supply and demand need to be
considered. For example, consider the scenario
where the cost of minting tokens is too low. More and
more tokens will be added to the supply, until supply
greatly outweighs demand. This is a recipe for
inflation and the value of individual ANT tokens will
fall. Ultimately, we believe that token holders will
eventually decide on a healthy equilibrium for
inflation. By weighing the opinion of every
stakeholder, the market will accurately reflect the
optimal minting cost.”106
“Company will create 1,000,000,000 ZRX shortly
before the Token Sale. No additional ZRX will be
created.”109

N/A

“70/15/15 distribution: 70% will go to purchasers, 15% to the
Foundation, and 15% to the founders and early contributors who
have worked on the project. The founder and early contributors will
all have vesting.”107

“The Aragon Network Token (ANT) will
initially begin as an upgradable token,
but will evolve to serve as the
governance token for the Aragon
Network when deployed. . . . In terms of
architecture, the Aragon Token has a
controller which can manage its critical
functionality (for example, minting new
tokens). During the sale period, the
smart contract running the sale serves as
the token controller.
Once the sale is complete, a placeholder
contract will take over as controller
(does not perform any critical
functions). The placeholder controller
will transfer controller power to the full
Aragon Network after deployment. The
Aragon developers core group will
deploy the Aragon Network’s code when
appropriate and the token will serve as a
governance mechanism.”108

“In the event that not all Sale ZRX have
been sold by the Token Sale End Date, the
remaining ZRX will be transferred to
Company.”110

“120,250,000 ZRX will be allocated to Company’s founding team
(with a 4 year vesting schedule and one year cliff) as compensation
for their efforts on the 0x Protocol.”111

N/A
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Luis Cuende, Aragon Network Token Sale Terms, Aragon Project Blog (Apr. 21, 2017), https://blog.aragon.one/aragon-network-token-sale-terms-8998f63a3429 [https://perma.cc/EDB4-84EJ] [hereinafter Cuende, Sale Terms].
Luis Cuende & Jorge Izquierdo, Aragon Network: A Decentralized Infrastructure for Value Exchange, ChainWhy (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.chainwhy.com/upload/default/20180705/49f3850f2702ec6be0f57780b22feab2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA58-F3YY]
107
Cuende, Sales Terms, supra note 105.
108
Luis Cuende, Introducing the Aragon Community Multisig, Aragon Project Blog (May 15, 2017), https://blog.aragon.one/introducing-the-aragon-community-multisig-348a69d16374 [https://perma.cc/GP52-4YAN].
109
ZeroEx Int’l, ZeroEx Terms of Token Sale 14 (2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
110
Id.
111
Id.
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Enjin

BlockV

“Only one billion ENJ tokens will ever be created.”112

“The total number of tokens released during both
the main sale and pre-sale events will add up to 35%
of the total supply of V.
During the main sale event, 1 billion V will be
released for sale to the public. The sale will continue
for 5 days, with a hard cap of $20 million. The final
price per token will depend on the total sum raised in
the main sale, with a maximum price of $0.02 per
token.”115

N/A

“Enjin Coin Platform tokens that are owned by the Company will not
be sold for less than the public crowdsale price.
Enjin Coin Platform and Company Staff Tokens will be locked for 6
months after the end of the Token Sale. Advisor tokens will be
locked for 2 months after the end of the Token Sale.”113
“Team tokens are locked for the first 6 months, and will be vested
over a period of 24 months total. Team members will be transferred
25% of their tokens after 6 months, and then 12.5% every 3 months
afterward. The team list may be updated during the 24 month vesting
period.
Advisor tokens are locked for 2 months and distributed fully.”114
“15% of the tokens will be locked up long term. To ensure long-term
success of our project, this portion of the tokens will be locked up for
6 years with some vesting starting at year 3. We have absolute
confidence in our project and are fully dedicated to the spread
vAtoms throughout the world and having this reserve will be the best
way to add further fuel to this vision in the future.
25% of the tokens will be reserved for incentives to promote the use
of BLOCKv and vAtoms. These tokens will be used to reward
developers for devising innovative uses for vAtoms, and to reward
vAtom end-users for performing specific actions. The diving goal is to
proliferate the use of vAtoms all over the world and across many
industries. These tokens will be locked up for 2 years, with 1/5th
being available after the token sale and 1/5th being unlocked every 6
months thereafter to ensure regular and timely incentives.
25% of the tokens will be held by the company with a portion going
to the development team, early contributors and advisors over time.
We believe that rewarding our supporters appropriately will
ultimately contribute to our project’s success in the long-term. These
tokens will be locked up for 2 years, with 1/5th being available after
the token sale and 1/5th being unlocked to the company every 6
months thereafter.”116

N/A

112

N/A

N/A

Enjin Pte. Ltd., Enjin Crowdsale Terms and Conditions, Enjin Coin 13 (Aug. 28, 2017), https://enjincoin.io/enjincoin_crowdsale_terms.pdf [http://perma.cc/3NYA-JNLG].
Id.
114
Enjin Pte. Ltd., Enjin Coin White Paper 30 (2017), https://enjincoin.io/enjincoin_whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/WG69-2U6K].
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Reeve Collins, Lukas Fluri & Gunther Thiel, BLOCKv: Smart Virtual Goods on the Blockchain, White Paper Database 23, https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/BLOCKv-VEE-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNN3-7GYC] (last
visited Feb. 10, 2019).
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COIN-OPERATED CAPITALISM
FinShi Capital

“The amount of issued tokens will depend on the
sum raised in dollars according to the rate 1 USD = 1
token.
Minimum capital – $30,000,000. Minimum sum of the
issued tokens = 30,000,000.
Maximum Capital – $50,000,000. Maximum sum of
the issued tokens = 50,000,000.”117

UTRUST

Token Pool Supply

Target Coin

“TGTCoin plans to issue 2 Bn coins. 1.34 Bn coins
are available to the public and 260 Mn coins are held
by the management team and 400 Mn coins are held
by the pre-ICO investors.”123
“As a POS cryptocurrency, ATB Coin will start with an
open ICO. During the ICO anyone will be able to
purchase ATB Coin tokens and also can receive a
certain number of ATB Coins as a bonus. The total
number of coins that are offered to the public during
the ICO equals a number of coins in the genesis
block, which is 50,000,000 ATB.”124

ATB Coin

500,000,000 (five
hundred million)119

“FinShi Capital takes on the obligation of
buying back the tokens through the fund’s
profits, thus implementing dividend policy.
Once the fund announces an exit from a
portfolio company, there will be created a
queue of investors who applied for selling
their tokens back to the fund. The amount
of tokens for buy-back will be announced
together with the exit date. . . .
The fund will buy out the tokens within
one month after the exit from a startup.
After that the tokens will be destroyed.”118
“Each time a buyer pays with any
cryptocurrency via the UTRUST payment
platform a percentage of the transactional
fee will be used to buyback UTK and to
remove them from the market. The
removed tokens will be burned. This will
reduce the amount of UTK supply further
driving demand, the adoption of the
platform and the value for contributors.
The amount of UTK was projected to be
reduced from the initial 1 billion to a
minimum cap of 100 million, at a rate no
faster than 50 million a year.”120
N/A

N/A

N/A

“50M
UTRUST
Diluted 2% per year during the next 5 years
100M
PRE-SALE
Private Investors (1 year vesting)”121

“At the beginning the tokens will not
have any features. The use as a means of
payment will only be possible after the
regulatory status of the UTRUST
platform has been clarified with
FINMA.”122

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
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Id. at 33.
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ATB Coin, ATB Coin Whitepaper 7 (2017), https://atbcoin.com/docs/ATBCoin_WhitePapper_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP83-93A3].
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Giga Watt

“If a cap of 30,000,000 WTT tokens sold is reached
before the scheduled end of the Token Launch,
Cryptonomos at its own discretion may issue WTT
tokens ahead of the specified date to provide access
to the facilities built by that time.”125

“WTT tokens retained for distribution to the team will be distributed
only when no proceeds from over-subscribed tokens remain in
escrow awaiting the completion of additional processing center
capacity construction. WTT tokens retained for distribution to
partners and advisors will be distributed on a case by case basis.”126

N/A
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Giga Watt, Giga Watt Token Launch White Paper 16 (2017), https://wtt.cryptonomos.com/white-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/77PZ-BP9X].
Id. at 19.
127
Id. at 17.
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“4.1 Replacement. The contract owner
can relinquish the ownership in favor of
any other Ethereum user or contract.
4.2 Blockade. The contract owner can
stop or resume token transfers between
token holders at any time. . . .
5.2 Limits. Maximum allowed tokens in
circulation and may be set and are
limited to.”127

